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Abstract 
This thesis is the first major study of the UK Supreme Court’s use of 
jurisprudence from foreign domestic courts in human rights cases. It 
contributes to the debate on judicial comparitivism by asking when, how and 
why the Supreme Court uses foreign jurisprudence, as well as whether the 
Court should be making greater use of it. 
 
The research findings are drawn from quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
judgments handed down by the Supreme Court during its first four years 
(2009-2013). These are supported by evidence obtained through interviews 
with ten Justices of the Supreme Court, one Lord Justice of Appeal and the 
eight Supreme Court Judicial Assistants.  
 
In the absence of legislative guidance, the use of foreign jurisprudence is 
neither consistent nor systematic. Different Justices use foreign 
jurisprudence to different degrees and for different reasons. The main use of 
foreign jurisprudence is as a heuristic device: it provides the Justices with a 
different analytical lens through which to reflect on their own reasoning about 
a problem. Some Justices also use foreign jurisprudence when interpreting a 
common legislative scheme and to support their conclusions. As a result, the 
Justices use foreign jurisprudence differently according to the audience to 
whom their reasons are addressed. Thus foreign jurisprudence can assist the 
Supreme Court to enter into dialogue with the Strasbourg Court. However, 
this thesis does not support theories of transjudicial dialogue with other 
domestic courts; the evidence does not indicate that the Supreme Court 
considers itself to be part of global conversation. Further, the use of foreign 
jurisprudence is limited by practical barriers including, but not restricted to, 
time pressures, the availability of comparative resources and the greater use 
of plurality style judgments. These barriers are worth addressing if the 
Supreme Court is to fully utilise the heuristic value of foreign jurisprudence.  
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the use of jurisprudence from foreign 
domestic courts (‘foreign jurisprudence’) in human rights cases before the UK 
Supreme Court (UKSC). This study contributes a fresh perspective to the 
vast literature in the field and is associated with research that describes the 
use of foreign jurisprudence by domestic courts as a phenomenon that has 
given rise to a ‘migration of constitutional ideas’,1 or similar characterisations 
on the theme, such as: ‘judicial internationalisation’, 2  ‘judicial 
cosmopolitanism’,3 and ‘trans-judicialism’.4 This non-exhaustive list broadly 
describes the simple practice of judges from one jurisdiction citing 
jurisprudence from another jurisdiction. 5  There is also significant and 
important research concerning the propensity for courts to use the 
jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts as part of a ‘global dialogue’ or 
‘transjudicial dialogue’.6 The claim made by many of these works is that 
judges from different jurisdictions are in conversation with each other as to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Sujit Choudhury, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
2 Cass Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds (Princeton University Press 2009); Richard 
Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press 2008). 
3 The Hon. Mr. Justice John L. Murray, C.J., ‘Judicial Cosmopolitanism’ [2008] (2) Judicial 
Studies Institute Journal 1; Richard Posner, How Judges Think, ibid. 
4 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 39 University of 
Richmond Law Review 99; A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2004); Justice 
L’Hereux-Dube, ‘The Importance of Dialogue: Globalisation and the International Impact of 
the Rehnquist Court’ (1998) 34 Tulsa Law Journal 15. 
5 See also Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts (Hart Publishing 2013); 
Sam Muller and Sydney Richards (eds), Highest Courts and Globalisation (Hague Academic 
Press 2010); Antoine Hol et al, ‘Special Issue on Highest Courts and Transnational 
Interaction’ (2012) 8(2) Utrecht Law Review 1. 
6 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ ibid; David S Law and 
Wen-Chen Chang, ‘The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue’ [2011] Washington Law Review 
523. 
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the interpretation and development of certain legal norms. As Bell has 
recently written, the use of foreign jurisprudence: 
is taken to be one of the indicators that legal systems are not self-
contained but develop as a result of ideas coming from outside as 
well as from inside the system. In addition, it is seen as evidence 
of the increasing globalisation of the law. Such potentially 
expansive claims from the importance of comparative law as a 
judicial method of decision-making need to be put in context.7  
 
Generally, researchers agree that judges have shown an increasing 
willingness to draw from a wealth of jurisprudence in the course of domestic 
adjudication. Slaughter has claimed that ‘[c]ourts are talking to one another 
all over the world’.8 In a valuable comparative volume titled Judicial Recourse 
to Foreign Law’, Markesinis and Fedtke wrote of foreign law’s ‘overt’ 
influence in Canada, Germany and South Africa and its ‘covert’ influence in 
France and Italy.9 Much has been written about the comparative approach of 
the Israeli Supreme Court, which is now well known for its reliance on foreign 
jurisprudence.10 Foreign jurisprudence has even found its way into a handful 
of judgments from the United States Supreme Court, which is usually given 
as the paradigmatic example of insularity.11   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 John Bell, ‘Comparative law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’ [2012] CJICL 20, 20. 
8 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 39 University of 
Richmond Law Review 99, 99. 
9 Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke (eds), Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A new source of 
inspiration? (University College London Press 2006). 
10  See e.g. Daphne Barak-Erez, 'The International Law of Human Rights and Constitutional 
Law: a case study of an expanding dialogue' (2004) 2(4) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 611. 
11 Atkins v Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304; Grutter v Bollinger (2003) 539 U.S. 306; Lawrence v 
Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558; Roper v Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551. These high profile 
decisions on the death sentence, criminalised sodomy and abortion that is responsible for 
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The use of foreign jurisprudence in UK domestic courts, however, has been 
given relatively little attention by researchers in the past. It is simply not clear 
that use of foreign jurisprudence matters. The aim of this research is 
therefore to provide evidence on the extent to which the UKSC makes 
references to foreign jurisprudence, as well as the reasons or purposes for 
which foreign jurisprudence is used. The following research questions are 
answered: Does the Supreme Court consider foreign jurisprudence in human 
rights cases? How is the jurisprudence used? For what purpose does the 
Supreme Court use foreign jurisprudence? What effect has the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) had on the use of foreign jurisprudence? And should 
the Court be making greater use of these sources? Questions of this kind 
have been considered in the context of other jurisdictions, 12  but few 
researchers have focused on the United Kingdom. This thesis therefore 
provides insights to questions that have not previously been given significant 
attention in the UK context. 
 
A detailed account of the existing literature and an explanation as to how this 
thesis is to be distinguished among the most relevant works is provided in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
much of the literature by exposing sharply divided opinion on the use of foreign jurisprudence 
in matters involving the interpretation of the Constitution. See e.g. Sujit Choudhry (ed), The 
Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University Press 2006) 2: ‘Advocates of the 
migration of constitutional ideas, however, appear to have gained the upper hand’. Cf Gordon 
A Christenson, ‘Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection 
analyses’, (1983) 52 Cincinnati Law Review 3, 5: ‘most united states courts … show less 
inclination now than at the beginning of the Republic to use sources of foreign and 
international customary law to aid interpretation, especially in constitutional cases’; Bruce 
Ackerman, ‘The Rise of World Constitutionalise’ (1997) 83 Virginia Law Review 771, 772: 
‘The typical American judge would not think of learning from an opinion by the German or 
French constitutional court’. 
12 E.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges (Hart Publishing 2013); James Allan, Grant Huscroft and Nessa Lynch, 
'The citation of overseas authority in rights litigation in New Zealand- How much bark? How 
much bite?' (2007) 11 Otago Law Review 433. 
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chapter two. There it is explained that empirical research on the use of 
foreign jurisprudence in the UK is rare and that no one study has provided a 
detailed account of the practice. It follows that one of the most significant 
contributions made by this thesis to the existing literature in this field is the 
empirical data, gathered from analyses of the Supreme Court’s judgments as 
well as through interviews with ten Justices of the Supreme Court, one Lord 
Justice of Appeal and the eight Supreme Court Judicial Assistants (JAs). A 
detailed account of the research methodology is provided in chapter three. 
 
One of the main arguments in this thesis is that foreign jurisprudence can 
provide a useful perspective in human rights cases. It was therefore 
necessary to establish that the Supreme Court may legitimately use these 
sources. To that end, it is explained in chapter four that there are no rules 
governing the judicial use of foreign jurisprudence, whether in human rights 
cases specifically or other cases more generally. While the HRA 1998 
provides that courts must ‘take into account’ the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, the Act is silent on 
the use of jurisprudence from the domestic courts of other jurisdictions. UK 
Courts are under no duty or obligation to follow the decisions of a foreign 
domestic court, but neither are these sources prohibited. Instead, foreign 
jurisprudence is merely ‘persuasive’ precedent and judges are free to use 
foreign jurisprudence in any manner that is thought to be helpful. 
 
The non-binding status of these sources can give rise to criticisms—often 
raised in the United States debates—that the use of foreign jurisprudence is 
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instrumental and opportunistic.13 One of the main conclusions is that the 
UKSC does appear to use foreign jurisprudence in this way, but that this itself 
is not problematic. Chapter four closes with an explanation that the use of 
foreign jurisprudence per se is not the problem. Rather, concern about the 
legitimacy of the practice usually stems from a perception that courts are 
liable to use foreign jurisprudence in an unprincipled and unsystematic way. 
If that is the case, the risk is that foreign jurisprudence may mask judicial 
creativity or obscure political judgments that a court might be minded to 
make. In other words, it is uncertainty about the reasons for using foreign 
jurisprudence that is likely to attract criticism.14 The aim in chapters five, six, 
seven and eight is therefore to identify the way in which foreign jurisprudence 
is used at the Supreme Court and the purposes that these sources serve.  
 
Chapter five sets out the reality of citations of foreign jurisprudence at the 
Supreme Court, by reference to empirical research. The data is important: as 
one recent publication in the field notes, ‘studies have focused extensively on 
the theoretical aspects of this practice … while empirical analysis of the 
frequency and meaning of citations remain generally still rare’.15 The data 
demonstrates that judges are using the jurisprudence of foreign domestic 
courts and that there are some clear patterns to the use. The main finding is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 E.g. Richard Posner, 'No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws' Legal Affairs July/Aug 
2004 http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp 
accessed 01 February 2011; Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas 
(Cambridge University Press 2006); Yash Ghai, ‘Sentinels of Liberty or Sheep in Woolf's 
Clothing? Judicial Politics and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights’ (1997) 60 MLR 459. 
14 Elaine Mak recently concluded that there was a lack of a systematic approach in the use of 
foreign legal materials at the UK Supreme Court: ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign 
law?’ (2011) CLJ 420, 449. 
15 Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, above n 12. 
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that—because there are no formal rules governing the use of foreign 
jurisprudence—the Justices have developed their own practices. Whether or 
not foreign jurisprudence is used is dependent on the approach of each 
individual Justice. For example, Lord Collins is known to be a more 
enthusiastic user of foreign jurisprudence, particularly from the United States 
of America. It is not surprising, therefore, that a larger proportion of cases 
contained explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence prior to Lord Collins’ 
retirement in 2011, with a steady decline in citation numbers between 2011 
and 2013. The decline in the use of foreign jurisprudence in human rights 
cases may otherwise be explained by developments in judgment styles. In 
particular, it is clear that the rise of plurality style judgments at the Supreme 
Court is likely to have had an effect: 16  the proportion of plurality style 
judgments including citations of foreign jurisprudence is much smaller than in 
cases which comprise a full set of separate judgments.  
 
Other practical considerations also affect the way that foreign jurisprudence 
is used at the Supreme Court. The interview evidence confirms that the Court 
is still highly dependent on counsel’s submissions, although some Justices 
also introduce foreign jurisprudence through their own research. 
Nevertheless, the most obvious variant is that some Justices simply have a 
greater interest in foreign jurisprudence than others, which is often a product 
of personal connections with a particular jurisdiction. However, this thesis 
does not support theories of ‘transjudicial dialogue’ as expressed in much of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Briefly, in this work a plurality style judgment includes a single ‘judgment of the court’, a 
leading judgment with which all have agreed or a single judgment with which others in the 
majority agree. See further n 190 below. 
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the literature.17 While citations of foreign jurisprudence are mostly drawn from 
a small family of courts, it is not found that the UKSC considers itself to be 
part of a global conversation. A more realistic conclusion is that foreign 
jurisprudence is used as a heuristic device; the Justices use foreign 
jurisprudence instrumentally and only when helpful.  
 
The use of foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device is the subject of 
chapter six. Some of the classical explanations for the use of foreign 
jurisprudence fall into this category. A clear example of this is the popular 
theory that judges would be most likely to use foreign jurisprudence in order 
to fill ‘gaps’ in the indigenous case law. However, it is not accepted that the 
‘gap-filling’ accurately explains the use of foreign jurisprudence at the UKSC. 
Although the Justices might be likely to consider foreign jurisprudence in 
those situations, filling the ‘gap’ is not the aim of the exercise. Rather, it is 
argued that the some Justices use foreign jurisprudence as an analytical 
lens, to help elucidate the issues or to seek reassurance about a conclusion 
reached independently of foreign jurisprudence. The purpose served by 
foreign jurisprudence in these circumstances is either to provide an 
opportunity for reflection or to form ‘part of the process of reaching a more 
fully theorised … agreement’.18  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17  E.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’ (1994) 39 
University of Richmond Law Review 99; A New World Order (Princeton University Press 
2004); Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges (Hart Publishing 2013). 
18 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’ in Esin Örücü and 
David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing 2007) 371, 374. 
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The only evidence for the ‘gap-filling’ theory might be the tendency to review 
foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases where the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence was unhelpful or non-existent. Foreign jurisprudence may 
nevertheless be used to confirm the Strasbourg position and the Court has 
shown willingness to use those sources to that end. This is also affected by 
the well-reported tendency to elevate clear and constant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence to a status of binding, rather than persuasive, authority.19 
Chapter seven explains that this is to do with a drive towards uniformity 
among the states signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The most obvious purpose for using foreign jurisprudence is as a 
tool to identify a consensus in cases where it is necessary to maintain a 
uniform interpretation of a common instrument. Thus where there is clear and 
constant Strasbourg jurisprudence, the Supreme Court is likely to follow it.  
 
One effect of the HRA duty to ‘take into account’ the relevant Strasbourg 
case law has therefore been to reduce the number of references to the 
jurisprudence of other foreign courts. The logic is intelligible: the conclusions 
of foreign courts interpreting similar but distinct instruments would not 
necessarily ensure compatibility with the ECHR, as the UK courts are bound 
to do. Thus even where it would be of interest to the Supreme Court to review 
the position of the other states signatory to the Convention, it is argued that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 E.g. Roger Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to 
Strasbourg?’ [2004] PL 725; Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg? The British 
Judiciary’s Approach to Interpreting Convention Rights’ [2005] EPL 405; Francesca Klug and 
Helen Wildbore, ‘Follow or lead? The Human Rights Act and the European Court of Human 
Rights’, (2010) 6 EHRLR 621; Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention 
Rights’, Lecture at University College of London’s Judicial Institute (London, 14 December 
2011). 
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the Court prefers to accept the results of the supranational (Strasbourg) 
court’s research on the point.  
 
The effect of the existence of a supranational court on the use of foreign 
jurisprudence is made clearer still by a review of the cases where no such 
court exists. The second half of chapter seven provides examples of the 
Supreme Court’s greater willingness to use foreign jurisprudence in such 
cases. It is explained that the emphasis on maintaining uniformity among 
contracting states is particularly prevalent when the court is interpreting an 
international instrument with no supervisory body. Nevertheless, anxieties 
remain about the legitimacy of references to foreign jurisprudence, especially 
if the use of those sources lead to an interpretation that unduly enlarges the 
scope of rights or the obligations under the common instrument in question. 
In part, this risk also explains the Supreme Court’s reluctance to make 
advances on the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
 
There is, however, some evidence that deference to Strasbourg may be on 
the decline. The Supreme Court is showing greater willingness to reject the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence where it is unhelpful or at odds with the 
constitutional arrangements in the United Kingdom. This is most obvious in 
cases where the Strasbourg jurisprudence has been thought to be out-dated; 
implicit in the construction of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ is the 
presumption that domestic courts may properly conclude that Convention 
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jurisprudence has lost its relevance with age. 20  Other opportunities for 
divergence are created by the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine or the 
accuracy, clarity and reasoning of the Strasbourg jurisprudence itself. In such 
cases foreign jurisprudence may provide a valuable and underused 
perspective on the Strasbourg jurisprudence, especially where the relevant 
case law of that court is unclear, unhelpful or has misunderstood some 
aspect of domestic law. It is argued in chapter eight that foreign 
jurisprudence can lend confidence to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in these 
cases, ensuring that the Court is not simply a ‘Strasbourg surrogate’.21 
Viewed in this way, the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts is more 
valuable than has so far been considered. By taking those sources into 
account, the Justices may begin to take a more theorised approach to human 
rights cases, working with the Strasbourg Court in human rights cases, rather 
than under it.  
 
It is concluded that the Supreme Court’s use of foreign jurisprudence is both 
legitimate and appropriate. The perspective offered by these sources is a 
valuable tool and could assist the Supreme Court to realise its full potential: 
to develop the domestic law of human rights which many hoped the HRA 
1998 would foster.  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 [31]. 
21 R (Prolife Alliance) v BBC [2002] EWCA Civ 297; [2002] 2 All ER 756, 771-772; also Roger 
Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ 
[2004] PL 725; Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ above n 19. 
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1.1 A note about style 
The lack of any single gender neutral pronoun in the English language has 
led many writers to forge a sense of equality by using ‘they’ or ‘their’, rather 
than ‘him’, ‘her’, ‘his’ or ‘her’. This approach is not adopted in this thesis. 
Instead, the masculine should generally be taken to include the feminine 
wherever there may be ambiguity about the gender of the subject. The 
choice of masculine over feminine has been made only on the basis that 
there is, at the time of writing, just one female Justice of the Supreme Court. 
Using the feminine pronoun when talking about judicial practices may 
therefore give the unintended impression that Baroness Hale is always the 
subject of the sentence in point. It was felt that a better balance would be 
achieved by dividing this attention among the male Justices, especially where 
anonymity was to be preserved.  
 
An inconsistency also lies with the treatment of numbers. In this thesis, 
numbers are written both as numerals and words depending on the nature of 
the passage and analysis. The widely adopted rule about spelling out single-
digit whole numbers is therefore occasionally ignored when discussing 
quantitative data, as in chapter five.  
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2 The existing literature 
Two centuries ago Friedrich Karl von Savigny wrote of his despair that 
England, which ‘in all other branches of knowledge actively communicating 
with the rest of the world, should, in jurisprudence alone, have remained 
divided from the rest of the world, as if by a Chinese wall’.22 In tune with the 
relative reluctance to compare there was, as one great comparative scholar 
has put it, ‘a remarkable dearth of comparative law teachers, books and 
articles’.23 In the late twentieth century, the citation of foreign case law in 
domestic courts grew immeasurably and in the early 1990s, the late Lord 
Bingham wrote his hopeful prognosis that the decade would ‘be remembered 
as the time when England … ceased to be a legal island, bounded to the 
north by the Tweed…’.24 There now exists a vast literature on comparative 
law.25 As one of the current Justices of the Supreme Court, Lord Mance, has 
recently recognised, ‘[i]ncreasing attention has been paid over recent years 
to the basis on which judges use foreign authority’.26 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 As quoted in Tom Bingham, ‘There is a World Elsewhere: the Changing Perspectives of 
English Law’ (1992) 41 ICLQ 513, 514; Tom Bingham, The Business of Judging: Selected 
essays and speeches (Oxford University Press 2000), 88. 
23 Basil Markesinis (ed), Foreign Law & Comparative Methodology: a subject and a thesis 
(Hart Publishing 1997), 2. 
24 Tom Bingham, ‘There is a World Elsewhere’, above n 22, 514. 
25 E.g. Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 
3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1998), Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative 
Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing 2007); Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday, (eds), 
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press 2003); 
John Henry Merryman and David S Clark, Comparative Law: Western European and Latin 
American Legal Systems. Cases and Materials (Bobbs-Merrill 1978); David Nelken (ed), 
Comparing Legal Cultures (Dartmouth 1997). 
26 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), 
Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 
2013), 87. 
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Markesinis, in particular, has been responsible for notable contributions on 
both foreign and comparative law. He has published valuable work on the 
convergence in certain legal subjects across a number of jurisdictions,27 on 
the opportunities offered by comparative law in a ‘shrinking world’ and,28 
most recently, with Fedtke on judicial recourse to foreign jurisprudence.29 The 
literature on comparative methodology is rarely framed in a way that directly 
addresses the judicial use of foreign jurisprudence in domestic courts, 
making Markesinis’ latest publication of particular interest. However, like 
most of the literature, the scope is largely restricted to private law.30  
 
In public law—and in human rights cases specifically—Groppi and 
Ponthoreau have made one of the most relevant contributions in a volume 
titled The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges.31 As the 
editors of that volume point out, studies cataloguing the different approaches 
adopted by constitutional or supreme courts in their use of foreign 
jurisprudence are relatively rare. The volume therefore reports on the citation 
practices of different constitutional or supreme courts in both common and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Basil Markesinis (ed), The Gradual Convergence (Clarendon Press 1994). 
28  Basil Markesinis, Comparative Law in the Courtroom and in the Classroom (Hart 
Publishing 2003) 
29 Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke (eds), Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law, above n 9; Sir 
Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke, ‘The Judge as a Comparatist’ (2005) 80 Tulane Law 
Review 11. 
30 E.g. Richard Fentiman, Foreign Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press 1998); 
Shaheed Fatima, Using International Law in Domestic Courts, (Hart Publishing 2005); 
Richard Bronaugh, ‘Persuasive Precedent’ in Laurence Goldstein, Precedent in Law 
(Clarendon Press 1987) 217; Albert Kiralfy. ‘The Persuasive Authority of American Rulings in 
England,’ (1948-9) XXIII Tulane Law Rev 209; Tom Bingham, ‘There is a World Elsewhere: 
the Changing Perspectives of English Law’ (1992) 41 ICLQ 513. 
31 Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges (Hart Publishing 2013). 
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civil law traditions.32 Sixteen chapters report on the use of foreign precedents 
by a particular court. All chapters follow a quantitative approach and provide 
results on: the number of decisions citing foreign case law; the number of 
citations (generally and from each jurisdiction cited); the number of citations 
to foreign precedents in cases dealing with human rights and institutional 
issues; and the number of citations in majority or minority opinions. The 
research illustrates that citations of foreign case law are most common in 
human rights decisions.33 The volume also includes visual representations of 
the empirical research to demonstrate the different courts’ citation practice 
and behavioural patterns. The clarity afforded by these visual representations 
in part inspired the inclusion of similar representations in this thesis, 
explained further in the research methodology below. 
 
However, unlike the approach taken in this thesis, the editors of The Use of 
Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges chose to direct attention only at 
explicit citations. The editors of that volume explain the omission of results on 
implicit citations on the basis that it would require significant extra-judicial 
research, conducted by way of interviews and questionnaires.34 Research of 
this kind has been carried out for this thesis. A lack of express citations does 
not necessarily indicate of a lack of knowledge of foreign case law by the 
judges. Focusing only on explicit citations would inevitably ignore analysis of 
non-explicit uses of foreign precedents. As the author of the chapter on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Ibid 3. 
33 Ibid 416. 
34 Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, above n 31, 7. 
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Hungary points out, ‘the frequency of citations in itself does not tell us much 
about the reasons and effects of the references, so it is extremely difficult to 
evaluate the character of the use of foreign judicial practices and cases’.35 
The chapters of the collection that do engage with these questions provide 
interesting insights, hinting at greater uses of foreign jurisprudence than is 
otherwise detectable on the face of the judgments. Lastly, the volume does 
not include a report on the United Kingdom Supreme Court. The absence is 
not explained. The potential usefulness of such a report is however noted by 
the author of the chapter on the South African Constitutional Court, pointing 
out that such a report would have assisted with her own conclusions: 
‘empirical research into the propensity of the UK court to cite South African 
courts would be needed in order to determine whether the … relationship 
between these two countries has led to cross pollination or not’.36  
 
2.1 Does the UK Supreme Court use foreign jurisprudence? 
An increasing number of works are published on the work of the UK Supreme 
Court generally and a smaller number of works have been published with 
specific reference to the use of foreign jurisprudence in that court.37 Mak has 
made the most relevant contributions in two articles and one recently !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Zoltán Szente, ‘Hungary: Unsystematic and Incoherent Borrowing of Law. The Use of 
Judicial Precedents in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, 1999-2010 in Tania 
Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional 
Judges, above n 31, 266. 
36 Christa Rautenbach, ‘South Africa: Teaching an ‘Old Dog’ New Tricks? An Empirical Study 
of the Use of Foreign Precedents by the South African Constitutional Court (1995-2010)’ in 
Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, above n 31, 200. 
37 The burgeoning literature on the UK House of Lords and now the UK Supreme Court was 
recognised by Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of the Judges (Hart 
Publishing 2011), 362. A helpful review of the most important works is given at 363-368. 
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published book. The articles, ‘Why do Dutch and UK Judges cite foreign law’ 
and ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the 
Netherlands: Explaining the Development of Judicial Practices’ were 
published in 2011 and 2012 respectively.38 Judicial Decision-Making in a 
Globalised World: A Comparative Analysis of the Changing Practices of 
Western Highest Courts, was published in November 2013.39  
 
In common with the approach taken in this thesis, the first of Mak’s articles is 
aimed at identifying ‘different judicial views and approaches to the use of 
foreign law’.40 To that end, Mak conducted interviews with judges from the 
UK and Netherlands supreme courts. Mak’s interviews were conducted prior 
to the interviews in this study but the article published some time after.41 For 
that reason it was, unfortunately, not possible to reflect and develop upon 
Mak’s interview results ahead of the interviews conducted for this thesis. The 
result is that some of the research findings inevitably duplicate and 
corroborate Mak’s published work. This thesis does nevertheless add to the 
interview evidence gathered by Mak, not least because a further four judges 
were interviewed, as well as the JAs.42 Further, Mak’s comparison with the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands leads to a division of attention between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’ [2011] CLJ 420; Elaine Mak, 
‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the Netherlands: Explaining 
the Development of Judicial Practices’ (2012) 8(2) Utrecht Law Review 20. 
39 Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts (Hart Publishing 2013). 
40 Ibid 423. 
41 Mak explains that the UK Supreme Court Justices were interviewed in November 2009, the 
first round of interviews conducted for the purposes of this research was October-November 
2010.  
42 Mak interviewed seven Justices of the UK Supreme Court and one retired Law Lord. Ten 
Justices of the UK Supreme Court and one Lord Justice of Appeal were interviewed for the 
purposes of this thesis.  
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the two courts. As a result, Mak’s article is helpful insofar as it provides a 
broad overview of this practice, ‘mak[ing] visible the variety of views within 
specific highest courts’,43 but does not provide the in-depth analysis of the 
UK Supreme Court undertaken in this thesis.  
 
The aim of Mak’s 2012 article was to ‘explain the development of the highest 
courts' decision-making practices in light of the trend of the 
internationalisation of the law’.44 Mak draws from the interview evidence 
presented in the 2011 article in order to highlight more nuanced points about 
the working methods at the UK and Dutch Supreme Courts. Of particular 
relevance, is the finding that the use of foreign jurisprudence is highly 
dependent on ‘personal variables’:45  
The judges of the Supreme Court for the UK feel that counsel 
should bring forward all legal materials which are relevant for 
deciding the case, including foreign judgments and academic 
resources concerning foreign law. The judges sometimes do 
conduct additional research themselves or ask a judicial assistant 
to look for useful sources. Some judges put more time and effort 
into this kind of research than others. With regard to a comparison 
with non-common law jurisdictions, the judges in general conduct 
research by themselves, i.e. without the help of judicial assistants. 
Therefore, the selection of this kind of foreign sources seems to be 
very much dependent on the personal background of the judges, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’, above n 38, 449. 
44 Elaine Mak, ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the 
Netherlands…’, above n 38, 20. 
45 Ibid, 27. 
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in particular concerning the languages they master and the data 
they have access to.46 
These findings corroborate one of the main claims made in this thesis, that 
the method of foreign jurisprudence citation is not always obvious and that 
the Justices continue to take individualised approaches to the research and 
use of those sources. Mak concludes that ‘[f]urther research regarding the 
aims, methods and legitimacy of the use of foreign law can help to clarify 
what the highest national courts can and may do, and thus guide the further 
development of these courts' judicial decision-making practices’.47  
 
Much of this ‘further research’ is developed in her book Judicial Decision-
Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative Analysis of the Changing 
Practices of Western Highest Courts.48 The stated aim of that work was to 
‘offer a new perspective on a much-debated question in current legal 
scholarship: why do judges study legal sources which originated outside of 
their national legal system and how do they use arguments from these 
sources in the deciding of cases?’49 Mak’s research for the volume was 
undertaken during a similar time period as the research for this study and 
publication fell very close to the submission of this thesis. As with the two 
articles discussed above, Mak’s evidence on the UK Supreme Court is drawn 
from an analysis of decided cases as well as interviews with a number of the 
Justices. Again, some of the findings that are most closely connected to 
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46 Ibid 30. 
47 Ibid 34. 
48 Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 39. 
49 Ibid 1. 
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those given in this thesis are about the individual approaches of the judges. 
Mak writes:  
… the interviews conducted for the research make clear that 
individual judges have an important influence on the way in which 
foreign law is used in their court. The individual use of foreign law 
by judges in deliberations and in judgments, beyond the 
mandatory use of sources, depends on three main factors: legal 
tradition, language and the prestige of foreign courts. Interestingly, 
the voluntary recourse to foreign law currently does not seem to 
follow a specific logic.50 
 
However, the book can be distinguished from this study in at least one 
obvious sense: Mak’s work does not include a quantitative analysis of the 
use of foreign jurisprudence by the examined highest courts.51 Further, the 
research parameters are broader than in this thesis, drawing from 
comparative study of the highest courts in five legal systems: United 
Kingdom, Canada, United States, France and the Netherlands.52 Finally, 
Mak’s findings about the use of foreign jurisprudence in the UK Supreme 
Court contribute to a wider analysis of trends in globalisation and the 
interaction between the studied courts. Nevertheless, Mak’s work is a 
valuable contribution to the literature in this field and the similarity of the 
research findings and main claims provide strong support for the conclusions 
drawn in this thesis. 
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50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid 8. 
52 Ibid 2. 
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Another closely related publication, ‘Comparative law in the Supreme Court 
2010-11’, was published by Bell in 2012. In that article, Bell builds on Mak’s 
2011 research and considers the use of foreign jurisprudence during the 
second year of the Supreme Court’s activity. He identifies a number of cases 
handed down by the Supreme Court during 2010-11, in which references 
were made to foreign jurisprudence. Interestingly, Bell finds that there was a 
paucity of decisions in that year directly discussing foreign jurisprudence but 
that this actually ‘reflects the recent analyses of the widening horizons of UK 
judges’.53 Bell’s conclusions are that ‘the Supreme Court is very open to 
looking at a variety of sources when value can be added to the justifications 
for their decisions by doing so’.54 However, the scope for analysis is limited, 
confined to just four pages. It is the aim in this thesis to develop this analysis 
further and consider the full first four years of the Supreme Court’s activity.    
 
Additional insight has been given by the recently published Comparative 
Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, authored by Michael Bobek. The 
volume was also published towards this end of the time period for this study. 
In that work, Bobek considers both ‘mandatory’ and ‘voluntary’ or ‘non-
mandatory’ uses of foreign legal rules. The former, it is explained, includes 
‘instances in which the national courts are obliged, by virtue of domestic law, 
to use foreign legal rules in deciding cases’.55 The latter two would include 
‘references to foreign sources’ which represent ‘the choice of the national !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 John Bell ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’ [2012] 1.2 CJICL 20, 24. 
54 Ibid 24. 
55 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 21. 
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judge to use the foreign as a source of inspiration for devising a solution 
and/or justifying a solution’.56 Bobek explains that the focus is on the use of 
‘non-mandatory comparative arguments’ by supreme courts in five 
jurisdictions: England and Wales, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia.57  The purpose of the chapter titled ‘England and Wales’ is to 
examine the theory and the practice of comparative reasoning in the English 
courts.58 In that chapter, Bobek also presents some empirical evidence from 
the UKSC’s activity although the evidence is limited to an analysis of one 
judicial year, 2010-11.59 Bobek’s feeling was that the ‘mainstream opinion’ 
among the English judiciary could be said to be ‘one of “reserved optimism” 
vis-à-vis the foreign: yes, helpful and most illuminating, but…’.60 
 
Some interesting research was also carried out on the use of foreign 
jurisprudence in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords (prior to the 
establishment of the Supreme Court). 61  ‘Resort to foreign constitutional 
norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with reference to terrorism 
cases’ was published by Cram in 2009 with the aim of gaining ‘a clearer 
sense of the nature of the role played by foreign human rights jurisprudence 
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56 Ibid 33. 
57 Ibid 67. 
58 Ibid 75. 
59 An analysis based on just one year runs the risk of being skewed by a-typical results. 
Indeed, as is noted in chapter five below, the findings from this research are that foreign 
jurisprudence was used in an unusually high proportion of cases during the 2010-11.  
60 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 55, 80 
(original emphasis).  
61 The Supreme Court was established by part 3 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, assuming 
the judicial functions of the House of Lords as the highest appellate court in the United 
Kingdom (other than for Scottish Criminal cases). It started work on 1 October 2009. 
 34 
in domestic judicial reasoning’.62 Cram identified and found five rulings which 
contained at least one reference to foreign jurisprudence, or, according to 
Cram’s terminology, ‘foreign constitutional norms’.63 The results of that study 
appeared to support one of the main criticisms for judicial comparativism: that 
citation of foreign jurisprudence is mainly opportunistic and results-driven. 
However Cram did not seek to interview the judges and, by his own 
admission, the conclusions are based on rather ‘limited evidence’,64 drawn 
from cases engaging the rights to liberty (Article 5 ECHR) and the right to a 
fair trial (Article 6 ECHR).65 
 
These works are valuable contributions to the literature in this field but none 
provide a systematic account of the use of foreign jurisprudence at the UK 
Supreme Court. For example, Bell found there to be a paucity of decisions 
citing foreign jurisprudence but cited just seven cases in his analysis of the 
cases decided in 2010-11.66 It is not clear whether Bell found only seven 
cases or whether he considered seven cases as an example. A similar 
picture emerges from Cram’s 2009 published study of the Article 5 and 
Article 6 claims before the Court of Appeal and House of Lords, which found 
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62 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence 
with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118. 
63 Ibid 132. 
64 Ibid 141.  
65 Ibid. At 127 Cram explained his methodology was ‘based upon searches of the Westlaw  
database of House of Lords and Court of Appeal decisions using each of the following search 
terms (i) “ terrorism” and “ Article 5” ; (ii) “ terrorism” and “ right to liberty” ; (iii) “terrorism” and 
“Article 6” and (iv) “ terrorism” and “ fair trial” . Within these search categories I have sought to 
locate all instances of judicial reference to a foreign court's ruling in the period from October 
2000 when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force’.   
66 John Bell, ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’, above n 53, 20. Bobek relied 
on Bell’s figures for 2010-11 in his analysis: Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in 
European Supreme Courts, above n 55, 90 (n 76). 
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only five judgments citing foreign jurisprudence in the years since the coming 
into force of the Human Rights Act in October 2000.67 The feeling from the 
existing studies of the use of foreign jurisprudence in UK courts is therefore 
that it is not a big factor and contributes to only a small proportion of cases. 
However these studies draw mainly from explicit citations to foreign 
jurisprudence, which cannot capture uses that didn’t convert into a full 
attribution in the published judgment. Mak’s study comes the closest to 
addressing this through her interviews with some Justices of the Supreme 
Court but also refrained from quantitative analysis of judgments, preferring to 
avoid ‘any drawbacks related to the quantitative analysis of a small research 
sample’.68 
 
2.2 Is foreign jurisprudence used in human rights cases?  
In human rights cases, the general consensus is that the frequency of judicial 
references to foreign jurisprudence is not unusual. Indeed, some 
commentators have said that judicial comparativism is seen most often in 
human rights cases,69 although it is also said that the extent to which judges 
draw from foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases varies greatly 
between jurisdictions. In this field, Örücü has made a significant contribution. 
Her edited collection, Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, brings 
together chapters on the experiences of England, France, Germany, Russia, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62. 
68 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’, above n 38, 422. 
69 See e.g. See Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational 
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20(4) OJLS 499, 527, asking ‘is there 
something specific to human rights that explains the apparently greater use of foreign case 
law in human rights cases?’ 
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Scotland, Turkey, the Commonwealth and South Africa as well as the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (previously ‘European Court of 
Justice’) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). According to 
Örücü, the reader can conclude from these studies that, in human rights 
cases at least, English and Scottish judges utilise comparativism on a much 
wider scale than judges from most other jurisdictions.70 Indeed, the coming 
into force of the HRA 1998 provided an obvious opportunity for judicial 
comparativism through section 2, which explicitly obliges domestic courts to 
‘take into account’ relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence. As Fenwick has 
written, ‘… it was always clear that the courts could also consider 
jurisprudence from other jurisdictions’.71 As Örücü had suggested earlier, 
foreign jurisprudence may provide the ‘analytical lenses’ through which 
domestic judges ‘converse’ with the international judges of the ECtHR and 
the CJEU.72  
 
Along these lines, and around the time that the HRA 1998 was coming into 
force, Sedley suggested that the HRA’s status as a domestic statute ‘opens 
the door to a wealth of jurisprudence and experience from other 
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70 Esin Örücü, 'Comparative law in British Courts' in Ulrich Drobnig and Sjef van Erp. (eds), 
The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, 14th International Congress of Comparative Law 
(Kluwer 1999). 
71 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Cavendish 2007) 192. 
72 Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National 
Committee of Comparative Law 2003). The most relevant chapter for the purposes of this 
study is Paul Kearns’ contribution, ‘United Kingdom Judges and Human Rights Cases’. 
Unfortunately, however, Kearns centres his discussion on the impact of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 on domestic judicial reasoning generally therefore precludes detailed analysis of 
judicial comparativism with jurisprudence beyond the ‘new European human rights landscape’. 
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Commonwealth, common law and European jurisdictions, as well as from the 
Strasbourg Court itself, in its interpretation and application’.73 He continued:  
It is through this rich prism that the Convention, in its turn will be 
read and applied in our courts: not as a monochrome exercise in 
textual interpretation and the application of received authority, but 
as a kaleidoscopic pattern combining the symmetry of law with the 
variety of experience.74  
 
In the context of the Scottish courts, Murdoch has commented that ‘reliance 
upon domestic solutions to domestic questions [has been] particularly acute 
… [with] little awareness of legal systems other than those closely-related 
common law systems (in particular, English law)’ because ‘Scotland … was 
(at least until recently) a small and relatively homogenised country’.75 In 
human rights cases, however, Murdoch has argued that judicial 
comparativism has greatly increased since the Scotland Act 1998 and the 
Human Rights Act 1998. These have ‘provide[d] a vessel for the use of 
comparative law analysis since domestic courts in giving effect to Convention 
rights … have to consider comparative practices in other European (and post 
Christine Goodwin, in other non-European) states’.76 It is as a result of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Stephen Sedley in Stephen Grosz, Jack Beatson and Peter Duffy, Human Rights: The 
1998 Act and the European Convention (Sweet and Maxwell 2000), foreword vii. 
74 Ibid foreword vii. 
75 Jim Murdoch, ‘Comparative Law and the Scottish judges’ in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial 
Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative 
Law, 2003), 88. 
76 Jim Murdoch, ‘Comparative Law and the Scottish judges’ above n 75, 105. In Goodwin it is 
reported that ‘[t]he Court … attaches less importance to the lack of evidence of a common 
European approach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed [by the legal 
recognition of gender re-assignment], than to the clear and uncontested evidence of a 
continuing international trend in favour not only of the increased social acceptance of 
transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals’. 
Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom (28957/95) [2002] ECHR 583, [85]. 
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HRA 1998, Murdoch submits, that ‘the use of comparative law … in the 
domestic courts is now obvious’.77  
 
Unfortunately, empirical evidence about the correlation between the citation 
of foreign jurisprudence and the type of issue is rare. As Bobek writes:  
There are no conclusive empirical studies which have, for instance, 
qualitatively studied and compared the amount of comparative 
references made by the same jurisdiction in the various areas of 
law, thus confirming or rebutting the assumption that the greatest 
amount of comparative reasoning is indeed carried out in the area 
of human rights adjudication.78 
Groppi and Ponthoreau’s edited volume made a significant contribution to 
this particular question, by reference to data gathered from a number of 
courts from jurisdictions working in the common law and civil law traditions. 
As has already been mentioned, one of the main conclusions of that volume 
was that citations of foreign case law are most common in human rights 
decisions.79 However, this is a finding which has yet to be substantiated in 
the UK context. One of the research aims for this study is therefore to 
consider the reality of any such correlation in the UKSC’s decided cases. 
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77 Jim Murdoch, ‘Comparative Law and the Scottish judges’. Above n 75, 96. 
78 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 55, 64. 
79 Ibid 416. 
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2.3 Where does foreign jurisprudence come from? 
On comparative law generally, methodological issues usually form the crux of 
academic debate. That is, which jurisdictions are compared and how one is 
to go about the exercise of comparing. Back in 1974 Otto Kahn-Freund took 
stock of the increasing comparativism and warned that ‘… in the process of 
becoming fashionable a thing gets distorted, and it is liable to be misused’.80 
Kahn-Freund was not seeking to condemn the use of comparative law. On 
the contrary, he encouraged it, seeking only to caution that it must be 
undertaken with specific regard to a number of factors beyond the legal 
systems of the countries compared. Thus scepticism about borrowing from 
other jurisdictions often stems from the perceived contextual differences, 
which are thought to preclude the possibility for useful analysis; in reality, 
local conditions produce difficulties ‘which are often subtle and require … 
sophisticated analytical tools’ to separate them from their ‘culturally-
determined realities’. 81  Lest one forget Montesquieu's denial that useful 
comparisons could be made between jurisdictions at all. His well-rehearsed 
feeling was that the law of any nation would (or should) vary according to a 
range of factors including (but not restricted to) that nation’s history and 
politics as well as the customs, religions and inclinations of its people. By its 
very nature, law was unsuited to a comparative exercise.82   
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80 Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 MLR 1. 
81 Nicholas HD Foster, ‘The Journal of Comparative Law: A New Comparative Resource’ 
<http://www.wildy.co.uk/jcl/pdfs/foster.pdf> accessed 01 December 2010. 
82 In The Spirit of the Laws Montesquieu argued that the law of any jurisdiction ‘should be so 
appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the laws of one 
nation can suit another’, Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone 
(trans. and eds.), The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge University Press 1989), 8-9.  
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This line of thought has links with concerns propounded by participants in the 
legal transplants debate, who have been emphasising the importance of 
contextual analysis for some time.83 As one commentator elegantly put it: 
[m]uch as winemakers claim  that a grape variety transplanted 
outside its native terroir produces a different wine notwithstanding 
that it remains the same plant, a transplanted law often functions 
in a different way in its new home.84  
On the subject of legislative interpretation too, the emphasis is usually upon 
reading the statute as a whole and ‘drilling down into the substratum of 
meaning’.85 Comparative methodologists take the same view and usually 
argue that if comparativism is to be meaningful, it would necessarily engage 
with even the subtlest of contextual differences since these may—even if 
indirectly—feed into the respective legislative regimes.86  
 
Given the importance attributed to the methodology of comparative law, it is 
curious that little has been said in relation to way that judges approach the 
matter, on either an empirical or on a normative level. Where it has been 
addressed, one of the common threads is a feeling that jurisdictions from 
which judges draw their sources must, above all else, be ‘fit for 
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83 See e.g. Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, 
University of Georgia Press 1993); Pierre Legrand, ‘What 'Legal Transplants'’ in David Nelken 
and Johannes Feest (eds.), Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing 2001) 55; Ian Cram, 
'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62, 122. 
84 T.T. Arvind, ‘The “transplant effect” in harmonization’ [2010] ICLQ 65, 66. 
85  Mary Arden, ‘The Changing Judicial Role: Human Rights, Community Law and the 
Intention of Parliament’ (2008) 67(3) CLJ 490. 
86 E.g. Mark Van Hoecke, Mark Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal 
Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law’ (1998) 47(3) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 495, 496: ‘… law cannot be understood unless it is placed in a 
broad historical, socio-economic, psychological and ideological context’. 
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comparison’. 87  Whether true or not, there is a perception that different 
ideological positions on human rights are taken by different jurisdictions and 
(if that is true) that drawing from one particular jurisdiction’s approach to 
human rights may be regarded as a sign of a particular orientation towards 
human rights generally.88 Thus the ‘fit for comparison’ perception has also 
been said to feed a reluctance to use foreign jurisprudence, especially where 
the domestic court suffers form a particular insularity whereby it sees its own 
jurisdiction as one which enjoys pre-eminence among civilised countries. 89 
The reluctance to draw from foreign jurisprudence in the United States is a 
good example. There it is generally agreed that the nation sees itself as a 
leader rather than a follower in the world order and this means resorting to 
the approach of other courts is unlikely: the US is known for a limited 
adherence to international law and ‘[a]n attitude lingers’ that it has ‘little to 
learn from countries whose constitutions have not reached the two-century 
mark’.90  
 
Unsurprisingly, McCrudden found that ‘it is [in the main] the judiciaries of 
liberal democratic regimes that cite each other … [t]he citation of, for 
example, Chinese cases by the [UK] House of Lords, does not seem likely’.91 
More recently, Groppi and Ponthoreau found that the practice of citing foreign 
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87 Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’ above n 69, 501. 
88 Ibid; Richard Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: the legitimacy of 
judicial intervention under the Human Rights Act 998’ [2004] PL 33, 47; Leighton McDonald, 
‘New Directions in the Australian Bill of Rights Debate’ [2004] PL 22. 
89 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norm…’, above n 62, 124. 
90 EA Mearns, ‘Emerging trends in international Constitutionalism: A Comparative Approach’, 
(1996) 28 Case Western Journal of International Law 1, 1. 
91 Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 69, 517-518. 
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jurisprudence is usually confined to a particular group or ‘family’ of courts.92 
In the UK context, Mak has written:  
For the UK Supreme Court judges, the first criterion for the 
selection of foreign judgments concerns legal tradition, in the 
sense of the shared background with other common law systems. 
Sources most often referred to come from Commonwealth legal 
systems and from the US legal system.93 
 
Jurisprudence under Bills of Rights from jurisdictions in similar legal traditions 
and that are of recent origin are likely to be especially relevant in this respect. 
Such instances are not difficult to identify: many countries with legal systems 
rooted in the common law have adopted Bills of Rights not dissimilar to the 
UK Human Rights Act. Indeed the framers of the HRA are often thought to 
have taken inspiration from some of those jurisdictions. For example, it is 
often pointed out that the Labour Party was strongly influenced by the 
Canadian position when it decided to campaign for human rights legislation.94 
Hence Feldman’s suggestion that the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
India under that country’s 1947 Constitution, those of the Court of Appeal of 
New Zealand on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and those of the 
South African Constitutional Court on the rights under South Africa’s 1993 
and 1996 African Constitutions, may all contain ‘useful insights’.95 The point 
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92 Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, above n 31, 430. 
93 Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 39, 206. 
94 E.g. Lord Irvine, ‘The legal system and law reform under Labour’ in David Bean (ed), Law 
Reform for All (Blackstone 1996) referred to in Richard Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and 
‘Democratic Dialogue’: the legitimacy of judicial intervention under the Human Rights Act 998’ 
[2004] PL 33, 45. 
95 David Feldman (ed) English Public Law (Oxford University Press 2004), 397.  
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was frequently repeated in the early literature on the HRA. Before the coming 
into force of the Act, Starmer considered jurisprudence of this kind to be 
‘invaluable’ in assisting the interpretation of Convention rights.96 A few years 
later, Lester and Clapinska wrote that ‘[t]he developing principles contained 
in the constitutional case law of courts in other common law countries…are 
likely to be at least as persuasive as the Strasbourg case law’.97 Indeed 
some of the more recent literature confirms that these jurisdictions frequently 
refer to UK jurisprudence,98 but there is little empirical research to confirm 
that the UK courts follow the same pattern.  
 
Quantitative analysis in these terms is uncommon. The most recent and 
direct attempt at empirical research on the citation of foreign jurisprudence—
The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Courts (discussed above)—
does not include a chapter on the United Kingdom experience. Mak’s work 
on the Dutch and UK Supreme Courts specifically excludes quantitative 
analysis and Bell’s 2012 piece takes a view of just one judicial year. Indeed, 
as Mak has pointed out in her most recent publication, ‘the views and 
practices of judges themselves have not been studied extensively’.99  
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96  Keir Starmer, European Human Rights Law: The Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Legal Action Group 1999) 27. 
97 Lord Lester and Lydia Clapinska ‘Human Rights and the British Constitution’ in Jeffrey 
Jowell and Dawn Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution (5th edn, Oxford University Press 
2004) 83. 
98 See e.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents 
by Constitutional Judges, above n 31. 
99 Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 39, 2.  
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One study that does give data on the use of foreign jurisprudence is 
Flanagan and Ahern’s 2011 article, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and 
Transnational Law: A Survey of Common Law Supreme Court Judges’.100 
Flanagan and Ahern find that judges in foreign jurisdictions are likely to ‘form 
a reference group’ to domestic judges adjudicating on constitutional rights.101 
However, the authors are cynical about judges citing foreign jurisprudence 
‘as a source of persuasive authority’, concluding that this is likely to ‘apply to 
only a minority of judicial comparativists’.102 Their data results also include 
some findings on the selection of foreign jurisprudence and supports the 
finding in this thesis that judges are likely to refer to a small family of courts, 
in particular those from Commonwealth jurisdictions. However, the research 
methods are quite different to those adopted in this study.  Firstly, the data is 
drawn from a number of apex courts, including but not restricted to the United 
Kingdom judges. Secondly, Flanagan and Ahern did not conduct interviews, 
explained on the practical basis that the ‘international dispersion of our 
intended subjects’ meant that interviews were not feasible.103  
 
Another notable quantitative study of UK judicial comparativism was 
undertaken by Örücü in a chapter headed 'Comparative law in British Courts', !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 Brian Flanagan and Sinead Ahern, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A 
Survey of Common Law Supreme Court Judges’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1. 
101 Ibid 28. 
102 Ibid. 
103  Ibid 9. A system of questionnaires and electronic submission were chosen as an 
alternative means of primary data collection. As explained in the methodology chapter below, 
interviews were feasible for this study and provided a distinct advantage: the possibility to 
follow up on interesting leads or to develop discussion in a way that is not possible in an 
electronic questionnaire. The point is also recognised by Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-
Making in a Globalised World, above n 39, 66. 
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published in Drobnig and van Erp’s edited collection, The Use of 
Comparative Law by Courts, 14th International Congress of Comparative 
Law.104 In that chapter, Örücü aimed not only to account for the number and 
frequency of judicial comparativism but also to detect existing patterns. She 
considered decisions published in the All ER rendered in 1972, 1982, 1992 
and between 1990-1995, finding that the proportion of references to foreign 
in law in domestic cases had increased significantly by the end of 1995.105 
Her study also revealed that the main judicial comparisons were between 
members of the common law family with frequent references to the United 
States of America and other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Further, since 
1993, references to common law jurisdictions had ‘increased four-fold’ while 
references to civil law jurisdictions had doubled.106  
 
Similar findings were given by Siems, who undertook a quantitative study of 
the Court of Appeal’s citation of foreign jurisprudence.107 Siems drew his data 
from the years between 1984 and 2006, concluding that the Court of Appeal 
referred to the jurisprudence of common law jurisdictions much more than 
non-common law jurisdictions.108 Among the common law courts that were 
most frequently referred to were (in order of the frequency of citation) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 Esin Örücü, 'Comparative law in British Courts’, above n 70, 253. 
105 From references to foreign law in 26 out of 602 cases in 1972, to 119 out of a total 285 
cases in 1995. It is worth explaining that the years 1972, 1982 and 1992 were chosen to test 
whether entry to the European Community in 1972 altered the pattern of references. Örücü 
recognised that these intervals allowed for a large chance element and included the period 
between 1990-1995 in part to correct this (but also since it was the most recent period and 
one that she felt to be long enough to attempt meaningful analysis and reliable hypotheses). 
106 Esin Örücü, 'Comparative law in British Courts', above n 70, 253. 
107 Mathias Siems, ‘Citation Patterns of the German Federal Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeal of England and Wales’ (2010) 21 KLJ 152. 
108 Siems found the Court of Appeal cited foreign common law courts in 16% of its cases 
while citations to non-common law courts were around 0.5%. 
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Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, Ireland and South 
Africa.109 Bobek also found that citations of foreign jurisprudence continue to 
be drawn from mainly common law jurisdictions. 110  It was for that reason 
that the focus of Bobek’s chapter on England and Wales was on how to 
classify such ‘intra-common law referencing’.111  
 
Notwithstanding these suggestions, a contrasting theme from the existing 
literature has actually been that reference to non-European jurisprudence in 
human rights cases has taken a back seat where the human rights issue is 
one that falls under the scope of the ECHR. In part, this has been attributed 
to the duty under section 2 HRA 1998, which requires domestic courts to 
‘take into account’ relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence. The section has been 
read as prioritising jurisprudence that the European Court would itself be 
likely to consider. The logic is intelligible: the ECHR and its jurisprudence are 
built into the structure of the HRA and therefore expressly tie domestic rights 
to those existing in the ECHR (in contrast to, say, the Canadian, Victorian 
and New Zealand experiences which do not draw from another treaty). As 
Masterman has suggested:112 
Comparative jurisprudence from those countries outside the 
Council of Europe is likely to offer little in terms of the strict 
question of judging the compatibility of a statutory provision with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 Ibid figure 5; See also Martin Gelter and Mathias Siems, ‘Networks, Dialogue or One-Way 
Traffic? An Empirical Analysis of Cross-Citations between Ten of Europe’s Highest Courts’ 
(2012) 8 Utrecht LR 88, 93. 
110 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 55, 75. 
111 Ibid. 
112  Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a 
‘municipal law of human rights’ under the Human Rights Act’ [2005] 54(4) ICLQ 907, 923. 
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the Convention rights themselves; similarly it is unlikely to point to 
the direction in which the common law should be developed to 
ensure compatibility with the Convention rights. 
 
Nevertheless, whether judges consider these as factors that influence they 
way they use foreign jurisprudence to form their domestic judgments is 
unclear. Certainly, judges do not explain their choices in these terms through 
their judgments. As Cram found:  
English judges, it seems, do little to explain why the insights of a 
particular jurisdiction might be relevant to the interpretation of 
domestic law and why those derived from other jurisdictions were 
not. The reader of these law reports searches in vain for an 
account of the criteria by which the included jurisdictions were 
deemed includable and why the excluded were considered 
excludable.113 
Like many comparative scholars, Cram’s conclusion is that ‘[u]ntil the 
methodology for selection of foreign norms is made much more explicit, the 
suspicion will linger that the court's selection of foreign judgments is purely 
results-driven’:114 
…some greater level of justification is needed from the courts as 
to why Case A from the Ruritanian Supreme Court is relevant and 
possibly even dispositive of the dispute in hand whilst Case B from 
the Freedonian Constitutional Court can be dismissed as irrelevant 
and further why the domestic court does not even bother to look at 
Case C from the High Court of Syldavia.115 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62, 140. 
114 Ibid 141. 
115 Ibid. 
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Finally, judges are themselves also likely to approach arguments with a 
number of preconceived perspectives, which may include a willingness to 
look abroad. As Cardozo famously said, it is hard for judges to remove 
themselves from ‘the empire of [their] subconscious loyalties’. 116  For 
example, some of the existing literature suggests that judges from scholarly 
backgrounds—particularly those that have studied abroad—are much more 
likely to cite foreign jurisprudence than career judges.117  
 
Dickson opens his 2013 publication, Human Rights and the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court, with the suggestion that ‘judges who are appointed tend to 
share certain characteristics, which inevitably make for a court that is 
cautious and reserved in its law-making’.118 The book is focused ‘on the 
attitudes struck by the United Kingdom’s most senior judges in relation to the 
rights set out in the Human Rights Act 1998’.119 For the purposes of this 
study, the chief interest in Dickson’s book turns on the stated aim of paying 
‘close attention to the views of individual judges in the domestic court and 
flag[ging] up the sharp differences of opinion which have often been 
expressed’.120 To that end, Dickson has identified trends and characterised 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 Benjamin N Cardozo, ‘The Nature of the Judicial Process’: Lecture IV, ‘Adherence to 
Precedent. The Subconscious Element in the Judicial Process. Conclusion’ 
<http://www.constitution.org/cmt/cardozo/jud_proc.htm> accessed 08 March 2011. 
117 Wen-Chen Chang and Jiunn-Rong Yeh, ‘Judges as Discursive Agent: The Use of Foreign 
Precedents by the Constitutional Court of Taiwan’ in Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire 
Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges, above n 31, 376. 
118 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 1. 
119 Ibid 2. 
120 Ibid. 
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the attitudes of Supreme Court Justices, through analysis of their judicial and 
extra-judicial pronouncements.121  
Life experience is particularly likely to influence Justices when they 
are confronted with human rights arguments, because those 
arguments will relate to what it is that every human being is 
entitled to expect from the state. The fact that all of the Justices 
will be of a certain age when appointed (the average age at 
appointment of those currently in post was 63) means that their 
approach to such arguments will be affected by long personal 
experience. Today’s Justices will have begun attending primary 
school in the 1950s and will not have experienced military service, 
as many of their predecessors would have done, nor the pre-
welfare state era. As adolescents, they will have lived through the 
sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s and will have benefited 
from free university education (even if prior to university 
they attended private schools). As lawyers they will have built up 
considerable financial security and numerous esteem indicators. 
They will have acquired significant legal experience, including 
perhaps as a lower level judge, before the Human Rights Act was 
enacted in 1998.122  
 
In addition, it has been suggested that law and legal practice may simply be 
in harmony with a pattern of globally inter-dependent exchanges and that  
‘just as those parties appearing before the courts interact increasingly with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid 13. Dickson notes a connected point made by Lord Neuberger in a 2011 lecture: 
‘yesterday’s judges were children of the conventional and respectful 40s and 50s, whereas 
today’s judges are children of the questioning and sceptical 60s and 70s’. See further Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury, ‘Who are the Masters Now?’ Second Lord Alexander of Weedon 
lecture, 6 April 2011 <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/mr-
speech-weedon-lecture-110406.pdf> accessed 24 November 2011, 15; Mak’s work also 
confirms that the selection of foreign sources ‘seems to be very much dependent on the 
personal background of the judges’, Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign 
law?’, above n 38, 429. 
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others beyond national boundaries, so inevitably are courts confronted with 
the existence and practices of other legal systems’.123 Comparative materials 
are increasingly accessible, and communication with practitioners and judges 
of other legal systems is increasingly easy. It is often said that greater 
convergence between legal orders is linked to the forces of globalisation.124 
Ease of travel coupled with technological developments (particularly the 
dissemination of information via the world wide web) and the growth of an 
international legal ‘community’ facilitating conversation between judges and 
practitioners from all over the world contributes to the use of foreign 
jurisprudence in domestic courtrooms.125 As Cram has suggested, electronic 
databases are likely to have had a profound effect on the citation of foreign 
legal materials and ‘it would be surprising if the results of database searches 
had not begun to filter through from counsels' submissions to court 
judgments’.126  
 
Thus the jurisdictions from which judges may draw from may often be limited 
to the sources selected and put before them by counsel.127 Analogy might be 
made with judicial reasoning on a more general level. Some time ago, for 
instance, Rudden identifed ‘four dialogues’ that take place in the process of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above, above n 62, 121. 
124  Although some commentators have been sceptical about this. William Twining was 
tempted to ban the use of the word ‘globalisation’: William Twining, ‘Globalisations and 
Comparative Law’ in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook 
(Hart Publishing 2007) 69, 70. Nelken’s introductory chapter also reminds us that 
‘globalisation can bring about difference as well as similarity’, 31. 
125 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62, 121. 
126 Ibid. 
127 See e.g. Bernhard Rudden, ‘Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia’ 
(1974) 48 Tulane Law Review 1010; Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (Macmillan Press 1982), 
chapter three; Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court 
(Hart Publishing 2013), chapter two. 
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arriving at a decision: the dialogue between the Bar and Bench; the dialogue 
amongst the Bench; the dialogue with the past (or with precedent); and the 
dialogue with the future (whereby judges may consider the consequences of 
a decisions such as any opening of ‘floodgates’).128 Alan Paterson’s valuable 
contribution in The Law Lords also provided some early insight by exposing 
the way that the judges themselves see their role and what they understand 
their processes to be.129  
 
Further observations on that theme are given in Paterson’s most recent 
publication: Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court.130 
In that book, Paterson concludes that decision-making in the UK’s top court 
is a social and collective process.131 That process, it is argued, is a product 
of several ‘dialogues’ that the Justices engage in when making their 
decisions. Aside from the main dialogue between the Justices themselves (to 
which Paterson devotes three chapters), Paterson also considers dialogues 
with counsel, with other branches of government, with lower courts, with 
academics and with the judicial assistants. A few pages are given on 
‘dialogues with courts overseas’ although these do not enter into the detail 
intended in this study and the focus is mainly on the dialogue with the 
Strasbourg Court rather than with foreign domestic courts. 132  However, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 Bernhard Rudden, ‘Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia’ (1974) 48 
Tulane Law Review 1010. 
129 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords, above n 127. 
130 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 127. 
131 Ibid 312.  
132 Ibid 222-233. 
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Paterson’s observations about the working methods at the Supreme Court 
are of clear interest and are referred to numerous times in this thesis.   
 
2.4 Why do judges use foreign jurisprudence?  
A method of study does not lend itself to definition otherwise than 
by an indication of the purposes for which it may be employed, 
and the essential problem is not—what is comparative law? The 
question of real importance is—what is its purpose?133  
Almost without exception, commentators addressing the ‘why’ in judicial 
comparativism have engaged with the concepts of comparative methodology. 
Grappling with the conceptual basis for comparativism is evidently felt to be 
an important pre-cursor to meaningful contribution. There are trends here 
too: the well rehearsed debate between ‘universalism’ and ‘pluralism’ (which 
echo the debates in human rights between universalism and cultural 
relativism) has become out-dated, although conversations continue to frame 
the possibility of a new ‘common law’ or ‘common enterprise’ which appears 
to operate in similar terms.134 More recently the debate amongst comparative 
law scholars has explained the issue as a tension between ‘functionalism’ 
and a ‘dialogic method’,135 of which functionalism was arguably the dominant !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Harold Cooke Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method 
of Legal Study and Research (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1949), 5. 
134 Often, these have led academics to consider the emergence of a regional (as opposed to 
universal) concept of human rights. See e.g. Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of 
Human Rights?’, above n 69; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial 
Communication’ above n 8, 127: there is likely to be an ‘awareness of a common enterprise, 
even if only in the sense of confrontation of common issues of problems’. 
135 The ‘dialogic method’, is a response to the functionalist approach which has gained 
currency with comparative scholarship by—it is argued—better responding to the ‘present 
context of globalizing politics’ and providing a ‘decentred view of constitutional practices 
deriving from pluralist sources, with the possibility of ‘cross fertilization’. Space precludes 
extensive analysis of these debates here.  
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approach, proceeding on the basis of ‘usefulness and need’: ‘…only a fool 
would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grown in his back garden’.136  
 
Thus it is usually argued that foreign material can contribute solutions to 
similar legal problems. Along these lines, one of the best known comparative 
lawyers wrote in 1949 that ‘at some future date more extensive use will, no 
doubt, be made of foreign law for the purpose of assisting our judges to fill 
the gaps that are still to be found in our law’.137 Lord Bingham touched on this 
explanation in his 2009 Hamlyn Lectures: 
If...it is true, as I think it is, that modern British judges are on the 
whole more inclined than their forebears to consider the effect of 
foreign authority in appropriate cases, the case should not be put 
too high. It is not easy, if indeed it is possible, to identify cases in 
which resort to foreign authority (I am excluding cases relating to 
the law of the EU, international law and human rights law) can be 
confidently said to have had a decisive effect on the outcome in 
the sense that the judge would have decided differently but for the 
foreign authority. We should not, I think, regard foreign authority 
as a match-winner, a magical ace of trumps. But there are 
perhaps two situations in which foreign authority may exert a 
significant if not a decisive influence. One is where domestic 
authority points towards an answer that seems in appropriate or 
unjust. The other is where domestic authority appears to yield no 
clear answer. In such situations...the courts have proved willing to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136 Rudolph von Jhering, Geist des Römischen Rechts auf den Verschiedenen Stufen Seiner 
Entwicklung [The Spirit of Roman Law at Different Stages of its Development], part i, 8f 
quoted in Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 
3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1998), 17.  
137 Harold Cooke Gutteridge, Comparative Law, above n 133, 40. 
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take notice of, and give weight to, solutions developed 
elsewhere.138 
Bell was evidently persuaded by the possibility in his study of the Supreme 
Court’s 2010-11 decisions, considering that R v Chaytor provided an 
example of foreign case law being used in this way (although Bell’s definition 
of foreign jurisprudence evidently encompassed Privy Council decisions, 
unlike this thesis which considers only the case law of foreign domestic 
courts).139 The gap-filling thesis also formed one of Feeley’s five purposes for 
using comparative law, alongside being educated about other legal systems, 
assisting domestic law reform, assisting in the transnational spread of norms 
and to bring about greater harmony and unity across legal systems.140   
 
Alternatively, judges may use foreign jurisprudence as a vehicle for adopting 
a more theorised approach to human rights. As one commentator has 
hypothesised, ‘[e]ven where the result of the foreign judicial approach has not 
been adopted, it has often been influential in sharpening the understanding of 
the court’s view of domestic law’.141 Another has suggested that ‘where the 
difference between comparative jurisdictions is so great as to render the use 
of comparative jurisprudence irrelevant, it may nevertheless perform a 
cognitive function … the confrontation of both legal systems may force some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 Tom Bingham, Widening Horizons (Cambridge University Press 2010), 7-8. 
139  John Bell, ‘Comparative law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’ above n 53, 23; R v 
Chaytor and others [2010] UKSC 52. 
140  Malcolm Feeley, ‘Comparative Criminal Law for Criminologists: Comparing for What 
Purpose?’ in David Nelken (ed.) Comparing Legal Cultures (Dartmouth 1997), cited in Ian 
Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62, 128. 
141 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law’ in Esin 
Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National 
Committee of Comparative Law, 2003), 17; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of 
Human Rights?’, above n 69, 512. 
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consideration and better understanding of the nature of domestic law’.142 In 
this vein, both Mak and Bell have concluded that foreign judgments provide 
‘more of a benchmark of the rightness’ for the Justices:143  
If a foreign court has decided a similar point, it is sensible to 
consider whether that solution reveals anything useful about 
whether it would be an appropriate decision in an English, Welsh, 
Scots, or Irish context.144  
Thus foreign jurisprudence is used ‘when judges want to obtain better 
knowledge or a yardstick for the judgment of the case at hand’. 145  A 
connected possibility is that judicial comparativism can perform mainly a 
‘legitimation function’. 146  In other words, judges draw from foreign 
jurisprudence in order to re-assure themselves (and their audience) about the 
merits of their judgment. Slaughter has argued that ‘[r]eferences to the 
activity of fellow courts in other states can act as … a security blanket …’,147 
and Justice Barak (of the Israeli Supreme Court) has talked of comparative 
law ‘granti[ng] comfort to the judge and giv[ing] him the feeling that he is 
treading on safe ground’.148  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
142 E.g. Luc Heuschling, ‘Comparative Law in French Human Rights Cases’ in Esin Örücü 
(ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, ibid 44; Rabinder Singh, ‘Interpreting 
Bills of Rights’ [2008] Statute Law Review 82: ‘courts are increasingly turning to comparative 
jurisprudence to better understand the content of human rights provisions’ (emphasis added). 
143 John Bell ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’, above n 53, 23. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law’, above n 38, 444; Elaine Mak, 
‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the Netherlands…’, above n 
38, 33-34. 
146 See e.g. Luc Heuschling ‘Comparative Law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights Cases’ in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, above n 
141, 47.  
147 Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 69, 519, quoting 
Anne Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, above n 8, 116. 
148  Aharon Barak, ‘Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law’, (1996) 3 Review of 
Constitutional Studies 218, 242. 
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Similarly, it has been suggested that courts have recourse to foreign material 
for pedagogical reasons. As Slaughter has said, ‘the court of a fledgling 
democracy … might look to the opinions of courts in older and more 
established democracies as a way of binding its country to this existing 
community of states’.149 The use of foreign jurisprudence may be ‘premised 
on the need to instil habits of Western democratic participation in a body 
politic that on the whole is inexperienced in the ways of democracy.150 
Alternatively, foreign judgments may be used ‘as a warning’, where ‘the 
foreign law is “the other”, which must be avoided’.151  
 
More cynically, it has been argued that judicial comparativism is mainly 
results-driven. That is to say, that judges use that jurisprudence which is 
likely to support their own predetermined conclusions,152  or a means of 
‘judicial fig-leafing’, designed to obscure the reality of judicial choice.153 
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149 Anne-Marie Slaughter ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, above n 8, 134. 
150 GJ Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States (Princeton 
University Press 1995), cited in Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of 
Comparative Law’, above n 141, 10. See also Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of 
Human Rights?’, above n 69, 518.  
151 Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, Ibid. 
152 E.g. Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62, 139-141; Elizabeth 
Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg? The British Judiciary’s Approach to Interpreting 
Convention Rights’ [2005] EPL 405, 410. See also Justice Antonin Scalia, ‘The Bill of Rights: 
Confirmation of Extent Freedoms or Invitation to Judicial Creation?’ in Grant Huscroft and 
Paul Rishworth, eds, Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law 
(Hart Publishing 2002); James Allan, ‘A Defence of the Status Quo’ in Tom Campbell et al 
(eds), Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions (Oxford University Press 2003). 
Cf. Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 69, 527: ‘One 
possible explanation is that the use of foreign judgments is simply results-driven … [leading 
to a] suspicion that the selective use of foreign judgments is inevitably associated with a 
rights-expanding agenda. But this would be mistaken’. 
153 Richard Posner, 'No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws' Legal Affairs July/Aug 
2004 http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp 
 57 
Similar anxieties are prevalent about the ‘substantial “cherry picking” of which 
jurisdiction to cite’ which McCrudden has explained as a concern that ‘those 
jurisdictions chosen will be those which are likely to support the conclusion 
sought, leading to arbitrary decision-making, not legitimate judging’.154 Cram, 
Mak and Bell all appear to agree that in the House of Lords and now the 
Supreme Court, foreign jurisprudence is ‘results-driven’ and often used 
opportunistically.155  
 
Nevertheless, perhaps the most compelling explanation for the use of foreign 
jurisprudence in human rights cases is that a particular regime requires it or 
that there exists a common alliance.156 In the UK, judges have drawn from 
foreign jurisprudence for some time, typically through comparison with the 
judgments of Commonwealth courts (similarly rooted in the common law) 
and, more recently, with the European legal orders. The latter has been of 
greater relevance since the accession to the European Community and, in 
human rights cases, the ECHR.157 Under the HRA 1998 domestic courts are 
under a duty to ‘take into account’ relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, but the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
accessed 01 February 2011; Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas 
(Cambridge University Press 2006), 7. 
154 Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 69, 507. 
155  Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 62, 139-141; Elaine Mak, 
‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law’, above n 62; John Bell ‘Comparative Law in 
the Supreme Court 2010-11’, above n 53.  
156 Jochen Abr. Frowein, ‘European Intergration Through Fundamental Rights’ (1984) 18 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 5; Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use 
of Comparative Law’ in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases 
(United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 2003) 13; David Richards, 
‘Comparative Revolutionary Constitutionalism A Research Agenda for Comparative Law’, 
(1993) 26 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 1, 59; Brian Flanagan 
and Sinead Ahern, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A Survey of Common 
Law Supreme Court Judges’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 21. 
157 E.g. Murray Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart Publishing 1998). 
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Act does not specify the approach that domestic courts should take to that 
foreign jurisprudence otherwise. Regard to the decisions of European 
domestic courts, for instance, is unregulated, as is regard to non-European 
jurisprudence. However, as mentioned above, the HRA may have steered 
domestic courts in the direction of jurisprudence the ECtHR would be likely to 
consider.158 
 
In keeping with these findings, Örücü’s 1990s study of Comparative Law in 
British Courts (discussed earlier) linked the tendency to cite certain 
jurisdictions to the purposes served by those sources. Thus Örücü concluded 
that comparison with common law jurisdictions led to a ‘functional use’ of 
comparative law whereas comparison with civilian systems lead to an 
arguably ‘ornamental use’ of comparative law.159 Further, she linked the use 
of common law material with cases that ‘deal mostly with domestic law and 
domestic problems’ whereas the second group of cases, comparison with 
civilian law, ‘fall mostly within a wider ambit, usually of European law or an 
international convention’.160 On a classical ‘like for like’ breed of reasoning, 
these findings are not surprising. What is interesting then, is the extent to 
which these patterns have altered since her study, a time lag which has seen 
the coming into force of the HRA 1998, thus augmenting the status of the 
ECHR in domestic law and giving rise to the possibility that—in human rights 
cases at lease—the relevance of foreign jurisprudence may have significantly 
altered.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 E.g. Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 39, 143. 
159 Esin Örücü, 'Comparative law in British Courts', above n 70, 294. 
160 Ibid. 
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Örücü’s 2003 publication, Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, is 
a less directly relevant but nevertheless significant publication on the same 
theme. Through a number of collaborative chapters, it is discussed how far 
judges are employing the comparative approach, the legitimacy of this 
approach and whether Comparativism is an interpretative aid, ‘functional’, or 
‘ornamental’. However, the account of comparative legal models in national 
legal systems is discussed insofar as it relates to the development of a 
common law or ‘ius commune’ of human rights. To that end, the book has a 
different focus to the one in this thesis. By seeking to address definitions of 
‘globalism’ and ‘localism’ and whether there is a place for ‘cultural 
exceptionalism’ in the context of human rights, there is limited space for 
analysis of the reasons for the use of foreign jurisprudence or the way that 
judges use it.  
 
To those questions, McCrudden has made one of the most relevant 
contributions. McCrudden has focused on ‘the use by national judges in one 
jurisdiction of judicial interpretations of human rights norms in another 
jurisdiction’.161 He has sought (in series of articles and book chapters) to 
illuminate the principles underlying judicial comparativism in human rights 
cases.162 In doing so, McCrudden has addressed three central questions: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law’ above n 
141, 2. See also Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 69, 
503. 
162 Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 69; Christopher 
McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law’, above n 141; Christopher 
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‘How far does comparativism happen?’, ‘Why does it happen?’ and ‘Is it 
legitimate?’ 163  McCrudden has thus examined the relationship between 
human rights interpretation and comparative legal methods as well as 
identifying a number of factors that are said to affect or explain the use of 
foreign judgments in domestic human rights cases.  
 
This study takes inspiration from McCrudden’s work but can be distinguished 
in the following ways: McCrudden has chiefly been concerned with exposing 
patterns in the way domestic courts use foreign case law and has therefore 
drawn from a number of jurisdictions. By contrast, this thesis is concerned 
with the use of foreign jurisprudence by United Kingdom judges specifically. 
While McCrudden’s work provides a valuable insight into why and how 
judges use foreign jurisprudence domestically, his analysis does not address 
the purposes for which judges see themselves as applying foreign 
jurisprudence. Moreover, McCrudden is himself conscious that his 
conclusions are, by his own admission, based on ‘somewhat anecdotal 
evidence’ and that he has ‘done little more than identify some of the issues 
that a more complete study of the complex phenomenon … should examine 
more systematically’. 164 As Whitman has put it, ‘some kind of borrowing is 
surely taking place and we need some account of what is going on’.165  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’ in Esin Örücü and David Nelken 
(eds), Comparative Law: A  Handbook (Hart Publishing 2007) 
163 E.g. Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, above n 141, xiii 
(Introduction). 
164 See Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law’, 
above n 141, 3–4. 
165 James Q Whitman, ‘The Neo-Romantic Turn’ in Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday, 
(eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press 
2003), 342. 
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3 Research Methodology 
One of the most significant contributions to the existing literature in this field 
is the empirical data, gathered from analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
judgments as well as the information obtained through interviews with the 
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Assistants. Since this 
evidence is the foundation for the arguments presented in this thesis, this 
chapter is devoted to a detailed account of the research methodology. In the 
first part, the parameters of the study are set out and the key terms defined. 
The methodology followed during the data collection and an account of 
sources from which data is taken is detailed in the second part. 
 
3.1 Research Parameters 
The focus of this thesis is on the use of jurisprudence from foreign domestic 
courts (foreign jurisprudence) in human rights cases before the UK Supreme 
Court. In drawing these parameters, other persuasive sources commonly 
used in UK courts were excluded from the study. These might include, for 
example, the judgments of lower courts, Obiter Dicta, academic literature and 
the decisions of the Privy Council. Incorporating the UK Supreme Court’s use 
of all persuasive authorities was considered in the early stages of the 
research design but could not be pursued for reasons of time and space; 
such a study would be of great interest but would be better undertaken as 
part of a larger project. Some of the findings about the use of foreign 
jurisprudence in this thesis may nevertheless contribute to understanding 
about the use of other persuasive sources more generally. In particular, it is 
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plausible that many of the findings reported in chapters five and six (how 
foreign jurisprudence is used and the use of foreign jurisprudence as a 
heuristic device) would be likely to reflect the approach to persuasive sources 
more generally. However, other findings are felt to be peculiar to the use of 
foreign jurisprudence. These most obviously include situations where the 
Court is looking to maintain consistency (chapter seven), in which the object 
of the exercise is to identify a common understanding or consensus among 
other jurisdictions. On those matters, it is not obvious that the findings in this 
thesis could apply to the use of other persuasive sources. For these reasons, 
this thesis therefore contributes strictly to the specific literature on judicial use 
of foreign jurisprudence and comparative law as a freestanding topic. 
 
A number of the terms used for this project are common among other 
academic works or in other broader contexts. What follows is therefore an 
account of the meaning ascribed to each of these terms for the purposes of 
this study.  
 
3.1.1 Foreign jurisprudence 
In the context of this study, ‘jurisprudence’ refers to a body of law in the 
doctrinal sense. That is to say, it encompasses case law, legal instruments 
and relevant travaux préparatoires.166 ‘Foreign’ takes its natural meaning and 
refers to non-domestic matters. ‘Foreign jurisprudence’ therefore relates to 
case law, legal instruments and relevant travaux préparatoires outside the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166  Literally: ‘preparatory works’, referring to material produced during the drafting of 
legislation or related instruments. 
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domestic legal system. This definition important since different sources of law 
may be useful for different purposes. As Saunders has hypothesised, 
One possible variation, which should be noted at the outset, is the 
nature of the foreign source on which a court draws. It may be a 
conclusion of law or a constitutional or legal norm, whether 
articulated by a court or otherwise. Equally, however, it may be an 
argument, a value, a perception, an interpretative approach, or 
merely a happy turn of phrase. The list is intended to be illustrative, 
rather than exhaustive.167  
Crucially, however, ‘foreign jurisprudence’ only encompasses foreign 
domestic law and does not refer to international law. It thereby excludes, for 
example, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in Strasbourg,168 although these 
materials are referred to by way of comparison or to better illustrate the 
approach taken to foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases where those 
sources are otherwise relevant. It also excludes the decisions of 
supranational courts which UK courts are bound to follow, including decisions 
of the CJEU under section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972 
(ECA).169  ‘Foreign jurisprudence’ thus limits the source pool to material from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’ in 
Jane Holder and Colm O'Cinneide (eds) Current Legal Problems (2006) Vol 59 (Oxford 
University Press 2007), 98-99; Cheryl Saunders ‘The Use and Misuse of Comparative 
Constitutional Law’ (2006) 13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 37. 
168 Strasbourg jurisprudence remains strictly ‘international law’ notwithstanding section 2 of 
the UK Human Rights Act 1998 which provides that domestic courts must ‘take into account’ 
Strasbourg jurisprudence (so far as it is ‘relevant’) in cases which engage the European 
Convention on Human Rights. On the use of Strasbourg jurisprudence in domestic courts, 
see e.g. Roger Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to 
Strasbourg?’ [2004] PL 725; Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg? The British 
Judiciary’s Approach to Interpreting Convention Rights’ [2005] EPL 405; Jonathan Lewis, 
‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720; Jonathan Lewis, ‘In Re P and 
others: an exception to the "no more, certainly no less" rule’ [2009] PL 43; Francesca Klug 
and Helen Wildbore, ‘Follow or lead? The Human Rights Act and the European Court of 
Human Rights’, (2010) 6 EHRLR 621. 
169 The ‘Practice Direction on the Citation of Authorities’ also excludes these sources from its 
guidance on foreign jurisprudence: ‘For the avoidance of doubt, paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 do 
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foreign domestic legal orders—which have no more than a ‘persuasive’ 
authority in UK domestic courts.170 To avoid confusion, the term ‘foreign 
jurisprudence’ has been preferred over ‘foreign law’ or ‘foreign precedents’, 
even where inelegant. The only exception to this is where other scholars 
have used the alternative terms in quoted material, in which case the original 
sense has been retained.  
 
3.1.2 Use of foreign jurisprudence 
The ‘use’ of foreign jurisprudence is the central thread of the enquiry. 
Identifying the use of foreign jurisprudence is the necessary first step in 
teasing out any method or motivation governing the practice. Discovering 
exactly how judges are utilising, employing, exercising, applying, exploiting, 
handling, managing, consuming or drawing from foreign jurisprudence are 
questions upon which all other research questions are parasitic. The ‘use’ of 
foreign jurisprudence must therefore be understood in the broadest sense.171 
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not apply to cases decided in either the European Court of Justice or the organs of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. Because of the status in English law of such 
authority, as provided by, respectively, section 3 European Communities Act 1972 and 
section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998…’, s. 9.3 Practice Direction (Citation of 
Authorities) [2001] 1 WLR 1001; [2001] 2 All ER 510; Bobek has gone so far as to conclude 
that ‘status enjoyed by the decisions of either of the European courts (Luxembourg as well as 
Strasbourg) [means that they] belong in the ‘must’ and not a mere ‘may’ category. … treated 
[by UK courts] essentially as domestic precedents’: Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning 
in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University Press 2013), 78.  
170 This is in contrast with the approach taken by some other studies. For example, in her 
1990s study of Comparative Law in British Courts, Örücü counted any citation of any non-
English jurisprudence, including the jurisprudence on international treaties or conventions: 
Esin Örücü, 'Comparative law in British Courts' in Ulrich Drobnig and Sjef van Erp. (eds), The 
Use of Comparative Law by Courts, 14th International Congress of Comparative Law (Kluwer 
1999); Mathias M Siems, ‘Citation Patterns of the German Federal Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal of England and Wales’ (2010) 21 KLJ 152. 
171 The term ‘use’ was also applied by Groppi and Ponthoreau in The Use of Foreign 
Precedents by Constitutional Courts (Hart Publishing 2013); Another recent study has 
preferred the term ‘inspiration’, Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European 
Supreme Courts, above n 169. 
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It captures any contribution made by foreign jurisprudence to judicial 
reasoning, from explicit citation to a passing reference or even a very casual 
consideration—including references that do not form a part of the published 
judgment.172 The last of these is crucial, since the existing literature has 
largely ignored non-explicit uses of foreign jurisprudence. 173  Although 
practical difficulties make analysis of these non-explicit uses more 
challenging, it is necessary to engage with this question if the aim is to 
provide a comprehensive overview of the ‘use’ of foreign jurisprudence.  
 
3.1.3 Courts and Judges 
At the outset, this research project purported to analyse the use of foreign 
jurisprudence in UK human rights cases. As originally designed, this project 
would have incorporated human rights cases decided in any of the UK 
appellate courts. However, it became clear that the volume of judgments 
falling within those broadly drawn parameters would allow for little depth of 
analysis. The parameters were therefore revised to the UK Supreme Court 
specifically. The empirical research draws from judgments handed down by 
the UKSC since the start of its work in October 2009 and up to the end of the 
fourth judicial year in July 2013.174 Interviews were held with the Justices of 
that court, their judicial assistants and one Lord Justice of Appeal. The choice !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172  In the latter case, the obvious methodological issue is that such ‘use’ will not be 
discernable from the published decision. These are considered further in chapter five below, 
in the context of the methods through which the judges arrive at foreign jurisprudence.  
173  See e.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign 
Precedents by Constitutional Judges (Hart Publishing 2013), 7. The decision to ignore implicit 
influences in that volume was considered earlier in chapter two, see text around n 34. 
174 The Supreme Court was established by part 3 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, assuming 
the judicial functions of the House of Lords as the highest appellate court in the United 
Kingdom (other than for Scottish Criminal cases). 
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to focus on the Supreme Court was made on the basis that the Justices of 
the Supreme Court were the most likely to face the complex legal problems 
that would trigger the use of persuasive authorities such as foreign 
jurisprudence.175 Time and resources preclude an extensive analysis of the 
way foreign jurisprudence is used in courts at all levels, although such a 
study would no doubt be very useful.176 
 
3.1.4 Human Rights Cases  
‘Human rights cases’ takes a broad meaning, generally referring to claims 
under the Human Rights Act 1998. Human rights, as a field of enquiry, was 
chosen for two reasons: first, human rights claims raise some of the most 
interesting and divisive issues and are often sensitive and subject to cultural 
interpretation. Second, there was also a strong sense in the literature that 
judicial comparativism is more prevalent in human rights cases than in other 
fields.177 Third, the diet of the highest court has been increasingly balanced 
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175  Bobek considers there to be two reasons for this. First, on an institutional basis, 
‘[s]upreme jurisdictions have a larger mandate: to look beyond the individual judicial file and 
case and see the broader picture’. Secondly, ‘[c]omparative analysis is, in terms of time, 
expertise, and resources, a demanding exercise’ and ‘it is at the level of supreme jurisdictions 
where human resources (analytical backup) and also procedural tools (lesser docket, 
selection of cases) may be available. These allow judges to concentrate on contentious legal 
issues in greater detail’: Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme 
Courts, above n 169, 44-45; Konrad Schiemann, ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ in Basil 
Markesinis and Jorg Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of 
Inspiration? (University College London Press 2006) 369: ‘The lower down the judicial ladder 
a judge finds himself the greater that pressure is in general’. 
176 In correspondence received towards the end of the study period, Lady Justice Arden 
noted that the subject of this thesis is also relevant to courts below the Supreme Court, 
including, in particular, the Court of Appeal where the vast majority of these cases are heard 
and not appealed: letter from Lady Justice Arden to author (17 January 2014).  
177 See e.g. E.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign 
Precedents by Constitutional Judges, above n 173, 416 ‘The research clearly shows that 
citations of foreign case law prevail in … human rights decisions’; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A 
Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional 
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towards public law and human rights cases,178 and judges adjudicating on 
human rights claims often have to consider the jurisprudence of 
supranational courts. For example, where Convention rights are at issue, 
section 2 HRA 1998 provides that UK courts must ‘take into account’ any 
relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or 
‘the Strasbourg Court’). The influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence also 
raises a question as to the approach that would be taken to foreign 
jurisprudence should a claim fall outside the scope of the HRA 1998. In that 
case, judicial reasoning may reflect a different balance between foreign 
(domestic) and supranational jurisprudence. Where no supranational 
jurisprudence exists, the degree to which foreign jurisprudence is used by (or 
is useful to) domestic courts may also differ. Thus human rights cases 
provide a variety of perspectives on the uses of foreign jurisprudence by 
domestic courts, which is not possible in other fields. Therefore, while some 
of the research findings do reflect on the use of foreign jurisprudence in other 
fields, these are incidental to the analysis of human rights cases. It was not 
practical to consider fully the use of foreign jurisprudence in all fields within 
the given time period and ‘human rights cases’ were numerous enough to 
provide a suitable subject for the purposes of rigour and reliability.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Rights’ (2000) 20(4) OJLS 499, 527, asking ‘is there something specific to human rights that 
explains the apparently greater use of foreign case law in human rights cases?’ 
178  This was mentioned by a number of the Justices interviewed for this study and is 
confirmed by another report of similar interviews conducted by Mak in 2009: Elaine Mak, 
‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’ [2011] CLJ 420, 432. Paterson also found 
that ‘…the type of case which now predominates is radically different … tax, shipping and 
criminal law cases have declined, whilst public law and human rights cases have dramatically 
increased.’ See further Alan Paterson in his most recently published work, Final Judgment: 
The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing 2013), 17, Table 2.1. 
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3.2 Research Methodology 
Such is the volume of literature covering theoretical approaches to the use of 
foreign jurisprudence that empirical research was felt to be the most useful 
analytical lens. As Bradney observed: 
… quantitative and qualitative empirical research … provides 
information of a different character from that which can be 
obtained through other methods of research. It answers questions 
about law that cannot be answered in any other way.179 
In order to test these research questions, it was necessary to undertake a 
detailed analysis of each case decided by the Supreme Court since its 
establishment in October 2009. This research involved quantitative analysis 
of each case by category (e.g. ‘human rights’) and citations of foreign 
jurisprudence. The findings were triangulated with qualitative data from the 
text of the judgments and through interviews with the Justices of the 
Supreme Court and one Lord Justice of Appeal.180 The evidence from those 
interviews also raised new points of interest. The final analysis therefore 
results from this evolution of ideas and reflects a ‘spiralling’ rather than 
‘linear’ progression through the research.181  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
179 Anthony Bradney, ‘The Place of Empirical Research in the Law School Curriculum’ in 
Peter Crane and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 
(Oxford University Press 2010) 1031, cited in Mandy Burton, ‘Doing Empirical Research’ in 
Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013).  
180  On triangulating research, see e.g. Eugene J Webb et al. Unobtrusive Measures: 
Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences (Rand McNally 1966); Norman K Denzin, The 
Research Act in Sociology (Aldine 1970); Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (2n edn, 
Oxford University Press 2004). 
181 For further discussion of research methodology: Chava Frankfort Nachmias and David 
Nachmias, Research Methods for the Social Sciences: Practice and Applications (4th edn, St 
Martin’s Press 1992); Bruce L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences 
(Pearson, 2007), 23; Karl R Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific 
Knowledge (Harper and Row 1968); Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Cambridge University Press 1987). 
 69 
 
3.2.1 Empirical research 
A total 246 cases were handed down by the Supreme Court in its first four 
years. When recording cases decided by the Supreme Court, appeals 
reported together with the same neutral citation were counted as one case. 
Cases with different neutral citations but which dealt with procedural matters 
(such as costs or preliminary referrals to the CJEU) were also counted as 
one. As the outcome of conjoined appeals inevitably drew from the same 
reasoning, it would have skewed the data to record the use of foreign 
jurisprudence in such instances more than once. No issue arose as to the 
data concerning foreign jurisprudence in cases dealing with procedural 
matters, since, predictably, the Supreme Court did not refer to any such 
material in those instances. The 246 figure was therefore arrived at by 
calculating the number of cases (number of reported cases with individual 
neutral citations) minus the number of cases dealing with procedural 
matters.182  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
182 If one counts each reported case decided by the UK Supreme Court during the first four 
judicial years, 2009-13, the total is 257 cases. However, eleven of these cases can be 
considered to deal with procedural matters or are in essence a duplicate by reason of a 
conjoined appeal. Indeed the UK Supreme Court website itself records (at the time of writing) 
these cases together and combines the neutral citations in these instances. Thus the 
following reported cases were counted as one rather than two case(s), the citation 
underlined was disregarded for the purposes of the data analysis in each instance: R (E) v 
Governing Body of JFS and others [2009] UKSC 15 & [2009] UKSC 1; Her Majesty's 
Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC), R (on the application of Hani El 
Sayed Sabaei Youssef) v Her Majesty’s Treasury, Her Majesty’s Treasury v Mohammed al-
Ghabra (FC) [2010] UKSC 2 & [2010] UKSC 5; RTS Flexible Systems Limited v Molkerei 
Alois Müller Gmbh & Company KG (UK Production) [2010] UKSC 14 & [2010] UKSC 38; 
British Airways plc Williams and others [2010] UKSC 16 & [2012] UKSC 43; Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v AP [2010] UKSC 24 &  [2010] UKSC 26; Manchester City 
Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 & [2011] UKSC 6; Duncombe and others v Secretary of 
State for Children, Schools and Families [2011] UKSC 14 & [2011] UKSC 36; O'Brien v 
Ministry of Justice (Formerly the Department for Constitutional Affairs) [2013] UKSC 6 & 
[2010] UKSC 34; Daejan Investments Limited v Benson and others [2013] UKSC 14 & [2013] 
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Information about each case was obtained from the official transcripts and 
law reports. Spreadsheets were generated to record basic information such 
as the full case name, neutral citation, date of hearing, and a list of the 
Justices sitting on the case. The spreadsheet also records the subject matter 
of each case. Since the research parameters set by this project were ‘human 
rights’ cases, it was necessary to ensure that all such cases were 
categorised. For the purposes of this research, a case was categorised as a 
‘human rights’ case where it had one of more of the following attributes: 
where the words ‘human rights’ are found in the judgment and are used to 
substantive effect (that is, as more than a passing reference, comparison or 
analogy);183 where human rights legislation or instruments (including but not 
limited to the HRA 1998 and the ECHR) are cited, again, with substantive 
effect; where the word ‘rights’ is discernably associated with human rights 
even if not explicitly stated (for example, in the case of common law 
rights).184  
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UKSC 54; Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Aimia Coalition Loyalty UK Limited 
(formerly known as Loyalty Management UK Limited) [2013] UKSC 15 & [2013] UKSC 42; 
Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury [2013] UKSC 38 & [2013] UKSC 39.  
183 For example, the judgment in AB and others v Ministry of Defence [2012] UKSC 9 makes 
one reference to ‘human rights’ and was therefore captured by the database search. This 
reference, however, serves merely to note the history of the case and the claimant’s 
knowledge of another case before the ECtHR. It has no direct bearing on the instant case 
and it would therefore distort the data to categorise the judgment as one concerning ‘human 
rights’. 
184 This broad definition of a ‘human rights case’ risks an amount of overlap with cases that 
might readily be classified under alternative categories, most obviously including ‘criminal law’ 
or ‘public law’ cases. This overlap is not felt to have a significant bearing on the findings in 
this study since the primary aim is to consider the effect of using foreign jurisprudence where 
there are human rights issues at stake. As such, breaking down the categories further was 
not felt to be a useful exercise. Nevertheless, the implications of the overlap are that the 
research findings must be considered to apply strictly to the parameters of this enquiry. If the 
cases were reorganised into these further categories so as to avoid the overlap, it is entirely 
possible that the overall data patterns would be slightly different. 
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A total of 102 cases were found to meet these criteria and were thus 
classified as concerning ‘human rights’ matters.185  For these cases, the 
spreadsheets record information about the instruments engaged, e.g. 
significant human rights legislation cited, articles of the ECHR at issue etc. 
For a case to have been recorded has having ‘used’ foreign jurisprudence in 
the broad sense intended here, it was enough that foreign jurisprudence was 
cited in the judgment (even if not discussed).186 To repeat the definition of 
‘foreign jurisprudence’ given earlier, a case was considered ‘foreign’ if it was 
decided by the court of another country which does not also fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the purposes of Part 3 Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005. Cases from Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were 
therefore excluded from the definition. While Scots criminal cases fall within 
the broad definition of ‘foreign jurisprudence’ (the High Court of Justiciary in 
Scotland sitting as an appeal court is the final court of appeal for criminal 
cases), the UK Supreme Court remains the final court of appeal in civil 
cases. As such, the Scots jurisprudence is slightly different in character to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185 There is a big disparity between this figure and the one given by Alan Paterson in his 
most recently published work, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court 
(Hart Publishing 2013). In that volume, Paterson works from the same figure for the total 
number of cases decided in the first four years (246) but divides these into six categories: 
‘Criminal’; ‘Human Rights’; ‘Public’; ‘Private/Commercial’; ‘Family’; and ‘Tax’. The result is that 
just 35 cases are categorised as ‘human rights’ cases. Interestingly, if one combines 
Paterson’s figures for ‘Criminal’, ‘Human Rights’ and ‘Public’ cases the total is also 102. This 
does not, however, guarantee that the same cases would make up that sample. As Paterson 
explains in a footnote: ‘Any case classification contains room for quibbles. Many cases no 
contain human rights points, but where they are obiter, I have not classified them as human 
rights cases. Here I can do no better than quote from Louis Blom-Cooper and G Drewry, Final 
Appeal (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972) at 244. “Any subject-classification we construct is 
essentially arbitrary, and the assignment of marginal cases to particular categories is 
extremely difficult”’. See further Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the 
Supreme Court (Hart Publishing 2013), 17, table 2.1 and note 17. 
186 As previously mentioned, this method cannot account for implicit citations, which are not 
obvious from the published judgments. Some insight on the potential for implicit citations was 
obtained through the interviews with the individuals Justices, discussed further in chapter five. 
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case law of other foreign courts and is likely to be more familiar to the UK 
Supreme Court where, by convention, care is taken to ensure that at least 
two of the Justices have experience of the Scottish legal system.187  
  
 The following analytical details were recorded about each case:  
A. If foreign jurisprudence was used in the judgments, by counsel, or both;  
B. If a foreign case was specifically referred to (and if so, by whom); 
C. Where the jurisprudence (if used) was drawn from;  
D. How many foreign cases were cited (for each jurisdiction); 
E. If foreign jurisprudence was distinguished;  
F. If foreign jurisprudence appeared to contribute to, or was determinative of, the 
outcome of the case;188  
G. If the outcome was in line with the foreign jurisprudence cited; 
H. Whether references to foreign jurisprudence were made in leading, plurality, majority, 
minority, concurring or dissenting judgments.  
 
For each case, the spreadsheets also record contributions made by the 
individual justices. This included whether a written judgment was given (in 
many cases a Justice may simply ‘agree’ with one of his colleagues), as well !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
187 See e.g. Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, Judicial appointments and a Supreme 
Court (court of final appeal) First Report of Session 2003-04, HC 48-I, [43]; Joshua 
Rozenberg, ‘Who will be the two new supreme court judges?’ The Guardian (London, 27 July 
2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/jul/27/supreme-court-judge-appointments> 
accessed 22 May 2014. 
188 This test is stronger than the ‘used to substantive effect’ test applied to the identification of 
human rights cases. ‘substantive effect’ in the latter means more than a passing reference to 
‘human rights’ which is not related to the issues in the case. In other words, that test would 
exclude from the data capture a contract law case which referred to the words ‘human rights’ 
for the purposes of some analogy. The ‘contributed to or was determinative of the outcome of 
the case’ test for the effect of foreign jurisprudence goes much further and records cases in 
which the outcome appears to rely in any way on the discussion of foreign jurisprudence. It 
should be noted that this test, along with others in this list, was applied only to assist with the 
analytical enquiry and that the much lower test was applied to capture cases using foreign 
jurisprudence generally; to have been ‘used’, it was enough that foreign jurisprudence was 
cited once, even if not discussed.  
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as whether a written judgment could be described as a leading judgment, a 
concurring judgment or a dissenting judgment. Identifying a lead judgment is 
significantly easier at the Supreme Court than it was at the House of Lords. 
As Baroness Hale has explained:  
One obvious change in the Supreme Court is that we can print the 
judgments in whatever order we choose, so the lead (what I call 
the 'donkey-work’) judgment can come first regardless of seniority 
(although that may not always happen).189 
It was also recorded whether the Supreme Court gave a full set of separate 
judgments from each of the Justices, whether some Justices had associated 
themselves with the judgment of a colleague or whether the judgments 
constituted a plurality of effectively plurality judgment. The rise of the plurality 
type judgment is described in greater detail in Chapter five. Briefly, in this 
work a plurality style judgment includes a single ‘judgment of the court’, a 
leading judgment with which all have agreed or a single judgment with which 
others in the majority agree.190 An ‘agreement’ is counted where the main 
aim of the Justice’s passage is to associate himself with the fuller judgment 
of a colleague. In most cases, this is clearly established with one or two 
sentences. In other cases, it includes passages of slightly greater length but 
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189 Brenda Hale, ‘Judgment Writing in the Supreme Court’ (First Anniversary Seminar, 30 
September 2010) <http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_100930.pdf> accessed 13 
August 2013, 2.   
190 Cf Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 
Publishing 2013), 14: Paterson defines a ‘plurality judgment’ as referring to ‘the situation in 
which there is no majority judgment in the Court. In that situation the judgment which receives 
the most support is sometimes referred to as a plurality judgment’. Baroness Hale’s 
explanation of plurality type judgments has been adopted in this thesis, see e.g. Dan Tranch 
and Laura Coogan ‘Baroness Brenda Hale: "I often ask myself 'why am I here?'” The 
Guardian (London, 16 September 2010) <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/sep/16/uk-
supreme-court-judiciary> accessed 13 August 2013. 
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which serve only to add an observation or footnote to the judgment with 
which the Justice has otherwise associated themselves.   
 
Finally, for each Justice, it was recorded if foreign jurisprudence had been 
explicitly cited. For the general purposes of the thesis, foreign jurisprudence 
was considered to have been ‘used’ even where a Justice had merely made 
reference to the position or attitudes of a foreign court or jurisdiction, without 
an explicit citation to a decision of that court. The situation arises in a number 
of cases where non-explicit references are made as part of a more general 
narrative. For example, in R (F),191 Lord Phillips made references to the 
systems of several foreign jurisdictions and had evidently considered an 
argument made by counsel on the point: 
Those acting for the first claimant have drawn attention to 
registration requirements for sexual offenders in France, Ireland, 
the seven Australian states, Canada, South Africa and the United 
States. Almost all of these have provisions for review...192 
A passage of this kind falls within the general meaning of ‘using’ foreign 
jurisprudence since it is evident that some aspect of the legal systems in 
those jurisdictions has been considered. In a number of cases it was possible 
to find references to the practice in a particular jurisdiction without any explicit 
reference to a reported judgment.  
 
However, for reasons of consistency, non-explicit citations of this kind are not 
captured by the quantitative data analysis offered in chapter five. This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
191 R (F) and another v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17. 
192 Ibid [57] (Lord Phillips). 
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approach differs to that taken by some other academics. For example, Bobek 
explains that ‘unspecified references to a “foreign solution”, invoking for 
instance the situation in country X, but not making any further substantiated 
reference to legislation, case law, or scholarly works, were included’ for the 
purposes of his study.193 
…even allusions to ‘foreign democratic legal systems’; ‘a number 
of foreign democratic countries’; values shared by ‘the Member 
States of the EU and other developed countries of the Western 
Europe’; or ‘the founding principles of the contemporary Euro-
Atlantic civilization’ were eventually counted as further unspecified 
instances of invoking some foreign inspiration, in spite of the fact 
that the displayed referencing culture and the quality of 
‘comparative argument’ leaves much to be desired.194 
The exclusion of such cases from the quantitative data analysis in this study 
is based simply on the reality that non-explicit references are almost 
impossible to capture systematically. The consequence, as recognised by 
Cram when undertaking his own study of resort to foreign jurisprudence in 
terrorism cases, is that the extent to which foreign jurisprudence is used is 
likely to be understated.195  
…the overriding problem is one of a failure to make an explicit 
attribution. This may occur for reasons to do with national pride … 
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193 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 169, 68. 
194 Ibid 69. 
195 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence 
with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 129. Bobek adds that the use of foreign 
jurisprudence may ‘hidden behind the veil of domestic scholarship’: Michael Bobek, above n 
169, 72-73. 
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or simply because there is no formal requirement to acknowledge 
help from foreign sources.196 
Non-explicit citations are, however, considered as part of the qualitative 
analysis in later chapters.  
 
To test hypotheses and facilitate pattern spotting in the qualitative analysis, 
cases were also coded using a number of ‘tags’ according to the research 
questions. As the literature review makes clear, there have been previous 
studies on the use of foreign jurisprudence, albeit with differing purposes or 
focus. The analysis and conclusions of those studies provide a number of 
classifications or ‘codes’ for the use(s) of persuasive authorities and/or 
foreign jurisprudence. A number of commentators have, for instance, 
suggested that judges use persuasive authority as a means of judicial fig-
leafing or to support their own predetermined conclusions. 197  Other 
possibilities are that it is used as a legitimation function,198 or as a vehicle for 
adopting a more theorised approach to human rights.199 Alternatively, a court 
may look for foreign case law pedagogical reasons,200 as a warning,201 or to 
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196 Ian Cram, Ibid. 
197 E.g. Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 195, 139-141; Elizabeth 
Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg?’ above n 168, 410. 
198 See e.g. Luc Heuschling ‘Comparative Law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights Cases’ in Esin Orücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United 
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 2003) 47. 
199 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law’ in Esin 
Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, above n 198, 17; Christopher 
McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 177, 512. 
200 Anne-Marie Slaughter ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, (1994) 29 University 
of Richmond Law Review 199, 134; GJ Jacohsohn, Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel 
and the United States (Princeton University Press 1995); Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial 
Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, above n 198, 10; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A 
Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 177, 518. 
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as part of a gap-filling exercise.202 To preserve a sense of continuity in the 
legal scholarship, those classifications have been used in this study. To 
these I have added respect for the judge or court in questions, responding to 
cited authority and references made for no discernible reason at all.203  
 
As explained in the literature review, one of the most valuable contributions 
to scholarship in this field has been empirical data. In particular, it is rare that 
researchers present their data in a digestible format, using charts, graphs or 
tables. This is not an approach that all academics agree upon. Some 
commentators have expressed doubt that this sort of analysis can provide 
any meaningful results at all. Bobek explained his own methodological 
choices from that viewpoint:  
This study is not a study in statistics or the increasingly popular 
‘quotation metrics’, the purpose of which were to generate a set of 
colourful, but for a real understanding of a phenomenon often 
quite useless, graphs or tables.204  
This is not easy to agree with. Compiling charts, tables or figures is a time 
consuming task but the value of doing so is felt to be greater value than for 
mere aesthetics. It is through these that it is possible to illustrate data 
patterns or trends, especially interesting if one is seeking to set out changes 
in judicial reasoning or consistencies in practice. Indeed, some recent works 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law’, above n 
199, 10. See also Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 177, 
518. 
202 Harold Cooke Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method 
of Legal Study and Research (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1949), 40 
203 The full database of cases is too large to print in a sensible format and is not included. 
204 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 169, 74. 
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have made use of such techniques to good effect, enabling the 
representation of findings which might not otherwise have been possible to 
outline fully.205  
 
 
3.2.2 Interviews 
The most significant contribution to legal scholarship made by this research 
project has been the information derived from interviews. Interview subjects 
were selected by a nonprobability method, sometimes called ‘purposive’ or 
‘judgmental’ sampling: it was always clear that questions about judicial 
reasoning at the UKSC would be best answered by the Justices of that 
court.206  
 
Difficulty with access to interviewees would have required a significant 
revision to the central research question but the problem did not materialise; 
almost all interview requests were granted. This result was surprising, given 
the problems reported by many researchers seeking to interview elites, 
including the most senior judges.207 For example, the author of one of the 
most recent studies has written:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
205 E.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, anove n 173; Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and 
the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing 2013), above n 190. 
206 See e.g. Bruce L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, above n 
181, 44. As Berg explains, ‘When developing a purposive sample, researchers use their 
special knowledge or expertise about some group to select subjects who represent this 
population’; Frank E Hagan, Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology (Allyn 
and Bacon 2006). 
207 See e.g. Mandy Burton, ‘Doing Empirical Research’ in Dawn Wilkins and Mandy Burton 
(eds), Research Methods in Law, above n 179, 59: ‘Organisations, such as the police and 
courts, are often deluged with research requests and those in authority may be reluctant to 
grant permission for their staff to devote time to what they see as unproductive academic 
research activities’.  
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Problems start already at the level of identifying judges to 
interview: it was largely only those judges who themselves tend to 
be in favour of ‘the foreign’ and ‘the international’ that would 
typically consent to an interview on the subject. Those who do not 
care or are even mentally hostile to anything foreign are not 
inclined to share their views with a foreign researcher coming to 
talk to them about precisely that subject. Moreover, as Continental 
supreme jurisdictions are larger institutions, only several judges 
can in fact be interviewed, typically precisely those interested. 
Both of these factors generate a rather non-representative 
sample.208 
Problems of this kind did not arise during this research. There was never any 
expression of hostility towards the subject and the smaller number of Justices 
at the UKSC (compared to other continental courts) made it possible to 
ensure a representative sample. In the UK Context at least, it is possible that 
the general willingness to be interviewed may reflect an increasing 
willingness on the part of judges to consider engagement with academics as 
a part of their judicial role.209 Darbyshire reached similar conclusions from her 
experience of studying judges: ‘[b]aby boomer judges seem to understand 
social research and academic freedom and most trust academics not to 
behave like journalists’.210 Greater interaction with academics is also obvious 
from the judgments. It is no longer uncommon for judges to refer to academic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
208 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 169, 71; 
Mak reported a similar experience: Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised 
World: A Comparative Analysis of the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts (Hart 
Publishing 2013), 63. 
209 See e.g. Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court 
(2013), above, n 190, 5: ‘My experience of elite ‘off the record’ interviews both 40 years ago 
and now attests to the levels of trust that many interviewees are prepared to repose in an 
academic researcher that they may hardly know’.  
210 Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart Publishing 
2011), 7.  
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work in judgments—a significant contrast to a time when academics were 
cited only once deceased.211  
 
3.2.3 Primary Subjects 
The primary subjects were appellate court judges, active between 2011 and 
2012. Interviews with the judges were sought by letter and conducted in two 
rounds. The first round letters were sent in August 2011 and the 
corresponding interviews took place between October and December of the 
same year. In total, ten Justices of the Supreme Court and one Lord Justice 
of Appeal were interviewed. The decision to interview a single Court of 
Appeal judge was made early in the research period, when it was thought 
that more Court of Appeal judges may be interviewed as part of a broader 
study.212 Although the parameters were later revised to include only the use 
of foreign jurisprudence at the UK Supreme Court, it was felt that the 
evidence obtained through the interview with Lady Justice Arden was 
nevertheless helpful to retain on the basis that it provided a useful 
perspective from outside the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, care has been 
taken to ensure that this interview evidence is used strictly anecdotally in this 
thesis, rather than contributing directly to the evidence from the UK Supreme 
Court interviews.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
211 The point was also recognised by Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European 
Supreme Courts, above n 169, 87-88. 
212 Explained further above at 3.1.3 ‘Courts and Judges’. 
 81 
The interviewees in round one were Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord 
Phillips of Worth Matravers (then President of the Supreme Court), Lord 
Mance and Lady Justice Arden. The second round letters were sent in March 
2012, with the corresponding interviews taking place between April and July 
of the same year. The interviewees in the second round were Lord Dyson, 
Lord Reed, Lord Kerr, Lord Clarke, Lord Walker, Lord Collins and Lord 
Sumption.213 Requests were made for just 30 minutes but the majority of the 
interviewees extended this time and provided useful information or thoughtful 
suggestions on developing the study. All interviews took place in the judicial 
offices of the relevant court. The interview communication and design is 
detailed in annexe one.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting findings related to the working practices of the 
judges—a subject that the judges generally considered to be obvious or 
uninteresting.  Surprise was expressed, for example, when a question was 
posed about the use of the judicial assistants or about their own methods for 
finding sources of law. In fact, the answers to these questions provide the 
most obvious contributions to legal scholarship. The way that judges do their 
work and the resources that they use may seem routine and mundane to the 
judges but were not at all obvious to a researcher. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
213 Lord Phillips and Lord Walker have since retired from the Supreme Court. Lord Dyson 
was appointed as Master of The Rolls with effect from 1 October 2012. 
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3.2.4 Questions 
While necessary to retain structure and continuity in the questions for 
purposes of data analysis, the exploratory nature of the research required a 
broad scope for answers and it was important that the interviewees could 
fully explore these with minimal interruption or guidance. For these reasons, 
some questions were common to all interviews while other questions varied 
according to the interview and the relevant experience or interest that the 
interviewee was able to offer. For example, judges that were already known 
to make liberal use foreign jurisprudence were asked more probing questions 
about the reasons for those uses and their guiding motivations. 
 
In all cases, a ‘semi-standardised’ or ‘guided-semistructured’ method of 
interviewing was applied.214 In other words, the questions posed to each 
interviewee were the same mixture of open questions but the interviewees 
were able to develop certain points above others where it was felt more 
relevant. It was crucial to the research aims that the judges were given the 
opportunity to expand on an answer or volunteer further information. In those 
circumstances, time was given to following any interesting leads insofar that 
this did not detract from the consistency of the interviews in general or 
detract from an otherwise important point of discussion. This flexibility was 
necessary in order to ensure that the interviews were not self-fulfilling and to 
allow for the consideration of matters that may not otherwise have been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
214 The alternatives are given as either a ‘standardised’ or ‘unstandardised’ (or in words to 
similar effect). In contrast to the semi-standardised, these require a rigid schedule of 
predetermined questions or an open schedule, with questions located on the imaginary 
continuum: Bruce L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Pearson 
2007), 92-95. Mak chose took the same approach in her interviews: Elaine Mak, Judicial 
Decision-Making in a Globalised, above n 208, 64. 
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raised. As one methodologist has described, the essence of the qualitative 
interview is the elicitation of stories:  
When people are least interrupted, when they can tell their stories 
in their own way … they can react naturally and freely and express 
themselves fully … [Interruptions and leading questions are likely 
to have the effect that] … the adventures into the unknown, into 
unchartered and hitherto undisclosed spheres, has been 
destroyed.215 
Where less was known about the particular area concerned, it was 
interesting to enable the judges to talk for longer, give their views more fully 
and to hear the variety of ideas and feelings.216 
 
It is also worth noting that these situations were, however, not always 
intentional. As is common with elite interviews, there was a general tendency 
among the Justices to steer the focus of the interview towards topics that 
they felt comfortable discussing. Such answers, however, are difficult to 
quantify and require strict attention to the precise language and comments 
given. The obvious limitation is that this kind of material restricts analysis to 
reporting the answers in their diversity, leading to anecdotal evidence or the 
‘cherry picking’ of particular comments to fit a purpose. For that reason, 
careful consideration was given to whether insight was valued above 
comparable data and open questions were preferred to closed questions only 
where the balance fell with the former. Some attempt to focus the interview 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
215 Pauline Young, quoted in Carol A B Warren and Tracy X Karner, Discovering Qualitative 
Methods (Roxbury 2005), 12: citing Jennifer Platt, ‘The History of the Interview’ in Jaber D 
Gubrium and James A Holstein (eds), Handbook of Interview Research (Sage 2002), 37. 
216 The interview design is given in Annexe 1.  
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discussion was made by defining the topics (as given within the ‘research 
parameters’ above) at the start of each interview. While these were primarily 
set out to ensure a common understanding of the terms and enhance the 
comparability of answers, this technique also provided a useful way to 
communicate the research aims and develop a rapport with the interviewee, 
reducing the need for ‘throwaway questions’ or other such devices often 
suggested for those purposes.217  
 
Despite the potential for disparity between interviews, the interviewees 
covered a number of common themes. These themes were usually a product 
of question design (drawing from questions common to all interviews) and 
where this was the case, it is interesting to compare and contrast the 
responses given by each of the judge. However, there are some surprising 
variations and some common themes were raised independently or as a 
corollary to the standard questions. For example, almost all of judges 
interviewed raised the ‘linguistic barrier’ as part of their explanation about the 
limited use of jurisprudence outside the traditional common law countries.218 
Judges that didn’t raise the matter of their own accord were asked about this 
factor. Interestingly, those that raised the matter independently of any leading 
question raised the linguistic barrier issue partly in response to a question 
regarding the overt reliance on the jurisprudence of Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. Of the judges that were prompted to consider the possible effect 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
217  See eg Bruce L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science, above n 181, 
101. 
218 The ‘linguistic barrier’ refers simply to the use of foreign jurisprudence precluded by 
unfamiliarity in the published language.   
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of a linguistic barrier on the use of foreign jurisprudence, most were 
dismissive about its relevance. A number of Justices expressed the feeling 
that language would not be a problem and usually gave examples of 
competency in other languages. 
 
Finally, an ethical issue arose as to the use of the interview evidence. It was 
not at first clear whether it would be appropriate to refer to each Justice by 
name when using interview evidence in the analysis. It was concluded that 
the value to be drawn from comparing the interview findings with the case 
analysis would make it impossible to retain full anonymity. 219  Each 
interviewee was therefore offered a right of refusal over the recorded material 
and, to preserve that discretion, the full interview transcripts are not included. 
As Paterson found, the confidential atmosphere of each interview 
‘undoubtedly led to very candid discussions’.220 Nevertheless, in common 
with Paterson’s experience, it was rare that discussions were indicated to be 
‘off limits’. Any revisions to the recorded discussion made by the judges were 
very minor and had little to no bearing on the substance of the discussion in 
point.  
 
3.2.5 Secondary Subjects 
An important research aim was to expose the practical side of using foreign 
jurisprudence, as well as the theoretical. Questions about the research !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
219 This is in contrast to the approach taken by Mak. Mak does not name her interview 
subjects and offered this as a guarantee in her initial communication with the judges: Judicial 
Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 208, 8. 
220 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 190, 6. 
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behind the citations led to questions about those persons, other than the 
Justices, who contribute to the research process. At the time, little 
information was available on those who support judicial work and it became 
clear that speaking with the judicial assistants (JAs) might provide the 
desired insight.221 They are therefore the secondary subjects. 
 
JAs support the work of judges by sourcing material, preparing briefs or 
undertaking specific items of research. JAs are usually appointed for one 
year but some are in post for just one or two terms and, although very rarely, 
a JA may be in post permanently. Only one of the JA posts in the UKSC is 
filled permanently.222 The positions are usually filled by early career solicitors 
or barristers, having completed—or being near the completion of—their 
training contracts or pupillages. Aside from some common duties, such as 
summarising the applications for permission to appeal into petition memos 
and the writing of press summaries, the work of a JA can vary significantly 
according to the judge by whom they are instructed.223  
 
The individuals in post at any one time are not publicly listed. Contact was 
made with the assistance of the Justices and their personal assistants. The 
meeting was agreed with the permission of Lord Kerr (as the Justice with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
221 Recent publications have since shed light on the work of the Supreme Court judicial 
assistants: Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind the Bench’ in Burrows, Johnston and 
Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford 
University Press 2013); Alan Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 190. 
222  The judicial assistant to Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Penelope Gorman, had 
progressed with Lord Phillips up from the Court of Appeal. See further Tetyana Nesterchuk, 
‘The View from Behind the Bench’, ibid 101. 
223 Ibid 104. 
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overall responsibility for the JAs at the time) and arranged by e-mail. Seven 
JAs were present at the meeting, which was conducted as a focus group. 
The focus group dynamic was not a conscious research choice but was 
simply a product of the terms under which it was agreed that I could speak to 
the JAs.224 Thus the focus group took place in the JAs’ open plan offices at 
the UKSC in July 2012. All seven JAs were in post at the time of the focus 
group, although six were coming to the end of their annual contracts. 
 
3.2.6 Reliability of Interview Evidence 
The duration of each interview varied from 28 minutes to 64 minutes. It is 
evidently harder to cover any subject comprehensively in 28 minutes than is 
possible 64 minutes. This must be coupled with the general tendency of 
judges to maintain focus on what most interests them. When combined, 
these factors explain the different level of depth and consideration given to 
some of the subjects raised. It also explains the lack of any interview 
evidence on certain points, from particular judges.  
 
In all but two cases, the reliability of interview data was greatly increased by 
the use of a digital recording device.225 The best efforts were made when 
transcribing the interviews; it is generally considered good practice to capture 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
224 The consequences of this dynamic are explored further under the heading of ‘reliability’ 
below. 
225 This is another contrast with Mak’s experience. Mak explains that she did not use a 
recording device but relied on writing up notes the day of the interview: Judicial Decision-
Making in a Globalised World, above n 208, 64-65. 
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interviewees’ comments as completely and accurately as possible.226 In the 
majority of the interviews, recording devices made redundant the debate 
about memory aids and transcriptions before the interview has ‘gone cold’, 
although there remain important considerations about preserving accuracy of 
mood and tone apart from the language itself. Mischler notes that an 
interview is a speech event as well as a special type of social interaction, 
requiring the contextual entirety of the dialog to be recorded. 227  Thus 
research methodologists generally agree that the interviewer’s own 
questions, prompts and probes should be included and, accordingly, the 
transcripts reflect these fully. Transcriptions were not outsourced,228 and no 
more than one week was allowed to pass before each interview was fully 
transcribed. 229  In the two cases in which a recording device was not 
permitted, the interview was written up immediately after the event.  
 
The nature of the focus group interview with the JAs posed some difficulties, 
which were not encountered during the transcription of the judicial interviews. 
The number of responses and the effect of differing distances from the 
recording unit,230 led to the loss of some material. To some extent it was 
possible to resolve these problems by reference to notes taken during the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
226 Carol A B Warren and Tracy X Karner, Discovering Qualitative Methods, above n 215, 12; 
See also Jennifer Platt, ‘The History of the Interview’ in Jaber D Gubrium and James A 
Holstein (eds), Handbook of Interview Research, above n 215, 37. 
227 Elliot G Mischler, Research Interviewing: Context and Narrative (Harvard University Press 
1986), cited by Carol A B Warren and Tracy X Karner, Discovering Qualitative Methods, 
above n 215, 152-153. 
228 Methodologists warn that transcriptions through ‘hired hands’, whom may not have the 
benefit of memories of the interview, can lead to unsatisfactory results. See eg Carol A B 
Warren and Tracy X Karner, Discovering Qualitative Methods, above n 215, 152. 
229 In the vast majority of cases, the transcriptions were completed within a day or two of the 
interview. 
230 Up to five metres in one case.  
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interview but it is nevertheless acknowledged that human error undoubtedly 
resulted in minor errors or omissions. These practical complications are 
additional to those fed by the nature of the focus group, as opposed to the 
one-to-one interviews conducted with the Justices. While the focus group 
dynamic has the potential to stimulate new thinking about a subject, an 
obvious drawback is that participants may be less willing to give a view on 
sensitive topics. 231  
 
It is worth noting that other researchers have been sceptical about the 
reliability of interview evidence as a foundation for data analysis generally. 
For example, Flanagan and Ahern point out that some commentators have 
questioned the validity of what is termed ‘judicial self-reporting’. 232 They cite 
Epstein and King’s cynicism:  
… asking someone to identify his or her motive is one of the worst 
methods of measuring motive. People often do not know, or 
cannot articulate, why they act as they do. In other situations, they 
refuse to tell, and in still others, they are strategic both in acting 
and in answering the scholar's question. This is obvious from the 
example of asking justices about how they reach decisions…233 
The related risk is that self selection bias might play a role in determining the 
subjects of any interview study. Flanagan and Ahern explain:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
231 See e.g. Richard A Krueger, Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research (4th 
edn, SAGE 2009). 
232 Brian Flanagan and Sinead Ahern, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A 
Survey of Common Law Supreme Court Judges’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1, 8. 
233 Lee Epstein and Gary King, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 69 U Chi L Rev 1, 93.  
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there may be a self selection bias at work due to a judge's 
personal attitudes toward comparison. In principle, such an effect 
might cancel itself out, with those anxious to present favourable 
and unfavourable points of view experiencing an equal marginal 
inclination to respond. As it was voiced to the authors, however, 
the concern is that the effect would predominately work to attract 
responses from those favourable to comparison.234 
Yet, as Flanagan and Ahern point out, ‘as a method of investigating judicial 
decision-making, asking those with actual experience thereof offers unique 
advantages’.235 Since it was possible to interview most of the Supreme Court 
Justices active during the time period for this study, it is hoped that the 
danger of ‘self selection bias’ has been avoided.236  
 
A final but important point is related to the extent to which it is possible to rely 
on responses that are subject to human fallibility. As Paterson found, ‘very 
few Law Lords or Justices have a very accurate picture of decision-making 
data’.237 Paterson’s examples include: 
the frequency with which they are on the winning or losing side 
where the court is sharply divided, their agreement rates with other 
judges, the proportion of judgments that are single, majority 
judgments, or whether their share of the lead judgment allocations 
is above or below the average for the Court.  
Paterson continues that ‘even more intuitive statistics’, including ‘dissent 
rates, the average time taken between the hearing and judgment being !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
234 Brian Flanagan and Sinead Ahern, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law’, 
above n 232. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid 12. 
237 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: the Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court, above n 190, 
8. 
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handed down, and the average success rate for permission to appeal 
petitions or for full appeals, are matters where the Law Lords and Justices’ 
“guestimates” may be considerably off the mark’.238 Similar findings were 
made during the interviews conducted for this study: a number of the Justices 
interviewed were unable to make accurate guesses about the frequency with 
which foreign jurisprudence was cited at the Supreme Court. A connected 
problem is that, at the time of interview, two of the Justices—Lord Sumption 
and Lord Reed—had been in post for only a short time.239 This relative lack 
of experience would be likely to prevent the Justices from obtaining an 
accurate picture of the Supreme Court’s working methods. The evidence 
from the interviews with Lord Sumption and Lord Reed must therefore be 
qualified by the relative lack of experience that the Justices would at that 
stage have had as a Justice of the Supreme Court.  
 
It is for these reasons that the quantitative data collection is important. The 
thesis therefore balances the interview evidence against the evidence 
obtained through the empirical analysis of decided cases, using the former to 
flesh out some of the findings from the latter rather than to represent a 
reliable factual account.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
238 Ibid. 
239 Lord Sumption was sworn in on 1 January 2012 and interviewed on 22 May 2012. Lord 
Reed was sworn in on 6 February 2012 and interviewed on 8 May 2012. 
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3.2.7 Secondary Sources 
An important supplement to the primary materials was given by a substantial 
volume of literature on the subject of judicial reasoning and, to a more limited 
extent, on the use of foreign sources and comparative methodology. 
Previous works were primarily identified and sourced through online 
databases. One text on research methodology cautioned against reliance on 
computer searches alone, noting the reality that online indexes, as with print, 
often suffer from terminological classification bias. 240  For that reason, 
physical searches through library collections were also conducted and did 
yield some additional material. An early review of the literature was an 
essential part of the project design and fed adjustments to the initial research 
questions where appropriate. The research period for this study ended in 
August 2013 but a small number of very relevant works were published later 
that year.241 Final revisions to the literature review were made in January 
2014.242   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
240 Bruce L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, above n 181, 21. 
241 Three important volumes were published in November 2013 which have made valuable 
contributions to legal scholarship in general and to this study in particular. The first of these is 
Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013), which contained an insightful chapter on 
‘Foreign Laws and Languages’, authored by Lord Mance. The second, Alan Paterson, Final 
Judgment: the Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court, above n 190, which draws evidence 
from a number of interviews, including a significant number conducted with the Law Lords 
and Justices of the Supreme Court. The third publication is the most closely related: Elaine 
Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 208. 
242 Mak’s most recent publication was not discovered until January 2014. It was not at the 
time available in any of the London libraries and was not possible to acquire in hardcopy prior 
to the submission of this thesis. The inclusion of that work was facilitated by reference to the 
proofed manuscript, which Mak kindly shared electronically.  
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4 The basis for using foreign jurisprudence  
There are no rules governing the use of foreign jurisprudence in UK domestic 
courts. Decisions of foreign courts are not authoritative in the precedential 
sense; UK Courts are under no duty or obligation to follow the decisions of a 
foreign court.243 In fact, there is no guidance on using foreign jurisprudence 
at all. The UK has no provision similar to section 39(1) of the South African 
constitution, which provides that the Constitutional Court must consider 
international law and may consider foreign law. Indeed as Cram has pointed 
out, the South African provision for consideration of foreign jurisprudence is 
‘the exception rather than the rule’.244 Cram continued:  
More commonly, the citing of foreign norms is largely unregulated 
by constitutions, leaving the judges to exercise their discretion as 
to whether, and in which circumstances, the practice is 
appropriate.245 
 
Some limited guidance is given to advocates by the ‘Practice Direction on the 
Citation of Authorities’, which both welcomes the use of foreign jurisprudence 
and also cautions against the overuse of those sources. Section 9.1 reads as 
follows:  
Cases decided in other jurisdictions can, if properly used, be a 
valuable source of law in this jurisdiction. At the same time, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
243 Recall that ‘foreign jurisprudence’ in this thesis refers to the domestic jurisprudence of 
foreign courts. It does not include in its scope the decisions of supranational courts such as 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (the jurisprudence of which, for example, 
UK domestic courts are obliged to ‘take into account’ where relevant under the Human Rights 
Act 1998).  
244 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence 
with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 119. 
245 Ibid. 
 94 
however, such authority should not be cited without proper 
consideration of whether it does indeed add to the existing body of 
law.246 
Advocates are therefore directed to resist citation to foreign jurisprudence if 
unnecessary. Section 9.2 provides that any advocate who seeks to cite an 
authority from another jurisdiction must: 
ii. indicate in respect of each authority what that authority adds 
that is not to be found in authority in this jurisdiction; or, if there is 
said to be justification for adding to domestic authority, what that 
justification is; 
iii. certify that there is no authority in this jurisdiction that precludes 
the acceptance by the court of the proposition that the foreign 
authority is said to establish.247 
 
This guidance does not extend to the judiciary. There are no rules specifying 
the way that judges must use foreign jurisprudence. In the absence of any 
guiding principles, the authority of foreign jurisprudence is merely persuasive. 
Indeed, as Cram also recognised, the most that could be claimed is that the 
lack of any limitation or prohibition on references to foreign jurisprudence 
might indicate a possible acquiescence on the part of the legislature.248 The 
judges have not suggested a greater role for foreign jurisprudence. Thus 
Lord Mance recently made clear his view that domestic courts could derive 
assistance from foreign jurisprudence, in much the same way that they could 
derive assistance from any other non-binding authority.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
246 s. 9.1 Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities) [2001] 1 WLR 1001; [2001] 2 All ER 510. 
247 Ibid s. 9.2. 
248 Ibid 125. 
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When judges look to comparative and international material, they 
may do so for information, inspiration, or confirmation, just as they 
use domestic decisions that are not binding on them. … What 
Ronald Dworkin calls a ‘relaxed doctrine of precedent’ may 
embrace the past decisions not only of courts above him or at the 
same level in his jurisdiction but of courts in other states or 
countries.249 
However, to say that foreign jurisprudence is merely ‘persuasive’, is to ignore 
the possibility that some sources may (legitimately or not) be more 
persuasive than others. For many, persuasive authority is a nebulous 
concept, ‘...well-known but imprecise’,250  about which we are ‘still in the 
dark’.251  
 
4.1 Persuasive authority 
As a starting point, it is usually agreed that persuasive authority sits in direct 
contrast to binding or precedential authority. Whereas a court must follow or 
give reasons for departing from otherwise binding authority,252 a court is 
neither obliged to follow nor to give reasons for departing from persuasive 
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249, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and 
Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013), 87-88 
citing Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing 1986), 25. 
250 Patrick H Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority’ (1987) 32(2) McGill Law Journal 261, 264. 
251 Chris Flanders, ‘Towards a theory of persuasive authority’ (2009) 62 Oklahoma Law 
Review 55, 57. 
252  The Supreme Court may depart from its own previous decisions (or those of its 
predecessor, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords): 1966 Practice Statement. See 
further James Lee, ‘The Doctrine of Precedent and the Supreme Court’, Inner Temple 
Academic Fellow’s Lecture, Inner Temple, (London, April 2012), 
<http://www.innertemple.org.uk/downloads/education/lectures/lecture_james_lee.pdf> 
accessed 28 November 2012. 
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authority. Indeed, for Schwartz it is the ‘touchstone’ of persuasive authority 
that a court is not ‘required to follow [its] result or reasoning’.253  
 
Schauer agrees: ‘…the distinction between [persuasive and binding authority] 
hinges on whether the decision maker has a choice to use the authority’.254 If 
persuasive authority is not mandatory, it must essentially be optional.255 But it 
is difficult to reconcile ‘optional’ with ‘authoritative’, since the ‘authoritative’ is 
frequently defined as ‘proceeding from an official source and requiring 
compliance or obedience’.256 As Schauer has asked, ‘is there anything at all 
authoritative about an optional authority whose use is solely at the discretion 
of the judge?’257 Along similar lines, Flanders has proposed that it may be 
‘puzzling to speak of persuasive authority? Why not simply persuasive 
sources?’258  The answer must be that it is ‘authority’ if a judge uses it as 
such. In the most straightforward sense, drawing from another argument in 
support of one’s own is an appeal to authority. Law is a practice based on 
authority,259 the appeal to which is signalled by citation.260 As Schauer has 
explained: 
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253 Timothy Schwartz, Comment, ‘Cases Time Forgot: Why Judges Can Sometimes Ignore 
Controlling Precedent’, (2007) 56 Emory Law Journal 1475, 1479.  
254 Frederick Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’ (2008) 94 Virginia Law Review 1931, 1945-
1946.  
255 Ibid 1947. 
256  Oxford Dictionaries <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/authoritative> 
accessed 15 August 2013. Other well known writers have described authority in similar terms. 
E.g. John Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford 1966), 16: ‘A man, or body of men, has 
authority if it follows from his saying “Let X happen”, that X ought to happen’, in Joseph Raz, 
The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press 1979).. 
257 Frederick Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’, above n 254, 1947. 
258 Chris Flanders, ‘Towards a theory of persuasive authority’, above n 251, 66. 
259 E.g. H.L.A. Hart, ‘Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons’, in Essays on Bentham: 
Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Clarendon Press, 1982) 243, 261–66; 
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a legal argument is often understood to be a better legal argument 
just because someone has made it before, and a legal conclusion 
is typically taken to be a better one if another court either reached 
it or credited it on an earlier occasion.261 
A source therefore manifests itself as authority if it is followed or 
distinguished and—crucially—cited. The intuitive hypothesis about 
persuasive authority is therefore that it is ‘authority’ insofar as a court is 
persuaded to use it as such; it is authority which attracts adherence.262 
Schauer’s conclusion, however, was that ‘persuasion is rarely part of the 
equation when persuasive authorities are being used…’.263 The problem is 
one of semantics:  
… being persuaded is fundamentally different from doing, 
believing, or deciding something because of the prescriptions or 
conclusions of an authority. But if this is so, then the very idea of a 
persuasive authority is self-contradictory, for persuasion and 
authority are inherently opposed notions. ... The use of a source 
can be one or the other—it can be persuasive or it can be 
authoritative—but it cannot be both at the same time.264 
 
It is the ‘persuasive’ element that is misleading. The problem for Schauer is 
that, on his analysis, a judge who draws from persuasive authority is learning !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Frederick Schauer, ‘The Questions of Authority’ (1992) 81 Georgetown Law Journal 95, 95–
96; Frederick Schauer ‘Authority and Authorities’, above n 254, 1935. 
260 Frederick Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’, above n 254, 1934-1935: ‘Rather than 
being little more than the characteristic form of legal jargon, the law’s practice of using and 
announcing its authorities—its citation practice—is part and parcel of law’s character’; 
Generally, Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality’, above n 256. 
261 Frederick Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’, above n 254, 1950. 
262 Patrick H Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority’, above n 250, 263. 
263 Frederick Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’, above n 254, 1944-1945. 
264 Frederick Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’, above n 254, 1944. Moreover, Schauer’s 
conclusion is that ‘persuasion is rarely part of the equation when persuasive authorities are 
being used…’, 1944-1945. 
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from that source rather than taking it as authoritative. In that sense, he says, 
it is treated no differently in the decision making process to the treatment of a 
persuasive argument from any source at all. But it is surely not the same 
thing for a judge to be persuaded by an argument ‘heard from her brother-in-
law or in the hardware store’,265 as for a judge to be persuaded by, say, the 
argument of a subject expert or the reasoning of learned judge in a similar 
case before another court. Even if a judge is merely ‘learning’ from 
persuasive authority, it is clear that some sources are better suited to the job 
than others; if a man is to learn about fishing, he would be advised to learn 
from a fisherman. The reasoning of a learned judge in a similar case, 
considering similar problems in a similar court, will be more persuasive and 
carry more authority than the arbitrary reasoning of friends, family or 
strangers.266 
 
A further manifestation of the importance attached to the nature of the source 
is the distinction between ratio dicedendi and obiter dicta. While it is only the 
ratio of binding precedent that must be followed, obiter dicta (statements that 
do not go to the principle upon which a case is decided) have frequently been 
treated as more than merely persuasive authority by courts. Indeed in some 
well-known cases, obiter dicta were so persuasive as to effectively bind 
future courts. A good example is the development of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel in Central London Property Trust v High Trees House. 
As is well-known, the facts of the case centred on the lease of a block of flats !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
265 Ibid 1943. 
266 Ibid 1943. 
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in London. In 1940, given the reduced occupancy rates at the outbreak of 
war, the landlord agreed to reduce the rental rate by half, but did not specify 
the period for which this would apply. By 1945 the flats were at full 
occupancy and the landlord sued for the full rental rate. Denning J upheld the 
claim that the full rate was payable from the moment of full occupancy. 
However, Denning elaborated that a claim for the full rate from 1940 onwards 
would have been unsuccessful, since it would be inequitable for the landlord 
to resile from a representation on which the tenants had relied. This 
elaboration was made in an obiter statement but was subsequently followed 
in a number of cases which continued to develop the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel in English contract law.267 A further example along these lines might 
be the obiter statement in Hedley Byrne v Heller that a duty of care could 
arise with respect to a negligent misstatement giving rise to pure economic 
loss.268 The statement was relied upon in a number of later cases despite not 
being strictly binding.269  
  
In part, reliance on obiter dicta may be explained by the fact that the task of 
distinguishing the ratio of a case can be difficult.270 This might be especially 
so where a case is comprised of multiple judgments as opposed to single or 
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267 E.g. Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215; Amalgamated Investyment Co v Texas Bank 
[1982] QB 84; Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Lts [2007] EWCA Civ 1329. 
268 Hedley Byrne v Heller [1963] UKHL 4 
269 E.g. Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801. 
270 As one introductory text points out, ‘judges do not actually separate their judgments into 
these two clearly defined categories.’ Gary Slapper, How the Law Works (Routledge 2011), 
87-88. 
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plurality judgments. 271  Alternatively, the willingness to follow obiter dicta 
could be indicative of the greater persuasiveness of judicial pronouncements, 
over other sources such as academic literature. This would also explain 
greater persuasiveness of some Privy Council decisions.272  
 
The conclusion that the source of a given statement could have bearing on 
its authority sits in tension with the inclination amongst scholars to define 
persuasive authority as ‘content-dependent’.273 Since persuasive authority 
does not bind intrinsically, it is argued that ‘the authority it holds flows from 
the persuasive content of the authority … [It] ‘compels by what it says, not by 
what it is’.274 Clearly, however, courts do consider the source of persuasive 
authority to be relevant to their analysis about the value of that authority. The 
well-known example about the reluctance of English courts to cite academic 
work of living authors bears this out well.275 It was evidently not the content of 
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271 E.g. Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1739 in which the Court of 
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Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’, above n 254, 1935-1936. 
275 Frederick Schauer and Virginia J Wise, ‘Legal Positivism as Legal Information’ (1997) 82 
Cornell Law Review 1080, 1088–89. This practice altered in 1945 when the House of Lords 
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those sources that altered with death; it was the source itself and, 
presumably, the perceived authority of that source. Even when judges do cite 
the work of living academics it is not always clear what the source of 
authority is. As Paterson wrote in his 1982 study of the Law Lords, it is 
unclear ‘whether these academics influence the Law Lords by the authority of 
their reasoning or by reason of their authority…’.276  
 
For many, the importance attached to the source of the ‘authority’ is at the 
heart of the legitimacy debate. This is particularly clear from the United 
States context. Posner explains:  
Problems arise only when the foreign decision is believed to have 
some (even if quite attenuated) persuasive force in an American 
court merely by virtue of being the decision of a recognized legal 
tribunal. This occurs, in short, when it is treated as an authority, 
albeit not a controlling one …277  
In the UK, it is very clear that some sources are thought to be of greater 
relevance or than others. The point has been recognised in another recent 
publication: 
Within the category of persuasiveness, the scale is a sliding one, 
depending on the case in question, its context, and its factual 
setting. Highly persuasive would typically be the judicial decisions 
from other common law jurisdictions, especially their highest 
courts. However, within the same category of persuasive 
precedent (albeit not with the same weight) also fall the decisions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
276 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (Macmillan Press 1982), 20. 
277 Richard Posner, 'No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws' Legal Affairs July/Aug 
2004 <http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp> 
accessed 01 August 2013. 
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of any other courts in other jurisdictions, which might provide some 
inspiration or analogy in the case at hand, including decisions of 
Continental or other jurisdictions.278 
The Court of Appeal, for example, has described decisions of the Privy 
Council as being of both ‘strong’ and ‘high’ persuasive authority,279 while the 
Supreme Court has referred to decisions of the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR as ‘at least of the very highest persuasive authority’.280 In Cadder v 
HM Advocate, 281  Lord Hope explained that ‘the court is faced with a 
unanimous decision of the Grand Chamber’ and that ‘this, in itself, is a 
formidable reason for thinking that we should follow it’.282 Clearly therefore, 
some persuasive authority is made more important by virtue of its 
‘pedigree’. 283  This is not surprising. In cases engaging provisions of 
international treaties, the decisions of associated supranational courts are of 
obvious relevance to a court attempting to reconcile international with 
domestic law. Similar cases would be those involving international 
conventions with no supranational court, where it surely makes sense to look !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
278 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 77. 
279 ‘...the decision of the Privy Council in Perera v Perera [1901] AC 354 is strong persuasive 
authority for upholding the decision in Parker v Felgate (1883) 8 PD 171’, Perrins v Holland 
and others [2010] EWCA Civ 840, [23]; ‘I doubt whether technically it is binding on this court, 
being contained in a decision of the Privy Council. None the less, it is of high persuasive 
authority’, [49]. See also R (HRH Sultan of Pahang) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] EWCA Civ 616, [35] in which the Court of Appeal sought to formally 
distinguish the Privy Council decision in Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v 
Receiver-General of New Brunswick [1892] AC 437 that was said to have been of ‘high 
persuasive authority’ and followed by the Court of Appeal in Mellenger v New Brunswick 
Development Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 604. 
280 HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (No.2) (FC) [2010] UKSC 2; [2010] 2 
AC 534, 596 referring to Kadi v Council of the European Union (Joined Cases C-402/05P and 
C-415/05P) [2009] AC 1225. 
281 Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 43. 
282 Ibid [45]-[46] (Lord Hope). 
283 Cf Chris Flanders, ‘Towards a theory of persuasive authority’, above n251, 62 arguing 
that persuasive authority does not bind by virtue of its pedigree. 
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for jurisprudence from other jurisdictions interpreting the same instrument. In 
these cases, a court may rely on the foreign jurisprudence in much the same 
way as domestic case law, seeking to identify the interpretation given to a 
particular clause in similar vein to the identification of the core principle (or 
ratio) of a previous decision. However, a distinction between ratio and obiter 
is likely to be of less importance when referring to foreign jurisprudence in 
general, since the domestic court has no obligation to follow the foreign case 
in any event. The court therefore simply refers to foreign jurisprudence 
because it is useful to do so. This is most evident in cases of interpretation 
since (to repeat an earlier conclusion) the reasoning of a learned judge in a 
similar case, considering similar problems in a similar court, will be of greater 
use than the jurisprudence of some other court dealing in different 
instruments. In fact, in such cases, the source (rather than content) of the 
material is probably the very feature that renders it legitimate to use.  
 
4.1.1 Cherry picking 
A related but rather different concern, is the tendency for courts to favour the 
jurisprudence of a court or a family of courts for reasons that are not strictly 
connected to the subject of the instant case. Anxieties about the ‘substantial 
“cherry picking” of which jurisdiction to cite’ are prevalent.284 McCrudden has 
explained this as a concern that ‘those jurisdictions chosen will be those 
which are likely to support the conclusion sought, leading to arbitrary 
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decision-making, not legitimate judging’.285 The asymmetry in the use of 
comparative case law in some domestic decisions does little to rebut this 
suggestion. For instance, Lord Walker found a judgment of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa ‘very helpful’ when giving judgment in Williamson and 
borrowed heavily from Justice Sachs’ reasoning in that decision in order to 
conclude that the ban on corporal punishment did not violate Article 9 of the 
ECHR.286  In that case Lord Nicholls preferred to distinguish the decision of 
the Strasbourg Court in Campbell and Cosans in order to reach the same 
conclusion.287  
 
Using foreign jurisprudence in an inconsistent or arbitrary fashion leads to the 
most prevalent of criticisms, that is that it invites manipulation. Such an 
approach can be encapsulated in Judge Harold Leventhal's well known 
remark, that ‘[u]sing legislative history is like looking out over the crowd at a 
cocktail party to try to identify your friends’.288 Part of the problem, of course, 
is that the burgeoning pool of foreign jurisprudence means that ‘identifying 
friends’ is almost always possible; a judgment might easily be manipulated 
by the ‘unprincipled selection of foreign experience’.289 As John Roberts, 
Chief Justice of the United States, said in his confirmation hearings before 
the United States Senate, ‘you can find anything you want [in foreign law]. If !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
285 Ibid 507. 
286 R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15; 
[2005] 2 WLR 590, [67]. 
287 Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293. 
288 Repeated at Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G Roberts Jr to be Chief 
Justice of the United States, 2005, 109th Congress 200, 200-201.  
289 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’ in 
Jane Holder and Colm O'Cinneide (eds) Current Legal Problems (2006) Vol 59, (Oxford 
University Press 2007), 114. 
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you don’t find it in the decisions of France of Italy, it’s in the decisions of 
Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever’.290 This, it is argued, is where the 
method and reasons involved in using foreign jurisprudence become 
obscured. The consequence is that judicial reasoning is left open to criticism 
on the basis that it appears opportunistic or random. The Supreme Court 
might expose itself to this risk by, for example, citing foreign jurisprudence 
with not real explanation as to how and why the relevant decision was 
chosen. Sometimes, of course, the problem is that the reasons are felt to be 
too obvious to explain.  The clearest example might be the tendency to cite 
jurisprudence from a small family of common law courts, as illustrated in 
chapter five. Thus in SerVaas Inc v Rafidian Bank, Lord Clarke referred to 
decisions from the US Court of Appeals 9th Circuit as ‘strong persuasive 
authority’,291  while Lord Rodger felt a decision of the High Court to be 
‘powerful authority’ in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department. 292  In keeping with these findings, several of the Justices 
interviewed suggested that the courts of long established democracies were 
likely to be the most useful. Lord Phillips, for example, explained that ‘some 
of the Canadian judgments are most impressive and can be very powerful 
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290 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G Roberts Jr to be Chief Justice of the 
United States, above n 288. 
291 SerVaas Incorporated v Rafidian Bank and others [2012] UKSC 40, [28] (Lord Clarke). 
292 HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; HT (Cameroon) v Secretary 
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support indeed for a judgment,’293 while Lord Sumption added that ‘the quality 
and compelling character of the judgments can be very persuasive’.294 
 
The simplest summation is that the legitimacy of foreign jurisprudence 
citation is clouded by an absence of reasons for using jurisprudence from 
one jurisdiction or another. It is because of this that the main purposes for 
using foreign jurisprudence are considered in chapter six, seven and eight, 
where the aim is to elucidate some of the guiding principles applied by the 
Supreme Court when using those sources. Clarity must also be sought on the 
status of foreign jurisprudence and the use of the word ‘authority’. In fact, one 
of the main conclusions of later chapters is that foreign jurisprudence is not 
considered to be ‘authoritative’ in human rights cases before the UKSC. For 
better or for worse, that is a status better associated with the jurisprudence of 
the European Court as the supranational courts providing an authoritative 
interpretation of an international instrument.  
 
4.1.2 Supranational jurisprudence 
In contrast to the lack of guidance about foreign jurisprudence, Parliament 
has legislated on the use of jurisprudence from some supranational courts. 
UK courts are obliged to follow supranational jurisprudence in some cases, or 
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293 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the 
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take them ‘into account’ in others.295 The existence of such guidance has 
arguably increased the weight of those authorities such they are at least 
more persuasive than the decisions of foreign domestic courts. Indeed, many 
have recognised that the attention paid to the Strasbourg jurisprudence has 
often come close to the attention paid to binding authorities.296 So close, in 
fact, that counsel have placed greater focus on the decisions of the 
Strasbourg Court in their arguments. As Baroness Hale recently put it:  
If you come and listen to a human rights case being argued in the 
Supreme Court, you will be struck by the amount of time counsel 
spend referring to and discussing the Strasbourg case law. They 
treat it as if it were the case law of our domestic courts.297 
As Baroness Hale has recognised, this is strange because the ‘Strasbourg 
case law is not like ours. It is not binding upon anyone, even upon them’.298 
The Strasbourg cases are therefore ‘at best, an indication of the broad 
approach which Strasbourg will take to a particular problem’.299  
 
It is worth remembering that the Strasbourg authority was never intended to 
be anything more than strictly persuasive authority. The words ‘must take into !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
295 E.g. Section 3 ECA 1972 has the effect of binding UK courts to case-law of the CJEU. 
Section 2 Human Rights Act 1998 does not bind domestic courts to the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, but at least obliges them to ‘take into account’ its decisions.  
296  E.g. Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (Cavendish 2007) 193, ‘the 
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jurisprudence’; also Roger Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding 
domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ [2004] PL 725; Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Taking Account of 
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405; Jonathan Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720; Jonathan 
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298 Ibid. 
299 Ibid. 
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account’ were heavily debated during the legislative stages of the HRA 1998 
and replacements like ‘must follow’ or ‘shall be bound by’ were rejected for 
precisely the reason that  
... the word ‘binding’ is the language of precedent … [Strasbourg 
decisions] are a source of jurisprudence indeed, but not binding 
precedents which we necessarily should follow or even 
necessarily desire to follow.300 
In the House of Lords debates, Lord Browne-Wilkinson concluded that ‘the 
doctrine of stare decisis … does not find much favour north of the Border, 
finds no favour across the Channel and is an indigenous growth of dubious 
merit’.301 Similarly, Lord Lester took the view that any stronger obligation than 
to ‘take into account’ would be inappropriate ‘since such cases deal with laws 
and practices which are not those of the United Kingdom’,302 while Lord Irvine 
thought it would give way to becoming ‘more European than the 
Europeans’.303 It was instead important to avoid ‘putting the courts in some 
kind of straitjacket where flexibility is what is required’.304 Accordingly the 
White Paper prior to the enactment of the HRA clarified that the scheme of 
section 2 would require domestic courts to ‘take account of relevant decisions 
… (although these will not be binding)’.305 More recently, the then President 
of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, said that ‘if the wording “take into 
account” gives a message at all, it is that we are not bound by decisions of 
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the Strasbourg court as binding precedent’.306 In fact, in his view, had those 
words not been included, ‘we might actually be treating them as stronger 
precedent than we do’.307 
 
Nevertheless, the dominant approach in the early yeas of the Human Rights 
Act was to treat the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court as more than 
merely persuasive authority. This has been a point of criticism in much of the 
academic commentary, where it has been said that the judicial interpretation 
of section 2(1) HRA as requiring domestic courts to ‘follow’ or ‘keep pace’ 
with the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence,308 has lead domestic 
courts to ‘mirror’ the Strasbourg conclusions.309 Some went so far as to 
suggest that the UK courts risk becoming little more than ‘Strasbourg 
surrogates’.310  
 
This loyalty to the Strasbourg jurisprudence prevailed for most of the Human 
Rights Act’s first decade but some reluctance to adhere so strictly to the 
Strasbourg court’s conclusions did begin to manifest itself even during the 
final years of the House of Lords. This is most evident from a series of 
possession proceedings cases, starting with Qazi, and culminating in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Supreme Court decision in Powell.311 As Paterson has written, in this series 
of ‘fraught exchanges’, the House of Lords were split between a group 
opposed to the Convention destabilising a key part of the common law 
relating to property and an opposing group who were more content to follow 
Strasbourg.312 In Qazi, although the House of Lords unanimously held that 
Article 8 was engaged, the majority (Lord Hope, Lord Scott and Lord Millett) 
held—contrary to the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence—that Article 8 was 
not infringed. By the time the matter came back to the House of Lords in 
Kay,313 Strasbourg had decided Connors v UK the other way. 314 The majority 
(Lord Hope, Lord Scott and Lady Hale) in the House of Lords repeated their 
objections to the Strasbourg position. The saga went for another round with 
the Strasbourg decision in McCann,315 which took the minority view in Kay. 
When the matter came back in Doherty, 316 The majority (again Lord Hope 
and Lord Scott, along with Lord Rodger and Lord Walker)317 explained the 
reluctance to follow the Strasbourg line on the basis that the Strasbourg 
Court had not ‘fully appreciated the very real problems that are likely to be 
caused if [the court] were to depart from the majority view in Kay’.318  
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311 Qazi v Harrow London Borough Council [2003] UKHL 43; Hounslow London Borough 
Council v Powell [2011] UKSC 8. For an account of the cases and the state of the law relating 
to possession proceedings leading up to Powell see e.g. Ian Loveland, ‘The shifting sands of 
article 8 jurisprudence in English housing law’ (2011) 2 EHRLR 151.  
312 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: the Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 2013), 
228. 
313 Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council [2006] UKHL 10. 
314 Connors v United Kingdom (2004) 40 EHRR 189. 
315 McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 913. 
316 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57. 
317 Although Paterson notes that Lord Walker expressed ‘grave disquiet while concurring only 
because he felt bound by the principles of stare decisis to do so’: Alan Paterson, Final 
Judgment, above n 312. 
318 Doherty v Birmingham City Council [2008] UKHL 57, [20] (Lord Hope). 
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Once Kay was decided in Strasbourg (predictably endorsing the minority 
from the House of Lords), 319 this internal conflict took a sharp turn. By the 
time the matter returned in Pinnock,320 the jurisdiction of the House of Lords 
had transferred to the Supreme Court who, in the unanimous decision of a 9-
strong court, retreated to a position of guarded loyalty to the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. Lord Neuberger authored the single judgment, explaining that 
where there is  
a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not 
inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural 
aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to 
overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, 
we consider that it would be wrong for this court not to follow that 
line.321 
A year later, a 9-strong Supreme Court endorsed the approach again, in 
Powell.322  
 
These fluctuations in the approach of the top court are also clear outside of 
the possession proceeds saga. Prior to the retreat in Pinnock and Powell, the 
Supreme Court had decided Horncastle, which chapter eight argues 
represents one of the clearest examples of a ‘departure’ from the relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence.323 The Court changed direction again in Cadder, 
considering itself compelled to follow the Strasbourg jurisprudence on the 
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319 Kay v United Kingdom [2011] (Application no 37341/06) [2011] HLR 2, 21 September 
2010. 
320 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45. 
321 Ibid, [48] (Lord Neuberger). 
322 Hounslow London Borough Council v Powell [2011] UKSC 8.  
323 Chapter eight from n 791. 
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right to a fair trial. The current mood turns back the other way; a number of 
Supreme Court Justices have recently set out the view that the time has 
come to reconsider the Ullah type loyalty to the Strasbourg jurisprudence.324  
The once well-ingrained temptation to ‘mirror’ the Strasbourg line appears to 
have been diluted. It appears that the weight of Strasbourg authority is 
tending back towards persuasive, in the optional sense discussed above.325 
 
But even if not considered to be more than persuasive, it at least appears 
that the Strasbourg jurisprudence ranks higher than the jurisprudence of 
foreign domestic courts. Mak has argued that this is part and parcel of an 
‘acknowledgement by British judge of a certain ideological affinity with the 
Strasbourg Court’:326 
In comparison with other courts the Strasbourg case law is 
considered to fit the ideological framework of the British highest 
court regarding human rights protection relatively well. A judge 
mentioned [in Mak’s interviews] that the UK Supreme Court used 
to refer more often to the Supreme Court of Canada, which 
developed important human rights case law after the introduction !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
324  E.g. Lord Wilson proposed reconsidering the Ullah principle in Sugar v British 
Broadcasting Corporation [2012] UKSC 4, [59] (discussed further in chapter eight). Extra 
judicially, see e.g. Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’, 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture (Kuala 
Lumpur, 20 November 2013); Lord Judge, ‘Constitutional Change: Unfinished Business’ 
(University College London, 4 December 2013) Brenda Hale, ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is 
Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme? (2012) 12 (1) Human Rights Law Review 65; 
Lord Phillips, ‘Strasbourg Has Spoken’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge 
and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013), 
118. 
325 Paterson was tempted to conclude that the fluctuations in the approach of the top court in 
part reflect the political dynamics surrounding the 2010 general election, the threats to the 
Human Rights Act from the political right, the Brighton Declaration and the more recent 
prisoner voting saga. See further Alan Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 312, 232; Chapter 
eight from n 791. 
326 Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts (Hart Publishing 2013), 143. 
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of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. 
However, this judge observed that the UK Supreme Court is now 
shifting its attention to Strasbourg, as it considers the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence to be too liberal.327  
 
An unofficial ‘hierarchy’ of persuasive authorities seemed to be well 
established among some of the Justices interviewed for this study. Lord 
Dyson, for example, explained that the approach in Convention cases would 
be to start with House of Lords or Supreme Court cases, if there were any. 
After those would come the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and after those the 
domestic courts but that the latter were ‘considerably down the list’.328 The 
logic is intelligible: it ‘reflects the fact that the Convention is an international 
instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be authoritatively 
expounded only by the Strasbourg court’.329  Courts are able to use the 
jurisprudence of the supranational court as a barometer. Moreover, as 
Masterman has suggested, the case law of jurisdictions not signatory to the 
European Convention is ‘unlikely to point to the direction in which the 
common law should be developed to ensure compatibility with the 
Convention rights’.330  
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327 Ibid. 
328 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Dyson MR, former Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 1 May 2012).  
329 Ullah, above n 308, [20] (Bingham LJ). 
330 Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account’  developing a 
‘municipal law of human rights’ under the Human Rights Act' [2005] 54(4) ICLQ 907, 923. 
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4.2 Legitimacy of using foreign jurisprudence 
Part of the difficulty with using the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts is 
that Parliament has offered no instruction, making the guiding principles 
behind the use of these sources more obscure. Obscurity in judicial 
reasoning does not sit comfortably with the principles of transparency and 
predictability, which are integral to the usual understanding of the rule of 
law.331 Predictably, the lack of clear guiding principles has given rise to some 
debate about the legitimacy of using foreign jurisprudence in the first place. 
As Cram has suggested, resort to foreign jurisprudence has the potential to 
pose ‘awkward questions concerning judicial forays into the policy-making 
realm of the constitution and the erosion of parliamentary sovereignty’.332 
 
In the United States, where the debate is most polarised, an argument has 
been developing about the use of foreign jurisprudence in cases of 
constitutional interpretation for some time. Following several controversial 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, commentators have 
questioned the motivation and mandate for using foreign jurisprudence in 
cases of constitutional interpretation. Although this debate revolves around 
questions that are arguably specific to the United States, there are some 
transferrable themes since the debate engages with broader questions about 
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331 See generally Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2011); Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule 
of Law’ [2007] CLJ 67.  
332 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence 
with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 125. 
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sources of law, the nature of ‘authority’, the role of the judge, judicial 
reasoning and the globalisation of the courts.333  
 
On a very basic level, to draw from foreign jurisprudence supports the simple 
premise that collective deliberation will produce a better solution:334 Many 
minds may weed out bad judgements through an evolutionary process, while 
the multiple analyses may contribute different perspectives. In turn, these 
may lead to better deliberation and better conclusions. Those who support 
the practice of domestic courts using foreign jurisprudence in their judgments 
often cite the benefits of seeking guidance ‘from the accumulated legal 
experience of mankind’:335 ‘If I have a difficult case and a human being called 
a judge, though of a different country, has had to consider a similar problem, 
why should I not read what that judge has said? It will not bind me, but I may 
learn something’. 336  It is illogical, the argument goes, to ignore the 
‘established body of findings to which others have contributed over the 
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333  Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’ (2005) 3(3) 
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335 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law 
Review 129, 140. 
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years’.337 The argument is usually reinforced by analogy to scientific study. 
As Waldron explains: 
Existing science claims neither unanimity among scientists not 
infallibility; nevertheless, it stands as a repository of enormous 
value to individual researchers as they go about their work, and it 
is unthinkable that any of them would try to proceed without 
drawing on that repository to supplement their own individual 
research and to provide a basis for its critique and evaluation.338 
 
Foreign jurisprudence is therefore ‘available to lawmakers and judges as an 
established body of legal insight, reminding them that their particular problem 
has been confronted before and that they like scientists, should try to think it 
through in the company of those who have already dealt with it’.339 The South 
African Constitutional Court’s approach to foreign jurisprudence proceeds on 
these grounds. It has explained that ‘[c]omparative research is generally 
valuable, and is all the more so when dealing with problems new to our 
jurisprudence but well developed in mature constitutional democracies’.340 
Indeed, Rautenbach’s recent empirical study of the South African 
Constitutional Court’s use of foreign jurisprudence shows the court to be 
among the heaviest users of comparative law in the world.341 
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The ‘many minds’ theory, however, has lost momentum and is often criticised 
for being stylised or pitched at a high level of abstraction.342 It has also been 
viewed with scepticism by those who see foreign jurisprudence as irrelevant 
to the interpretative task of the judge. The arguments in the US debate on 
foreign authority exemplify this well. The primary objection to the judicial use 
of foreign jurisprudence in US constitutional cases is usually derived from a 
so-called ‘originalist’ view, whereby the task of interpreting the constitution ‘is 
to try to understand what it meant’ and ‘what it was understood by the society 
to mean when it was adopted’.343 The other viewpoint is that it is the task of 
judges to interpret the Constitution in light of the present day and that it is 
appropriate to do so in the context and culture in which the issues arise. 
Justice Breyer, for instance, sees himself as interpreting the Constitution of 
the United States ‘…in today's world’ and that ‘where similar relevant 
experience becomes more and more common we are more likely to learn 
from other countries’.344 
 
The objection to this approach is sometimes connected to concerns about 
the quality and standing of foreign jurisprudence. Not too long ago the late 
Lord Bingham wrote about the earlier reluctance of English courts to draw 
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Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
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342 Adrian Vermeule, ‘Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory’ (2008) Harvard Public Law 
Working Paper No. 08-02 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087017> accessed 5 July 2011. 
343 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 336, 525 
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344 Ibid 537 (Justice Breyer). 
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from foreign jurisprudence, feeling the ‘unquestioning belief in the superiority 
of the common law and its institutions’ to be at the root of the matter: 345 
When I started in practice, it was an almost universal article of 
faith that English law and legal institutions were without peer in the 
world, with very little to be usefully learned from others…346 
This attitude lingers in the United States. Several of the participants in the 
foreign authorities debate there have expressed scepticism about the value 
in borrowing from certain jurisdictions not previously famous for the quality of 
their human rights decisions.347  
 
Moreover, using foreign jurisprudence as an aid to constitutional 
interpretation is said to undermine the authority of the original text and risk 
importing a meaning that was not intended when the constitution was drafted. 
Since judges in UK human rights cases are not reasoning by reference to an 
original text, the emphasis on retaining the original meaning and sovereignty 
of the constitutional text is itself irrelevant. In fact the absence of such an 
instrument may itself provide the opportunity for comparativism. As Lord 
Mance has recently put it, ‘without the constraints of a constitution or code, 
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345 Tom Bingham, ‘There is a World Elsewhere: the Changing Perspectives of English Law’ 
(1992) 41 ICLQ 513, 514. 
346 Ibid. 
347  Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’ (2005) 3(3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 519, 528 (Justice Breyer): ‘I may have made what 
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the legal systems of England and Scotland have a particular freedom to look 
to other systems’.348 
 
The underlying tension between judicial interpretation and judicial law 
making, however, remains important. This is a tension that is usually 
marched alongside accusations of the ‘cherry picking’ of jurisdictions from 
which citation occurs. These charges are discussed in further detail in later 
chapters, where the purposes for using foreign jurisprudence are given a 
more lengthy analysis. For now it is sufficient to note that a piecemeal or 
arbitrary approach to foreign jurisprudence is not one normally aligned with 
an interpretative exercise and tends to detract from the legitimacy of citing 
such sources.  
 
It is not hard to see why. Used in this way, foreign jurisprudence may simply 
be ornamental, cited when it suits the court to do so. Waldron notes that 
‘reference to official judgments, whether local or foreign, helps rescue judges 
from a feeling of intellectual nakedness’, 349 whereas Posner describes the 
judicial search for quotations and citations of foreign jurisprudence (as well 
as previous decisions) as an effort ‘to further mystify the adjudicative process 
and disguise the political decisions that are at the core of the Supreme 
Court’s output’.350 Slaughter has added that ‘citation of [foreign decisions] 
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348 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), 
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seems most likely to reflect a calculation by the listening court that evidence 
of foreign support or parallel reasoning will strengthen its own decision’.351 
Indeed, it is not universally accepted that legal citations are necessarily 
connected to the outcome in any given case: 
Legal sophisticates these days worry little about the ins and outs 
of citation, tending instead to cast their lot with the legal realists in 
believing that the citation of legal authorities in briefs, arguments, 
and opinions is scarcely more than a decoration. Citation may be 
professionally obligatory, the sophisticates grudgingly 
acknowledge, but it persists largely as an ornament fastened to 
reasons whose acceptance rarely depends on the assistance or 
weight of the cited authorities … it is a mistake to think that the 
cited authorities have very much to do with the substance of legal 
argument or the determination of legal outcomes.352 
 
It must be true that the potential for ornamental citation is greater than ever 
before. Technological developments, in particular, have had a profound effect 
and the World Wide Web has made available a burgeoning pool of materials. 
As Wilson and Horne have commented: 
…from about the mid-1990s judgments started to become 
available on the internet. Previously, most unreported judgments 
effectively vanished. With the internet—coupled with the growing 
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constitutional decision making’ (2004) 2(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 597, 
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351 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, above n 334, 119. 
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number of specialist series—almost every judgment is now freely 
available to counsel.353 
The effect is recognised in the first paragraph of the ‘Practice Direction on the 
Citation of Authorities’:  
In recent years, there has been a substantial growth in the number 
of readily available reports of judgments in this and other 
jurisdictions, such reports being available either in published 
reports or in transcript form. Widespread knowledge of the work 
and decisions of the courts is to be welcomed. At the same time, 
however, the current weight of available material causes problems 
both for advocates and for courts in properly limiting the nature 
and amount of material that is used in the preparation and 
argument of subsequent cases.354 
 
However, the research findings do not indicate a strong inclination on the part 
of the Supreme Court Justices towards ornamental citations for the purpose 
of strengthening decisions in the manner described by Schauer above. In 
fact, not all of the Justices felt that the vast numbers of cited authorities 
would always be an advantage. Lord Reed considered that very numerous 
citations could often be ‘a sign of the weakness of an argument’.355 There is 
also a limit to the number of authorities that can realistically be used, as Lord 
Kerr explained: 
… if you attend an appeal hearing that’s going to last two or three 
days in the Supreme Court and which involves a number of human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
353 James Wilson and Alexander Horne, ‘Judgment Matters’, (2010) New Law Journal 7446 
<http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/nlj/content/judgment-matters> accessed 18 August 2013. 
354 Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities) [2001] 1 WLR 1001; [2001] 2 All ER 510, [1]. 
355 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012). 
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rights issues, you will see vast bundles of authorities, most of 
which are never referred to.356 
The mere presence of foreign jurisprudence in the bundles would not 
therefore prompt the use of those sources by the Supreme Court.  
 
The case law also hints at reluctance to use comparative sources in this way. 
Consider, for example, Lord Carnwath’s comments in ANS v ML [2012] 
UKSC 30: 
We were referred to numerous cases dating back over more than 
20 years, dealing with the rights of children and parents in similar 
contexts. … In general little help is likely to be gained by detailed 
comparative or historical analysis. In the present case, as Lord 
Reed has shown, the relevant Strasbourg principles are readily 
apparent from the most recent cases, and the leading UK 
authorities, as cited in his judgment.357 
When interviewed, Lord Clarke noted that the cases referred to in the 
judgments are ‘very often the tip of the iceberg in terms of what is actually 
considered … one simply can’t refer to every case that was referred to …’ 
and pointed to some thick bundles of authorities to show the size of the 
practical problem. It is not surprising, therefore, that the comparative 
authorities which Lord Carnwath had implied were referred to by counsel in 
ANS are not found in the published judgment.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
356 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the United Kingdom 
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If it were the case that citations represent little more than decoration, they 
could surely be left out altogether, as Lord Carnwath apparently felt able to 
do here. Indeed during the data collection stages of research, it was clear 
even from the smaller number of references given in the law reports (as 
opposed to the full lists that would be found in the printed cases) that counsel 
frequently cited foreign jurisprudence which did not subsequently appear in 
the judgments. Some of the interviewed judges explained the discrepancy. 
Reflecting on the length of judgments in some jurisdictions, Lord Walker 
pointed out the size of the ‘bundle’ of authorities given to them by counsel 
(prior to the oral hearing), some of which included over 300 cited cases.358 
The numbers of citations was, he felt, ‘terrifying, and one of the reasons that 
litigation is so expensive’.359 Moreover, ‘a judgment shouldn’t be a textbook. 
It shouldn’t try and refer to all the relevant cases’.360  
 
Since judges decide cases on the basis of reasoned arguments, it is 
expected that there would be a strong correlation between materials referred 
to by counsel and those cited in the judgments. However, without access to 
the printed cases, it is impossible to quantify the full extent of counsel’s 
submissions so as to prove this correlation.361 The most that can be claimed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
358 Lord Walker also gave a rare insight into these bundles of authorities in HJ (Iran) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the 
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359 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, former Justice of the United 
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is that there is a general perception that counsel at the Supreme Court would 
be likely to refer to foreign jurisprudence. Lord Clarke felt this to be obvious 
from the quality of counsel at the Supreme Court:  
The great thing about being in the Supreme Court is that we have, 
on the whole, very high quality counsel, who spend a great deal of 
time preparing every conceivable argument on every conceivable 
point and quite a few inconceivable points. And so they’d think 
nothing of filling the books with endless references to 
jurisprudence from all around the world.362 
Baroness Hale also explained that this was always going to be more likely at 
the highest appellate court: 
… you will find big variations as between this court and the Court 
of Appeal and the High Court, because obviously, any advocate 
preparing a case has got to think, ‘how interested will the Court be 
in this comparative material?’ … it costs money to cast your net 
wider and it’s pretty tricky for them … to predict the level of interest 
that there will be in a very busy court, whereas they can be pretty 
certain that, by the time it gets to us, we will want to know whether 
there is anything helpful in the rest of the world.363 
 
If the citation of foreign jurisprudence does follow from references made by 
counsel especially those made during the oral arguments, courtesy may be a 
factor. As Wilson and Horne explain: ‘counsel feel able, and often obliged, to 
cite multiple authorities and judges, in turn, feel compelled to deal with all of 
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them’.364 Although they considered the practice likely to be more acute in the 
lower courts (where a judge may prefer to deal with as many of the 
authorities as possible by way or a pre-emptive strike ‘lest failure to do so 
results in an appeal’), it is evident that similar considerations apply at the 
most senior level. For example, Lord Reed described during interview that 
foreign jurisprudence might come to his attention while reading into the 
academic literature on a problem. That jurisprudence, he explained, may not 
necessarily find its way into the judgment unless it were directly on point and 
important—in which case it would just be ‘good manners, apart from anything 
else, to acknowledge the idea you’ve found somewhere else’.365 Citations 
made out of courtesy was also a theme picked up by Mak in her interviews:  
The attitude of the British judges in particular has consequences 
for the use that is made of judgments from foreign courts. … If an 
argument is found in a foreign judgment and used in the reasoning 
of the case at hand, it is only courteous to mention the author, as 
one Supreme Court judge stated.366  
Bell later agreed and argued that evidence of courteous citations could be 
found in the Supreme Court’s recent case law:  
Knowsley very much reflects courtesy to counsel, who had 
presented the material at length and so merited a response, even 
if it was not very positive. Certainly Lord Mance's comments reflect 
a concern to show that he had considered the material, even if he 
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felt he could come to a decision without having to make a final 
decision on the value of that material.367  
There are numerous other examples in the Supreme Court’s case history to 
demonstrate this sort of approach. For example, in HJ Iran v Secretary of 
State of the Home Department Lord Hope made a point of noting that ‘the 
court was referred to a number of decisions in Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, the United States and Canada’ and went on to spend five paragraphs 
reviewing those authorities, presumably to explain his conclusion that they 
did not ‘reveal a consistent line of authority’ on the point.368  
 
Nevertheless, citations of this kind are not necessarily ornamental in the 
‘decorative’ sense described by Schauer above. At the very least, it is a 
fundamental feature of judgment writing that reasons are given for the 
conclusions reached. As many academics point out, the giving of principled 
reasons for judgments is a core aspect of the rule of law and judicial 
accountability. 369  It is no surprise, then, that a judge would address 
arguments put to him by counsel and seek to explain why he did or did not 
take the same view (especially, perhaps, in the case of the latter).  
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A slightly different version of the courtesy point is that judges may cite foreign 
jurisprudence (or any jurisprudence) out of respect for a particular court or 
jurist. In other words, a judge might cite foreign jurisprudence in their 
judgment if it has been thought to provide a particularly well-reasoned 
account of the relevant issue, even where the conclusion in the domestic 
case is not in line with that authority. In these circumstances it might look like 
foreign jurisprudence is being formally distinguished, in the manner of binding 
precedent. When raised in the interviews with some of the Justices, two 
possible explanations were given. The first was a speculation that it might be 
a means of showing respect to the jurist who had authored the judgment in 
question. The second was that judges may do this simply as part and parcel 
of the duty to give reasons—in this case explaining why a source has not 
been very persuasive especially if counsel have placed emphasis on it in the 
arguments. This explanation ties in with the earlier discussions of showing 
respect to counsel and was best articulated by Lady Justice Arden, in the 
Court of Appeal: 
Most likely [foreign jurisprudence is distinguished] because it has 
been cited and … if you’re turning away a party and holding that 
their case must be rejected, if they’ve relied on some foreign 
authority and made a big point of it then you have to deal with it.370  
 
Nevertheless the prevailing feeling in the UK is that judgments are already 
too long and that citations of this kind would be increasingly unlikely. The 
Justices of the Supreme Court are visibly taking steps to reduce the length of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
370 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden, Lord Justice of Appeal (Royal Courts of 
Justice, London, 7 December 2011). 
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their reasoning.371 Ornamental citations of foreign jurisprudence are therefore 
less and less likely to be a feature of judicial reasoning. Indeed none of the 
interviewed Justices expressed the view that superfluous citations of this kind 
would be a useful addition to a judgment. Lord Kerr’s assessment was that: 
… to add to the authorities that we consider by casting around in 
domestic courts is probably not going to be a profitable exercise. 
Ultimately … the outcome of these cases depends critically on 
your own powers of analysis. Reference to authority, be it 
domestic, supranational, international or whatever, is always going 
to be by way of supplement to your own reasoning in the case. 
Hopefully to confirm the views that you have formed and, 
occasionally, to shape those views. But I see that very much in a 
secondary—an extremely important but nevertheless secondary – 
role.372 
The dismissive view adopted by Schauer’s legal realists therefore cannot 
provide a satisfactory explanation for citations of foreign jurisprudence at the 
UK Supreme Court. The Justices are not interested in padding out judgments 
by referencing foreign jurisprudence. Moreover, if the explanations given by 
Lord Walker, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed above explain anything about the use 
of foreign jurisprudence it is that citations would probably only be relevant if 
directly on point and important. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
371 The most obvious example is the common use of single and plurality style judgment (As 
discussed in chapter five, text from n 514) even if the reality isn’t quite as envisaged. 
Paterson’s empirical research revealed that ‘on average, sole leading judgments are longer 
than multiple leading judgments in the Supreme Court’. Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: the 
Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 2013), 106-107 and n161. 
372 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 356.. 
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The attitude is more severe in the United States. Justice Scalia of the US 
Supreme Court has repeatedly denounced any reference to foreign 
jurisprudence as a practice that ‘invites manipulation’.373 Dissenting in Roper 
v Simmons,374 Scalia said that ‘to invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s 
own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but 
sophistry’. 375  For Justice Scalia then, citation of foreign jurisprudence is 
entirely opportunistic: ‘[w]hen it agrees with what the justices would like the 
case to say, we use the foreign law, and when it doesn’t agree, we don’t use 
it’.376 The criticism usually derives from a lack of transparency about the use 
of foreign jurisprudence or a feeling that judges are not applying a methodical 
approach to the selection of those sources. As Cram has written: 
…frequently no clear methodology is adopted to explain why 
certain sources were considered and others ignored, leaving its 
practitioners open to accusations of methodological sloppiness 
and a tendency to judicial activism. The latter charge arises 
because, critics argue, only those foreign norms that sit 
comfortably with the judge's moral preferences are ever likely to 
be invoked.377 
 
An obvious opportunity to level this sort of criticism can be drawn from the 
propensity of judges use foreign jurisprudence which has not been raised by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
373 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 336, 
531 (Justice Scalia). 
374 Roper v Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 627. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 336, 521 
(Justice Scalia). 
377 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 244, citing Yash Ghai, 
‘Sentinels of Liberty or Sheep in Woolf's Clothing? Judicial Politics and the Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights’ (1997) 60 MLR 459, 479. 
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counsel. For example, it is possible that relevant foreign jurisprudence may 
come to light after the oral hearing or that judges would be willing to engage 
in extra research into comparative material. Evidence that the late Lord 
Rodger engaged in research of this kind can be drawn from Tetyana 
Nesterchuk’s—one of his previous judicial assistants—recent account of her 
role. Nesterchuk explained that written pieces of research to assist with the 
writing of the judgment would usually be commissioned at the post-
deliberation meetings with Lord Rodger (after the oral hearing in any given 
case) but that Lord Rodger would often carry out his own research in 
parallel.378 She continued: 
I soon discovered that I was linguistically ill-equipped to assist 
Lord Rodger who could read a number of languages, including 
French, German and Italian, and would often look up decisions 
from foreign jurisdictions to inform or supplement his judgments.379 
When interviewed, Lord Phillips implied that this was a relatively frequent 
occurrence at the Supreme Court:  
We do a bit of our own research on areas of foreign law … that 
was particularly the case with Lord Collins. He would almost 
always go off and do some research and come up with a chunk of 
his judgment which didn’t owe very much to counsel.380 
Lord Collins explained in the interview that there were a number of factors 
that led him to conduct independent research of this kind. The first was to do 
with expense: while in big commercial cases few expenses are spared, in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
378  Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind the Bench’ in Burrows, Johnston and 
Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford 
University Press 2013), 109. 
379 Ibid. 
380 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, above n 293. 
 131 
others such as human rights cases, looking into foreign jurisprudence may 
not be included in the advocate’s fee but may nevertheless be helpful for the 
court to hear about it. The second factor was a question of practicality: it was 
‘not for counsel to start looking at American law when they are not familiar’ 
with the exercise—‘these things take time’.381 Lord Collins felt himself well 
placed to look into these matters and fill voids left by counsel. 
 
Some of the justices felt this to be a bigger problem than others. Lord Kerr, 
for example, considered that if that jurisprudence was in any way 
controversial it was important that counsel should be given the opportunity to 
make submissions on it:  
If counsel had not made submissions on this particular theme, and 
we subsequently discovered that there was a rich vein of 
jurisprudence to be mined from other jurisdictions, there would be 
two alternatives: … if it was in any way controversial, if there were 
arguments to be made on either side of the particular theme, I 
think it’s likely that we would invite submissions from counsel on it. 
More usually submissions in writing, but occasionally—very 
occasionally—we have found ourselves in a situation (and I’m not 
now talking about foreign jurisprudence) where after deliberations 
between the Justices, issues have arisen which we feel where not 
sufficiently canvassed in the appeal hearing and we have 
reconvened to allow counsel to address those.382 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
381 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, retired Justice of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012). 
382 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 356. The issue of judges 
referring to material that was not raised by counsel is given further discussion in chapter 5, 
from n 428.  
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It is therefore considered to be sufficient that counsel have been given the 
opportunity to consider an argument that the Justices plan to use in the 
determination of the case. However, it the position was felt to be ‘sufficiently 
clear so as not to require further submissions’, the Court might ‘conduct the 
research ourselves and take whatever course that jurisprudence led us to’.383  
 
This latter suggestion risks controversy. In such circumstances it is easy to 
sympathise with Justice Scalia’s feeling that citations of foreign jurisprudence 
are largely opportunistic. It is the task of judges to decide cases on the basis 
of reasoned arguments and the idea that a judge might conduct their own 
research, independently of the arguments given by counsel, runs the risk of 
obscuring the reasons for their conclusions and compromising the 
transparency upon which the legitimacy of the judicial process is founded. At 
the extreme, such techniques may be considered to render a trial unfair for 
the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR since the essence of a fair trial is that 
the parties are entitled to hear and reply to the case against them.  
 
Perhaps for these sorts of reasons, Lord Clarke explained that ‘one is 
generally reluctant … to decide cases on arguments that were never run’ and 
that the preference would be ‘not to cite important authorities that were never 
mentioned’. 384  Lord Sumption explained that even reliance on written 
submissions ‘would be very unsatisfactory on a brand new area’.385 It would 
risk ‘counsel passing like ships’ and one would ‘not [be] able to ask them !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
383 Ibid. 
384 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, above n 362. 
385 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumption, above n 294. 
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about points which you need to clarify’.386 Thus even where relevant material 
has been found independently of counsel’s arguments, the Supreme Court 
will try to give counsel the opportunity to address them on it. If a Justice were 
to be influenced by foreign jurisprudence that was considered independently 
of counsel’s arguments, it would always be referenced in the judgment. As 
Lord Kerr put it:  
If I, in writing a judgment, have been influenced by a foreign 
judgment, I will say so. I will not … keep it in the background and 
allow it to inform my thinking but not refer to it in the judgment. I 
think that would be … a very curious way of writing a judgment: 
allowing yourself to be influenced by a factor which you don’t refer 
to.387 
 
In any case, foreign jurisprudence is not generally used as a ‘magical ace of 
trumps’.388 Lord Collins felt ‘sure that [he had] never been turned by foreign 
law’.389 At best he ‘might have been confirmed in [his] feelings'.390 Such 
research would be ‘very much icing on the cake’ (and preferably prior to the 
arguments ‘so that you can put any tricky matters to them’).391 Lord Justice 
Sedley was of a similar mind when contributing to a ‘roundtable’ on 
comparative constitutionalism:  
Comparative constitutional law is of infinite interest but of little or 
no practical value in constitutional adjudication (…) My sympathies !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
386 Ibid. 
387 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 356. 
388 Tom Bingham, Widening Horizons (Cambridge University Press 2010), 7-8. 
389 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 381. 
390 Ibid. 
391 Ibid. 
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are with the British academic who has described the practice—not 
the theory—of comparative law as judicial tourism. Tourism is 
enjoyable and informative, but the artifacts which you bring back 
cannot be more than decorative. The real value of what you learn 
is to enhance your appreciation of your own culture. Like other 
British judges I refer to comparative sources in some of my 
judgments, a number of them on constitutional issues. But no 
judge I know anywhere in the world has ever decided a case 
differently because of persuasive decisions in other jurisdictions. 
Comparative sources will either amplify the decision which the 
judge has already decided is the correct one or, at worst, will be 
sidelined as unhelpful. This is not the isolationism of a Scalia. It is 
the cosmopolitanism of a Kennedy, a Breyer, a Ginsburg—
tempered by judicial realism.392 
 
A distinction ought to be made, however, between piecemeal citations of 
foreign cases and citations of multiple foreign cases together presenting a 
common consensus. To conflate the two would commit the fallacy of 
composition. Identifying a consensus on a particular issue is one of the most 
obvious reasons for which judges draw from foreign jurisprudence. 393 For 
some, referring to a consensus position is the most legitimate way to use 
foreign jurisprudence. Returning to the science analogy, a consensus 
represents ‘a dense network of checking and rechecking results’.394 It is more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
392  Stephen Sedley, ‘Constitutional Court Judge’ in ‘Comparative Constitutionalism in 
Practice: Constitutional court judges' roundtable’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 543, 569–70. 
393 Vlad F. Perju, ‘The Puzzling Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate’, above n 273, 175; 
Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ above n 335, 139. 
394 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, ibid 145. 
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than a simple accumulation of authorities and may therefore be more than 
the sum of its parts.395  
 
For those that see foreign jurisprudence as an opportunity to draw assistance 
from other judges facing similar problems, a consensus may represent a 
viewpoint that a judge would be remiss to ignore. As Justice Breyer of the 
United States Supreme Court has put it, ‘… the fact that everyone in the 
world thinks one thing is at least worth finding out’. 396  For others, this 
approach is problematic. Identifying and relying upon a consensus in the 
foreign jurisprudence is to legitimate that authority on the basis of a nose-
count; it is the mere fact of that conclusion being reached by a number of 
foreign jurisdictions that is the justification. Used in this way, the authority of 
foreign jurisprudence is content-independent and tends towards more than 
merely persuasive authority. A court draws value not from the reasoning 
towards the consensus position but from the consensus itself.397  In this 
situation, the difference between precedential decisions and decisions with 
merely persuasive authority turns out to be, as Flanders as put it, ‘more a 
difference in degree than a difference in kind’;398 a kind of ‘super persuasive’ 
authority.399 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
395 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, above n 335, 145. 
396 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 336, 519, 
(Justice Breyer) 
397 Vlad F. Perju, ‘The Puzzling Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate’, above n 273, 178-
179; Richard Posner, 'No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws', above n 277; Frederick 
Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’ (2008) 94 Virginia Law Review 1931, 1944. 
398 Chris Flanders, ‘Towards a theory of persuasive authority’, above n 251, 59.  
399 Ibid 82. 
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The ‘nose-counting’ exercise is also problematic on the basis that it 
presumably relies on the consensus theory of truth. Among the most obvious 
of criticisms is the simple possibility that a consensus can be engineered. 
Young has related the point well, arguing that a consensus amongst foreign 
jurisprudence ‘carries no guarantee of moral authority’ because the 
consensus itself ‘could be the result of international arm-twisting, legitimacy-
seeking, or simply a tendency to fall into patterns by imitating the behaviour 
of other states (“acculturation”)’.400 
 
An altogether different situation is the one in which the aim of the exercise is 
to identify the consensus itself. Such an exercise may be relevant, for 
example, to a court whose aim is to adjudicate in line with a particular 
agreement or regime. This point is pertinent to UK human rights cases since 
UK courts are duty bound by the HRA 1998 to decide cases compatibly the 
ECHR.401 Unlike the US Constitution, which places emphasis on interpreting 
an original meaning, it is well known that the Convention is said to be a ‘living 
instrument’, to be interpreted ‘in the light of present-day conditions’.402 A by-
product of this is that the ECtHR has frequently altered its decisions on the 
basis of an ‘emerging consensus’. Keeping track of any evolving consensus 
is an exercise that has, on occasion, been passed down to the domestic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
400 Ernest A. Young, ‘Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem’, (2005) 119 Harvard Law 
Review 148, 157 (citing Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘How to Influence States: 
Socialization and International Human Rights Law’, (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621, 638–
56); Vlad F. Perju, ‘The Puzzling Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate’, above n 273, 180. 
Cf Chris Flanders, ‘Towards a theory of persuasive authority’, above n 251, 84: ‘the more 
courts that have decided a matter in a certain way, the greater weight those decisions may be 
said to have, and not necessarily because consensus is a measure of truth’. 
401 Section 6(1) and 6(3) Human Rights Act 1998. 
402 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 [31]. 
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courts of the United Kingdom.403  When seeking to ‘keep pace’ with the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence in such cases, UK courts may find the domestic 
jurisprudence of other signatory states instructive. As the late Lord Bingham 
wrote: 
… the judge's task is not, as in an ordinary domestic case, to 
ascertain the meaning to be given to an expression in English law: 
it is to ascertain the autonomous meaning which an expression 
bears under the Convention.404 
 
Courts discharging such a task would be likely to refer to the jurisprudence 
that the Strasbourg Court would itself be likely to consider. Similar 
considerations prevail when the Court is interpreting an international 
Convention with no supranational court. In those cases the case law of 
foreign domestic courts is of even greater importance; the very purpose of 
these instruments is to harmonise standards on a particular issue. Consider, 
for example, the preamble to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), which recognises that ‘a satisfactory 
solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognised the 
international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
403 The duty of a domestic court to keep track of the development in Convention attitudes is 
most clearly exemplified by a series of judgments on the rights of transsexuals: Rees v UK 
(1987) 9 EHRR 56; Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622; Sheffield and Horsham v 
United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 163; Bellinger v Bellinger [2001] EWCV Civ 1140. In the 
earlier cases, the Court held that the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to alter the 
register of births or to issue birth certificates concerning the recorded gender of the individual 
could not be considered as an interference with the applicant’s Article 8 right, instead 
affording the UK a wider margin of appreciation but stressed the importance of keeping 
appropriate legal measures in this area under review. In Goodwin v United Kingdom [2002] 
EHRR 583 The Strasbourg Court was satisfied that European (and international) consensus 
had progressed so that the ‘fair balance’ now tilted in favour of the applicants and The House 
of Lords in Bellinger accordingly say the case as an appropriate one for a declaration of 
incompatibility.  
404 Tom Bingham, ‘The Human Rights Act’, (2010) 6 EHRLR 568, 572. 
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international co-operation’ (emphasis added).405 Similarly, the preamble to 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child includes 
‘Recognizing the importance of international cooperation for improving the 
living conditions of children in every country’.406 Where several jurisdictions 
are adjudicating with reference to a particular legislative instrument or 
agreement, the decisions of other jurisdictions may deserve recognition for 
exactly the same reasons that courts are minded to follow their own past 
decisions. That is, to uphold the same principles of predictability and stability 
which are embedded by the rule of law domestically.407  
 
Critics point out that this exercise is at odds with the cultural sensitivity of law. 
Returning to the science analogy, the problem is that it ignores the possibility 
that law—or interpretations of the law—can alter from one jurisdiction to 
another. Inescapably, law is a social science and subject to a number of 
external influences that flow from historic and cultural differences. In reality, 
local conditions produce difficulties ‘which are often subtle and require … 
sophisticated analytical tools’ to separate them from their ‘culturally-
determined realities’.408 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
405 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
(entered into force 4 October 1967), preamble. 
406 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, 
preamble.  
407 Chris Flanders, ‘Towards a theory of persuasive authority’, above n 251, 84. 
408 Nicholas HD Foster, ‘The Journal of Comparative Law: A New Comparative Resource’ 
<http://www.wildy.co.uk/jcl/pdfs/foster.pdf> accessed 01 December 2010. Cf Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, (1994) 29 University of Richmond 
Law Review 99, 127: Recognition of this commonality does not obviate cultural differences, 
but it assumes the possibility that generic legal problems such as the balancing of rights and 
duties, individual and community interests, and the protection of individual expectations, may 
transcend those differences’. 
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Thus the problem is not the reference to foreign jurisprudence per se. It is the 
elevation of foreign jurisprudence, often different in character to domestic 
law, to a position where it is treated it as authoritative in domestic courts: 
‘[t]he problem is not learning from abroad; it is treating foreign judicial 
decisions as authorities ... as if the world were a single legal community’.409 
The risk is not lost on the Justices of the Supreme Court. The late Lord 
Rodger, who is usually said to have been one of the most enthusiastic users 
of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court, was aware of the issue and 
apparently voiced it among his colleagues. Lord Mance has recently written 
that Lord Rodger was ‘insistent that the proper use of comparative law 
cannot permit the loose or selective citation of random foreign material; a full, 
informed, and up-to-date understanding is necessary.410   
4.3 Conclusions 
The use of foreign jurisprudence is nowhere prohibited and there are no rules 
governing the practice. First and foremost, therefore, judges use foreign 
jurisprudence because those sources are available to them in the same way 
as other persuasive authorities. Nevertheless, foreign jurisprudence 
represents an unusual kind of persuasive authority. It is unclear, for example, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
409 Richard Posner, 'No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws', above n 277; Mary Arden, 
‘The Changing Judicial Role: Human Rights, Community Law and the Intention of Parliament’ 
(2008) 67(3) CLJ 490, 506. 
410 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’, above n 348, 88, citing ‘The Use of Civil Law 
in Scottish Courts’ in David L Carey Miller and Reinhard Zimmerman (eds), The Civilian 
Tradition and Scots Law (1997) 225, 228-9; ‘Roman Law in Practice in Britain’ (1992) 
Rechtshistorisches Journal 261, 269-70; ‘Savigny in the Strand’ (1993-95) 28-30 Irish Jurist 1, 
19, where Lord Rodger commended the work of ‘scholars like Professor Treitel [in] providing 
the kind of detailed comparative treatment of particular topics without which, certainly, such a 
development’—ie the use of codified civil law sources—‘can never begin’.  
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that the usual distinction between persuasive and binding authority—that 
these carry authority by virtue of content and source respectively—works in 
the context of foreign jurisprudence. Further obscurity is created by the 
variety of purposes for which it is used and, in turn, by the anomaly of the 
consensus theory through which foreign jurisprudence tends towards binding 
rather than merely persuasive authority.  
 
The problem is to do with methodology. Pointing to examples of arbitrary 
decision-making ultimately represents a complaint that the working methods 
behind the use of foreign jurisprudence are unclear. A lack of transparency 
leaves the door open to charges of judicial activism and illegitimate law 
making and, as Perju has highlighted, ‘methodological challenges may be 
fatal to ... the authority of foreign law in such situations’.411 
The intuition is that methodological questions—such as which 
jurisdictions judges should consult, how to check sources and 
references, how they can escape the dangers of nominalism, and 
how to assess the relevance of a particular provision or line of 
reasoning outside of its broader legal, cultural, and historical 
context—are more difficult to answer in situations of piecemeal 
comparisons, with serious implications about the integrity of 
constitutional discourse. 412 
If it is not to be taxed as arbitrary or opportunistic, a system that uses foreign 
jurisprudence must have some methodical basis. It is the lack of clear guiding 
principles that is confusing. To extricate these principles it will be necessary 
to draw together the ways in which judges use foreign jurisprudence, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
411 Vlad F. Perju, ‘The Puzzling Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate’, above n 273. 
412 Ibid. 
 141 
effect of that practice on domestic human rights cases and the processes or 
influences involved. The answers to these may go a long way towards 
dispelling some of the increasingly tired complaints about judicial law making. 
Or, if they must be rehearsed, they may at least refresh the debate. As 
Waldron has explained, ‘we should not reject the idea of a theory of citation 
of foreign law simply because we see foreign law being cited 
opportunistically; we should reject it only if we think inconsistent and 
unprincipled citations is inevitable…’.413  
!  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
413 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, above n 335, 131. 
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5 How is foreign jurisprudence used?  
It was explained in the literature review that most of the published work in the 
field of judicial comparativism focuses on the legitimacy of using foreign 
jurisprudence or on the possibility that uses of foreign jurisprudence have 
provided for a dialogue between courts around the world. All such studies 
usually make an implicit assumption: that the courts are, in fact, using such 
sources. Very few, however, seek to set out the reality of the practice, 
making it difficult to get a real sense of the extent to which courts are actually 
using foreign jurisprudence. As one recent publication in the field notes, 
‘studies have focused extensively on the theoretical aspects of this practice 
… while empirical analysis of the frequency and meaning of citations remain 
generally still rare’.414 This chapter sets out some of the results from the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the judgments handed down by the 
Supreme Court during the first four years of its activity (2009-2013). Although 
this research focuses on human rights cases, quantitative data is given on 
citations of foreign jurisprudence in both human rights cases and non-human 
rights cases. A holistic view is important in order to understand the general 
trends in the use of foreign jurisprudence, so as to enable any context 
specific conclusions to be drawn about human rights cases. The data 
corroborates some of the accounts given by the existing literature and adds 
some new contributions. Crucially, the data shows that the Supreme Court is 
using foreign jurisprudence in human rights cases. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
414 Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges (Hart Publishing 2013), 3; See also Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-
Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative Analysis of the Changing Practices of Western 
Highest Courts (Hart Publishing 2013), 2. 
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5.1 Extent to which foreign jurisprudence is used 
The first claim in this thesis is that the Justices of the Supreme Court are 
using the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts. Judgments frequently 
make references to the decisions of foreign domestic courts. Of the 246 
cases handed down by the Supreme Court in the first four years, explicit 
citations of foreign jurisprudence are found in 77, just over 30% of the total.   
 
Table 1: Proportion of judgments in which at least one decision of a foreign 
domestic court is explicitly cited, by case type. 
 Total judgments 
handed down between 
2009-2013 
Total cases with 
citations of foreign 
jurisprudence 
Cases citing foreign 
jurisprudence as a 
percentage of total cases.  
All cases 246 77 31.3% 
Non-human 
rights cases 
144 42 29.2% 
Human rights 
cases 
102 35 34.3% 
 
Some of the literature suggests that a greater use is made of foreign 
jurisprudence in human rights cases but the empirical research did not find 
this to be true of the UK Supreme Court.415 As table 1 shows, the balance is 
broadly the same whether a case considered a human rights issue or not: of 
the total 246 cases decided by the Supreme Court in the time period, 144 do 
not engage human rights issues and explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence 
can be found in 42 of those, or 29.2%. The remaining 102 can be described 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
415 E.g. Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, above n 414, 416: ‘The research clearly shows that citations of foreign 
case law prevail in … human rights decisions’; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of 
Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20(4) 
OJLS 499, 527, asking ‘is there something specific to human rights that explains the 
apparently greater use of foreign case law in human rights cases?’; Also Jim Murdoch, 
‘Comparative Law and the Scottish judges’ in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in 
Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 2003), 96. 
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as human rights cases and explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence can be 
found in 35 of those, or 34.3%. In other words, the Supreme Court is likely to 
cite a decision of a foreign court in around one in three cases, no matter what 
the subject. However it is important to note that the figures differentiate only 
between ‘human rights cases’ and ‘non-human rights cases’. They do not 
consider human rights cases compared to, say, commercial law cases, 
corporate law cases, and property or tort law cases.416 Further, as explained 
in the methodology, these numbers do not account for non-explicit citations 
of foreign jurisprudence or capture citations of Privy Council decisions.  
 
The data on explicit citations does, however, provide interesting insights. It is 
clear from table 1 that the overall figure for the proportion of cases citing 
foreign jurisprudence is fairly constant when human rights cases and non-
human rights cases are compared. If the same proportions are considered by 
year, however, a more erratic picture emerges. Figure 1 (overleaf) plots the 
proportion of human rights and non-human rights cases containing explicit 
citations of foreign jurisprudence on a line graph, by year. The graph shows a 
spike in the 2010-11 year when explicit citations of at least one foreign 
decision were found in around 47.6% of human rights cases, and this is 
followed by a steady decline between 2011 and 2013. The numbers were 
surprising given the findings outlined by the existing literature: Bell’s 
conclusion was that there had been a paucity of cases citing foreign !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
416 Some insight on these can be gained from Elaine Mak, Judicial Decision-Making), above 
n 414, 180: ‘British judges considered that citations of foreign law mostly occur in human 
rights cases and in private law cases … In contract and tort cases, the shared background 
with other common legal systems is thought to make legal comparison often useful. … The 
use of foreign law is less frequent in criminal law cases.’ 
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jurisprudence in 2010-11 and noted just seven where such sources were to 
be found (not specifically human rights cases). However, as mentioned in the 
literature review, it is not clear whether Bell found only seven cases or chose 
only to consider seven of the found cases for the purposes of that article.417 
The data supporting this thesis shows that 23 of the 58 judgments handed 
down in 2010-11 cited at least one decision of foreign court, and that this 
included 10 (of a total 21) human rights judgments. Meanwhile, the trend for 
citations of foreign jurisprudence in non-human rights cases suffers a 
significant dip in 2011-12, falling to just 13.8%.418  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of human rights and non-human rights cases making explicit 
citation to foreign jurisprudence, by year. 
 
 
The spikes in the use of foreign jurisprudence may be caused by any number 
of factors. It may be, for example, that the use of foreign jurisprudence in 
human rights cases prompted the use of foreign jurisprudence in other types !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
417 John Bell, ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court’ [2012] 1.2 CJICL 20 
418 The data is given in greater detail in Annexe two.  
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of case. Another possibility is that counsel before the Supreme Court in 
2010-11 were more inclined to make reference to foreign jurisprudence in 
their arguments than in 2011-12. The influence of counsel’s submissions on 
the use of foreign jurisprudence citation in a judgment is not always obvious 
from the law reports as the ‘bundles’ of authorities given to the Justices prior 
to the hearing are generally not included.419 Some speculative analysis of 
counsel’s influence is drawn from the interview evidence below. At the very 
least, it is clear that the use of foreign jurisprudence relies upon it being 
introduced to the Court in the first place. As Lord Kerr explained:  
First of all we need to have been referred to the jurisprudence of 
foreign courts, or to have some means of entry to it which arises 
extraneously from the litigation of the appeal. …420 
Alternatively, the Justices active at the Supreme Court in that year may have 
been more inclined to look abroad than their successors in 2011-12.  
 
5.2 The individual approaches of the Justices 
It is clear from the case analysis and the interviews that the tendency to use 
foreign jurisprudence is very likely to be connected with the background and 
inclination of the individual Justices.421 Along these lines, Lady Justice Arden !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
419 Although the ICLR’s Appeal Cases report series do often provide a summary of counsel’s 
arguments, the full list of authorities provided to the Court prior to the oral hearing in the 
‘bundle’ is not included. The reports also resist repetition and only list ‘additional cases cited 
in argument’ further to those cited in the judgment(s) of the court. Thus it is not always 
possible to tell whether judges are citing authorities because counsel have presented them, 
or whether they have come to the court through some other route.   
420 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012). 
421 A point recognised by other recent works: John Bell, ‘Comparative law in the Supreme 
Court 2010-11’, above n 417, 21; Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’ 
[2011] CLJ 420.  
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considered that many judges would be ‘self-starters’ in comparative law: if 
judges had done a lot of work internationally or studied abroad, they would 
be ‘natural self-starters on this because they have no problem with different 
legal cultures’.422 At the Supreme Court, Lord Mance explained that the 
extent to which a judge would be likely to use foreign jurisprudence was 
dependent on: 
…how interested you got, how relevant you thought it might be 
and how difficult it was. Lord Collins, for example, … used to … 
focus quite heavily on American authority. He had access to 
databases and so on which I don’t have access to and he mined 
that. He’s obviously … from his academic work … very much 
interested in comparative law.423  
Lord Mance was himself frequently referred to as a more likely user of foreign 
jurisprudence, by the other interviewed Justices. Talking about the possibility 
of an increase in the use made of foreign jurisprudence, Lord Dyson felt Lord 
Mance to be ‘a shining example’, being ‘more adventurous’.424 Baroness 
Hale, one of the lightest users of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court, 
felt it obvious that the Justices may have different interests and ‘go off on 
frolics on their own’, giving the example of occasions on which the Court may 
get ‘Mance on the German law of something’.425 Lord Clarke implied that he 
was less likely to use foreign jurisprudence than some of his colleagues:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
422 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden, Lord Justice of Appeal (Royal Courts of 
Justice, London, 7 December 2011). 
423 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011). 
424 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Dyson MR, former Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 1 May 2012). 
425 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012). 
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I think we would be unlikely to go on a frolic of our own. I mean I 
would be unlikely myself to send my JA to go and look into the 
French text. But I might, I mean one might … some people are 
keener on it than others. … Lord Mance is very interested in 
German Law for example.426 
 
Table 2 shows a breakdown of the citation practices according to each 
member of the Supreme Court that heard at least one case between 2009 
and 2013. For each judge, the table gives: the total number of cases heard; 
the total number in which the judge contributed a written judgment (which 
includes concurring and dissenting judgments, insofar as these amounted to 
more than the simple expression of agreement with another of the judgments 
in any one case); the number of those written judgments in which explicit 
citations of foreign jurisprudence are found; and the latter figure expressed 
as a percentage. Thus, for example, Lord Hope heard 172 cases between 
2009 and 2013, contributing a written judgment in 128 of those cases. 
Foreign jurisprudence was explicitly cited in 25 of those judgments, 
amounting to 19.5%. In other words, between 2009 and 2013, Lord Hope 
made explicit citation of at least one foreign decision in approximately one 
fifth of his judgments. This proportion is consistent with the practice of 
several of the Justices. Of the Justices that have given more than 20 written 
judgments, the majority fall close to the 20% figure. Lord Clarke, Lord Mance, 
Lord Walker, Lord Phillips, Lord Dyson, Lord Wilson, Lord Rodger, and Lord 
Neuberger fall into this camp. Baroness Hale, Lord Brown and Lord !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
426 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012). 
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Carnwath, however, appear less inclined to cite foreign jurisprudence, with 
Lord Brown doing so in just 4.2% of his judgments. Heavier users of foreign 
jurisprudence are Lord Neuberger and Lord Collins. In fact, the fluctuation 
between 2010-11 and 2011-12 shown by figure 1 may be explained on the 
basis of Lord Collins’ contributions. Lord Collins cited foreign jurisprudence in 
42.9% of his written judgments between 2009 and 2013. In 2010 that figure 
peaked at 63.6%.427 In 2011, Lord Collins gave just two written judgments 
before retiring, neither of which made explicit citations of foreign 
jurisprudence and the figure therefore fell to zero. 
 
The fact that certain judges are more willing to use foreign jurisprudence than 
others is further supported by the different approaches taken to resourcing 
those materials. For example, if counsel had not referred to foreign 
jurisprudence, a number of the Justices interviewed said that they might ask 
for it if they felt it was useful to do so. Lord Kerr explained:  
… If we knew that there was a line of authority which bore on the 
questions that we had to answer and that we considered it was 
likely to be helpful in analysis, and we were alerted to it in 
sufficient time, then certainly we would ask counsel to address us 
on it. There have been occasions—very rare occasions—where 
we have pointed out to counsel that there was possibly some 
assistance to be derived from jurisprudence in other countries and 
invited them to research it themselves and to make submissions 
on it.428  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
427 In 2010 Lord Collins heard 23 cases, gave written judgments in 11 and cited foreign 
jurisprudence in 7.  
428 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 420.  
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The issue was picked up by Paterson during his interviews for The Law 
Lords,429 and revisited in his more recent publication. Paterson notes that: 
Among the counsel whom I have interviewed in the last 40 years, 
there has been a high degree of consensus on [this] point. Even at 
the level of the House of Lords or Supreme Court [counsel] do not 
consider it appropriate for the judges to decide appeals on points 
of law which have not been argued by counsel or at least put to 
them for comment.430  
As Paterson points out, the differences between the Justices in relation to the 
expectation has surfaced in a number of the Supreme Court’s cases:  
Thus, Lord Dyson … observed that Lord Phillips had breached the 
convention [in Lumba], ‘In my view it is not appropriate to depart 
from a decision which has been followed repeatedly for almost 30 
years unless it is obviously wrong (which I do not believe to be the 
case), still less to do so without the benefit of adversarial 
argument.431 
Others among the Justices, however, were less convinced that these steps 
would always be necessary. Paterson notes that ‘Lord Phillips and Lady Hale 
were sceptical as to the strength of the convention when interviewed’,432 
while Lord Reed felt it would be ‘a question of judgement what you decide to 
do’.433   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
429 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (Macmillan 1982) 38-45. 
430 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 
Publishing 2013), 20. 
431 Ibid 22, citing Walumba Lumba (Congo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2011] UKSC 12, [25] (Lord Dyson).  
432 Ibid 21. 
433 Ibid 22.  
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Some indication of the willingness to conduct or commission research on 
foreign jurisprudence can be seen in some of the Supreme Court’s case law. 
In HM Treasury v Ahmed,434 Lord Rodger wrote in his judgment that he had 
found it ‘instructive in this regard to see how certain other Commonwealth 
countries’ had approached the instrument in question. 435  Mak reported 
another example:436 the Jewish Free School case.437 The case is well known 
and concerned a policy to impose a criterion for admission to the Jewish free 
School that a child applicant be recognised as being Jewish by the Office of 
the Chief Rabbi of the United Congregation of the Commonwealth. The issue 
was whether the policy constituted discrimination under section 1(1)(a) of the 
Race Relations Act 1976. The Supreme Court judgments cite inter alia 
jurisprudence from Israel, New Zealand and the United States of America.438 
The source of the jurisprudence is not obvious from the reported judgment 
but Mak’s evidence from her own interviews is that ‘[s]everal members of the 
panel indicated that extra comparative legal research had been carried out at 
the request of the judges themselves’.439 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
434  Her Majesty’s Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (No.2) (FC) [2010] 
UKSC 2. The case is discussed further below, from n 873. 
435 Ibid [199].  
436  Elaine Mak, ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the 
Netherlands: Explaining the Development of Judicial Practices’ (2012) 8(2) Utrecht Law 
Review 20, 31. 
437 R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15.  
438 Respectively: No'ar K'halacha v Ministry of Education HCJ 1067/08 (unreported) 6 August 
2009, SC Israel; King-Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531; Bob Jones University v United 
States (1983) 461 US 574. 
439  Elaine Mak, ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the 
Netherlands’, above n 436, 31. 
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5.3 Practical matters: accessing foreign jurisprudence 
Since the Justices do sometimes consider foreign jurisprudence as a product 
of their own research in this way, it is interesting to consider how this unfolds. 
These questions are part and parcel of any understanding about the way that 
foreign jurisprudence is used at the Supreme Court. Baroness Hale 
confirmed that there were several avenues to the use of foreign 
jurisprudence:  
We might ask Counsel, we might know about it anyway, we might 
look it up, or we might get one of our legal assistants to look it up 
and see if there is anything.440  
Practical considerations play an important part. Lord Collins explained that 
the main barrier to using foreign jurisprudence was likely to be a question of 
resources: 
By contrast with the United States, we don’t have banks of law 
clerks here, and so those Justices who are interested in the way 
things are done abroad will get their law clerks to research it and 
those who are not, won’t. Here, by contrast, we are … largely 
dependent on counsel for our legal materials. We have some 
judicial assistants but on the whole I don’t think that they are used 
much for research...441 
 
The judicial assistants (JAs) are qualified barristers or solicitors in the UK. All 
but one JA (at the time of writing) are appointed for one-year posts and are 
generally available to assist their assigned Justice(s) in their work. The JAs !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
440 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425. 
441 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, retired Justice of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012). 
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do not write judgments but have had a growing input in other ways.442 For 
example, it is no longer uncommon for JAs to see and comment on draft 
judgments of their own Justice or sometimes even those of other Justices.443 
Their role may also include conducting research on the cases and a Justice 
could certainly ask his JA to look into foreign jurisprudence if it appeared 
relevant. This might be of particular relevance if a Justice relies on his 
assistant to carry out online searches. Although not specifically discussing 
foreign jurisprudence, one of Lord Brown’s JAs has written that she was 
frequently asked to conduct research of this kind: 
Either in the morning before the oral hearing or in the lunchtime 
break, Lord Brown would often think of a case that contained 
useful guidance on the matter that was before the Court. If the 
parties had not relied on this particular authority, it would be my 
job to find it and print enough copies for the Justices and the 
parties if Lord Brown decided to bring it up in oral argument. I 
would also give my view on the relevance of this new authority and 
highlight any important passages.444 
Lord Reed explained that his JA might make notes through her own initiative 
and that she may choose to give references to foreign jurisprudence but that 
he hadn’t so far specifically asked her to research foreign jurisprudence.445 
However the amount of foreign jurisprudence that would be likely to come !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
442 Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of the Judges (Hart Publishing 
2013), 383; Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court 
(Hart Publishing 2013), 254-256. 
443 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court, Ibid, 254-
257. 
444  Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind the Bench’ in Burrows, Johnston and 
Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford 
University Press 2013), 107. 
445 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012). 
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from the JAs is limited. For the most part, the JAs are often too busy to 
undertake extensive research of this kind without having been prompted for 
it. It is also not the case that the UKSC Justices each have their own JA as 
do, for example, the Justices of the United States Supreme Court or the 
courts of other countries.446 The JAs explained that it was normal for some of 
their work to be shared between two Justices, and, at the time of the 
interviews, Lord Reed and Lord Kerr shared a JA.447 Lord Kerr confirmed that 
there were limited opportunities for the JAs to undertake this kind of 
extraneous research: 
… partly because I share [a judicial assistant] with Lord Reed, but 
mainly because we are so busy, the opportunity to cast a wide net 
over potentially relevant foreign jurisprudence just doesn’t exist.448  
Others among the Justices interviewed expressed similar sentiments about 
time pressures in reference to their own research. For example, Lord Mance 
felt that digesting the precise meaning of foreign jurisprudence would 
necessarily take time: 
If I get say six decisions of the German Supreme Court or 
Constitutional Court, it takes some time to read them – they are 
not short! … You could easily spend, you know, three or four 
hours reading those decisions once you’ve got them, and you’ve 
got to find them first.449  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
446 See further David S Law and Wen-Chen Chang, ‘The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue’ 
[2011] Washington Law Review 523. 
447 Focus group interview with the judicial assistants of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012). 
448 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 420. 
449 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011). 
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Nevertheless several of the justices admitted that they would be likely to 
conduct their own research into areas of foreign jurisprudence that were felt 
to be of interest. Technological developments, in particular, have had a 
profound effect on this; the ability to conduct research and communicate 
online has made available a burgeoning pool of materials. This compliments 
a growing tradition of international conferences and symposiums, which 
facilitate a direct exchange of ideas between judges and practitioners from all 
over the world. As Cram has said, ‘just as those parties appearing before the 
courts interact increasingly with others beyond national boundaries …so are 
courts confronted with the existence and practices of other legal systems’,450 
and it is not surprising that these have filtered into their judgments. Baroness 
Hale commented, ‘you only have to push a few buttons’ to find any material 
that may be of interest.451  
 
In most cases this involved using the various legal databases such as 
Westlaw International or LexisLibrary (previously LexisNexis) which was itself 
indicative of one of the main differences between judicial reasoning at the 
Supreme Court and in lower courts. In the Court of Appeal, for example, Lady 
Justice Arden explained that the time pressures would often be too great to 
allow for much research of this kind on the part of the judges:  
You have to have something which gets you started with the 
foreign law, because you simply do not have time to go and, as it 
were, sit down with Lexis Australia or Lexis South Africa, and work !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
450 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence 
with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 121. 
451 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425. 
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out what relevant cases there might be. There has to be 
somebody who has done some work first.452  
The Supreme Court also has its own library which may be asked, by the 
Justices, to source relevant materials for consideration. The library is well 
stocked with law reports from various foreign jurisdictions and, in addition to 
this, produces a monthly broadsheet which includes some comparative law 
material. In a lighter way, the UKSC blog site evidences its attention to 
developments in other foreign courts by posting notes on key cases from 
‘Supreme Courts around the World’.453    
 
Academic work is also an important vessel for comparative jurisprudence, 
again partly as a result of time pressures on the Court. Lord Phillips 
explained that ‘academics have the advantage of being able to spend much 
[more] time on looking at particular area of the law than [the Supreme Court]’ 
and the Justices would all be likely to read ‘the leading academics on a 
particular topic to see what they have to say’.454 It is evident that where 
foreign jurisprudence has been identified by academics in leading works, the 
Supreme Court would be alerted to it.455 A good example of academic work 
being used in this way can be drawn from the HJ (Iran) case considered in 
chapter seven.456  In that case Lord Dyson did not ‘find it necessary to 
examine the Australian authorities to which [the Supreme Court] were !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
452 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden, above n 422. 
453  E.g. <http://ukscblog.com/supreme-courts-around-the-world-the-us-supreme-court> 
accessed 18 August 2013. 
454 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 
2011). 
455 Ibid. 
456 Chapter seven, text from n 736. 
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referred’. Instead, it was ‘sufficient’ to refer to an academic paper exploring 
the impact of the troublesome S395/2002 case on the refugee jurisprudence 
of Australia and the United Kingdom five years on. Lord Dyson was satisfied 
that the paper showed ‘the reasoning of the majority judgments is being 
generally applied in Australia...’. 457  Lord Walker also noted comparative 
academic work on this point and reproduced a lengthy paragraph from the 
paper to which Lord Dyson referred in the judgment.458  
 
The suggestion implicit here is that cases which have not been digested by 
academic work are not as likely to be used as those that have. Lord Reed 
took this view to explain the reasons why some jurisdictions were cited more 
than others:  
There is a practical problem about finding foreign jurisprudence. … 
I’ve got … a French textbook on human rights law, which 
obviously cites French case law. But not many people have got 
foreign textbooks on their shelves.459  
This reliance on academic research may therefore further inform the 
consideration as to why certain jurisdictions are cited above others, as 
discussed below. According to Lord Mance, one wouldn’t look up 
jurisprudence from smaller foreign courts, for example. If foreign sources are 
used, ‘it would be because it was in some particular international field and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
457 HJ (Iran) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, [112] (Lord 
Dyson). Citing J Millbank, ‘From discretion to disbelief: recent trends in refugee 
determinations on the basis of sexual orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 
13 IJHR 391 
458 HJ (Iran), Ibid [92]. 
459 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, above n 445. 
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had received a degree of notoriety’.460 ‘That sort of case’, he explained, 
‘would be a case that had achieved international note and had therefore 
appeared in human rights textbooks and you would be referred to it because 
it was there in a footnote’. 461  Otherwise, ‘unless one had been to a 
conference in Africa [for example] with the Commonwealth Magistrates and 
Judges Association or something like that, and it had been mentioned then, 
you wouldn’t come across it probably’.462 
 
The last suggestion that a judge might learn about foreign jurisprudence 
through conferences or judicial exchanges has perhaps been the most 
popular idea in the modern literature on judicial comparativism. The most 
fashionable explanation for the increase in judicial comparativism in recent 
years has been that judges refer to foreign jurisprudence simply because 
their eyes have been opened to it. The more widely known theory is the 
notion of a ‘transjudicial dialogue’. This usually encompasses ‘dialogue’ both 
in the sense that judges may communicate through their judgments, and in 
the more obvious sense of judges communicating through a direct—face to 
face—exchange of ideas with other judges and practitioners from all over the 
world. Broadly speaking, dialogue of this kind can be summarised simply as 
meetings which being about an awareness of each other’s decisions.463  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
460 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011). 
461 Ibid. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, (1994) 29 University 
of Richmond Law Review 99, 103. 
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Such meetings are of obvious relevance between national and supranational 
courts, especially where national judges may wish to seek guidance as to the 
supranational court’s jurisprudence. Thus it is not surprising that, as Paterson 
has noted, these meetings are common between the Justices of Supreme 
Court and the judges at the ECtHR. Interestingly, Paterson also notes that 
the Supreme Court interacts with the Strasbourg Court much more frequently 
than with the CJEU in Luxembourg: 
…there is far more interaction—oral and written—between the two 
courts than there is with Luxembourg. Members of each court visit 
the other and discussions ensue of actual cases and points of 
debate. Written exchanges are also frequent, and not just in 
judgments but also through lectures, and even occasional 
emails.464  
Paterson explains that the difference may be due to the style of the 
judgments in either court: ‘the outputs from the Luxembourg court are short, 
stilted and enigmatic, adhering to a civilian style which appears as though 
drafted by a committee with no spark of individualism’. 465  Similar 
explanations were given by several of the Justices of the Supreme Court 
interviewed for this study.  
 
As regards interaction with judges of top domestic courts in other 
jurisdictions, the Supreme Court regularly participates in international 
conferences and judicial exchanges and there are a few international visits a 
year, usually lasting three to four days. Some of the Justices interviewed did !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
464 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 430, 224.  
465 Ibid 223. Paterson notes (at n 72) that no dissents or concurrences are permitted at the 
Luxembourg court.  
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consider that international conferences and symposiums of this kind would 
be likely to contribute to an awareness of foreign jurisprudence which might 
later be used in the process of reasoning. Lord Walker, for example, felt that 
personal relationships between judges would affect the attention paid to the 
jurisprudence from a particular court: 
In my case that certainly is a factor. When I was at the bar and as 
a first instance judge, I did virtually no networking, I simply just got 
on with my work and it’s really only since I got to the top appeal 
court that I have started travelling and I have done quite a bit in 
the last… I first went to Australia in 2005 I think to give a lecture 
and I’m going for the 5th time this summer. So that’s five times in 
seven years. I’ve been to New Zealand a couple of times. And you 
do get to know people and it does make a big difference that you 
read a judgment and you know who it is that is writing it. I think 
that, right or wrongly, that is a very important factor in how much 
interest you take.466 
 
However none of the Justices appeared to consider that these sorts of 
meetings would usually be a primary source of foreign jurisprudence. It was 
felt to be only in very exceptional cases that dialogues of this kind would 
substantially affect judicial reasoning. Rarely was an example given during 
the interviews in which a Justice could recall an instance of discussion with 
judges from other jurisdictions which was visibly linked to reasoning in a later 
judgment. Only one such example could be recalled, regarding the well-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
466 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, former Justice of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 15 May 2012). 
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known Daly case from the early years of the HRA.467 Lord Dyson recounted a 
story about a visit to the Israeli Court during which a round-table discussion 
took place on the concept of proportionality. Lord Dyson felt that Lord Steyn’s 
judgment in Daly drew heavily from that meeting. Lord Dyson recalled Lord 
Steyn to have said something along the lines of: ‘this has been a very useful 
discussion, especially as I have now to write a judgment concerning this 
issue’.468    
 
No more recent examples could be recalled and, aside from the Daly 
example, the general feeling was that international meetings would usually 
be very interesting but would not always be likely to contribute substantively 
to the work of a judge in their home court.469 In part this may be explained by 
a convention that discussion of topics that are known to be coming up in the 
Supreme Court are avoided, but there are a number of other reasons as well. 
Firstly, the meetings are pitched at varying levels. For example, the Israeli 
and Canadian conferences are regarded, by some Justices, to be more 
serious affairs than some of the other events. Some of the Justices that had 
not participated in those more serious conferences felt more sceptical about 
the value of international judicial exchanges, expressing the feeling that such 
meetings were often likely to descend to ‘chitter chatter’.470 One Justice went 
so far as to joke that international visits could often be described as ‘Judicial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
467 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 WLR 
1622. 
468 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Dyson MR, above n 424. 
469 Similar findings are reported by Mak in her most recent publication: Elaine Mak, Judicial 
Decision-Making in a Globalised, above n 414, 85. 
470 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, above n 426. 
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Tourism’.471 Secondly, some of the Justices were more enthusiastic about 
these meetings than others. While some of the Justices recounted that they 
had led delegations to other courts and found these meetings useful, others 
explained that they were not as keen on participating in this way, preferring 
instead ‘to get on with the business of judging’.472 Thirdly, these meetings 
repeat. Visits tend to be to those courts that are already familiar to the 
Justices of the Supreme Court, such as Canada and South Africa, where 
there is already an established relationship. The established relationships 
and familiarity with certain courts also perpetuates the tendency to refer to 
the jurisprudence of those jurisdictions. It is also likely that there are reasons 
connected to the perceived quality of the jurisprudence from certain 
jurisdictions or that there are other practical concerns, such as language 
barriers. These are questions that are best considered in context. The next 
section of this chapter therefore addresses the more literal ‘where does it 
come from’ question.      
 
5.4 The preference towards common law jurisdictions 
It is indisputable that the Supreme Court generally cites foreign jurisprudence 
from a small family of courts.473 As a proportion of all explicit citations of 
foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court, figure 2 shows that the 
jurisprudence of common law courts is the clear favourite. Of the total 316 
foreign decisions cited by the Supreme Court between 2009 and 2013, 277 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
471 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumption, above n 294. 
472 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, above n 426. 
473 This much has been recognised by other recent publications, e.g. Elaine Mak, Judicial 
Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 414, 206. 
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were from common law jurisdictions. Figures 3 and 4 show that the pattern is 
fairly consistent between human rights cases and non-human rights cases, 
although the proportion of citations of common law courts appears to be 
greater in human rights cases.   
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Figure 2: Proportion of citations from common law jurisdictions in all cases decided by the 
UK Supreme Court 2009-13. 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of citations from common law jurisdictions in non-human rights cases 
by the UK Supreme Court 2009-13 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of citations from common law jurisdictions in human rights cases by the 
UK Supreme Court 2009-13. 
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Figure 5 shows the number of cases of the total 246 handed down in the time 
period in which explicit citation were made to each jurisdiction. Of the 13 
jurisdictions cited by the Supreme Court, only 5 jurisdictions are cited in more 
than 10 judgments, all from established common law or mixed systems. In 
human rights cases the numbers are less polarised on account of fewer 
judgments, but they follow the same pattern. Most citations are drawn from 
Australia, the United States, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Table 3 
(overleaf) gives the break down of citations for each jurisdiction and case 
type. 
 
 
0!5!
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Figure 5: Number of cases in which at least one case from the given country is cited, between 
2009 and 2013. 
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The balance is even more extreme in human rights cases, where citations of 
common law courts make up over 90% of the total references to foreign 
jurisprudence—141 of the total 156 foreign case citations. These trends are 
best illustrated by figure 5, which shows the number of cases cited from each 
jurisdiction. Viewed this way, it is not only clear that the Supreme Court is 
likely to cite common law authorities the most often, but also that it is likely to 
cite more of those decisions per case.  
 
Figure 5: Total explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence between 2009-13, arranged by 
country and case type. 
 
 
The reasons for citing any particular jurisdiction are not made obvious in the 
judgments. As Cram found: 
English judges, it seems, do little to explain why the insights of a 
particular jurisdiction might be relevant to the interpretation of 
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not. The reader of these law reports searches in vain for an 
account of the criteria by which the included jurisdictions were 
deemed includable and why the excluded were considered 
excludable.474  
Whether true or not, there is a perception that different ideological positions 
on human rights are taken by different jurisdictions and that comparative 
standards drawn from a particular jurisdiction’s approach to human rights 
may be regarded, therefore, as a sign of a particular orientation towards 
human rights generally.475  The treatment of comparative authority by the 
South African Constitutional Court is illustrative of this point:476 The Court has 
explained that ‘[c]omparative research is generally valuable, and is all the 
more so when dealing with problems new to our jurisprudence but well 
developed in mature constitutional democracies’.477 On that basis, it is hardly 
surprising that ‘it is [in the main] the judiciaries of liberal democratic regimes 
that cite each other’.478  
 
Cram was tempted to conclude his own study by suggesting that ‘the judges 
in the House of Lords and Court of Appeal conceive, in the main, of the 
Canadian and United States Supreme Courts as similarly placed institutions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
474 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence 
with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 140. 
475 See Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 415, 501; 
Richard Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: the legitimacy of judicial 
intervention under the Human Rights Act 998’ [2004] PL 33, 47; Leighton McDonald, ‘New 
Directions in the Australian Bill of Rights Debate’ [2004] PL 22. 
476 s.39(1)(b) South African Constitution the Constitution expressly declares that ‘[w]hen 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum may consider foreign law’476 but that it 
‘must consider international law’ (emphasis added). 
477 Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) (emphasis added); 
Rabinder Singh, ‘Interpreting Bills of Rights’ [2008] Statute Law Review 82. 
478 Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’’, above n 415, 517. 
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functioning under similar circumstances within a framework of broadly similar 
rules and underlying values’.479 This is a conclusion that is supported by the 
interview evidence from this research. As Baroness Hale explained:  
The common law world is preferred to elsewhere and that is partly 
because it is all in English and partly because we are dealing in 
similar instruments, similar modes of thought and similar modes of 
judgment.480 
Others among the interviewed Justices agreed. The then President of the 
Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, felt that there would be:  
… more use when we are a looking at courts in the long 
established democracies than some of the countries which have 
not had the benefit of developing over years with democratic and 
independent judiciaries.481  
In large part, this is related to a perception that the quality of the reasoning is 
greater in the established common law courts. Lord Phillips added that 
whether or not foreign jurisprudence would be used depended very much on 
‘the nature of the authority’ and that some decisions of foreign courts have 
been really ‘carefully thought out’—giving the example of some Canadian 
judgments.482 Explaining what it takes to be ‘carefully thought out’, Lord 
Phillips said that ‘you have to be an outstandingly good jurist’.483 Asked if that 
was something perceived from reading the cases or if that is known before, 
Lord Phillips answered: ‘We have a very good idea of who the really 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
479 Ibid. 
480 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425. 
481 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011). 
482 Ibid. 
483 Ibid. 
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outstanding jurists in the Commonwealth are’.484 Lord Collins gave similar 
answers to these questions, expressing a requirement for confidence in the 
jurisdiction that one is drawing from:  
[Foreign jurisprudence] won’t necessarily be … of direct 
assistance, unless it is a court of great authority and it’s something 
that hasn’t come up here, like the Supreme Court of Canada …485 
In fact, this apparently provides one of the barriers to the use of foreign 
jurisprudence from other countries:  
It is very difficult to judge the quality of foreign decisions if you 
don’t know the people and their reputation … I suppose in itself 
you can say well the Supreme Court—American Supreme Court or 
Canadian Supreme Court or Australian High Court—they wouldn’t 
have got there unless they were pretty good. … You get a feel for 
it. When precedents are cited here, even of English judges, there 
are some who have got much greater reputation than others – for 
example. One might pay more attention to what Lord Bingham or 
Lord Hoffman has said than to another judge whose reputation is 
not so high.486 
 
Nevertheless, the tendency to cite common law jurisprudence is surprising 
given the fact that the dominant force in human rights cases is likely to be the 
ECHR. That the United Kingdom has moved steadily towards convergence 
with the rest of Europe is hardly contentious. Indeed, the UK was among the 
first members of the Council of Europe to ratify the Convention and English 
lawyers made a substantial contribution to the drafting of the document. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
484 Ibid. 
485 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 441. 
486 Ibid. 
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Moreover, a major factor said to be involved in the reluctance of the French 
judges to rely on Strasbourg decisions is their national pride in front of a new 
instrument, which is supposed to be dominated by English legal 
conceptions.487 More significantly, and as Masterman suggested, cases from 
jurisdictions outside the Convention borders are ‘unlikely to point to the 
direction in which the common law should be developed to ensure 
compatibility with the Convention rights’.488 Unlike the Canadian, Victorian 
and New Zealand experiences, the Convention and its jurisprudence are built 
into the structure of the HRA. 
 
The use of common law jurisprudence is especially surprising given the 
cautionary statements made in the early days of the HRA. For example in 
Sheldrake, Lord Bingham set out that, even though courts had on a number 
of occasions ‘gained valuable insights from the reasoning of Commonwealth 
judges’,489 the UK ‘must [now] take its lead from Strasbourg’.490 In Gillan Lord 
Bingham thought it was ‘perilous ... to seek to transpose the outcome of 
Canadian cases’,491 by reason of their being ‘decided under a significantly 
different legislative regime’.492 In Marper, Lord Steyn rejected the idea that 
domestic traditions bear any relevance to the scope of Convention rights at !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
487 J-F Burgelin and A Lalardrie, L’application de la Convention par le juge judiciaire français, 
Mélanges Pettiti (Bruylant, 1998) 160 referred to in Luc Heuschling ‘Comparative Law and the 
European Convention on Human Rights Cases’ in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in 
Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, 2003) 36. 
488  Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a 
‘municipal law of human rights’ under the Human Rights Act' [2005] 54 ICLQ 907, 923. 
489 Sheldrake v DPP [2004] UKHL 43; [2004] 3 WLR 876 [33]. 
490 Ibid. 
491 R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12; [2006] 2 AC 307, 
[23]. 
492 Ibid. 
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all.493 The court in British American Tobacco recognised that ‘it is instructive 
… to see how another respected jurisdiction has dealt with a related but 
confined problem’ but also considered that comparison (with the 
jurisprudence of the US First Amendment) should be undertaken with care:494 
…the balance between State legislation and federal legislation in 
the United States is a subject of renowned complexity. Decisions 
on such matters can have limited effect on our consideration of the 
balance to be struck in considering a restriction of a limited 
Convention rights and the measure of a discretion to be afforded 
to Parliament and ministers under our own rather different 
constitutional system.495 
 
Implicit in the idea that common law jurisprudence is likely to provide less 
assistance in human rights cases for the reason that they were ‘decided 
under a significantly different legislative regime’,496 is that jurisprudence from 
courts interpreting the same legislative regime would be of greater relevance. 
Thus one might reasonably consider the jurisprudence of European domestic 
courts interpreting the same instrument to be of interest to the Supreme 
Court. As Bobek has written: 
After the UK joined the European Communities, some people 
might have hoped (and others feared) that the UK would now join 
Continental Europe. This should be evidenced by a change in the 
(comparative) attention of the English courts: less comparative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
493 R (Marper) v Chief Constable of Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39; [2004] 1 WLR 2196 [27]. 
494 R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v The Secretary of State for Health) [2004] EWHC 
(Admin) 2493s. 
495 Ibid [36]. 
496 R (Gillan), above n 491, [23] (Lord Bingham). 
 174 
consideration would be given to the common law world and more 
considerations to Continental Europe.497 
If the courts have followed this sort of approach, the use of foreign 
jurisprudence from common law jurisdictions should be on the decline. If that 
were true, the trend evidenced by figure 5 represents a rather more 
discouraging outlook: rather than representing a greater use of jurisprudence 
from common law jurisdictions in human rights cases, it may represent an 
overall decline in the use of foreign jurisprudence altogether. This is difficult 
to substantiate without comparable data on explicit citations of foreign 
jurisprudence in the early years of the Human Rights Act. The closest of the 
existing studies is that conducted by Cram, encompassing judicial references 
to a foreign court's jurisprudence in cases concerning rights to liberty and fair 
trial since October 2000. Cram found just five cases referencing other 
nations' constitutional courts but does not give a figure for the overall number 
of cases captured by his research.498 From those five cases, Cram also 
found that citations were most likely to be drawn from common law 
jurisdictions.499 Another study reviewed the decisions of the House of Lords 
in its final year, 2009. In that year, Bobek counted that ‘legal materials from 
outside of the UK’ were referred to in 24% of cases. These were ‘almost 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
497 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 93. 
498 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence 
with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 132. 
499 Ibid 140: ‘The United States and Canada supplied by far the most frequent sources to 
which our judges refer, although the jurisprudence of five other jurisdictions is also 
represented in this survey’. See also Mathias M Siems, ‘Citation Patterns of the German 
Federal Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal of England and Wales’ (2010) 21 KLJ 152. 
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exclusively of common law provenience’, with just one referenced to 
materials from outside the common law world.500 
 
An obvious explanation is that the analysis of explicit citations distorts the 
picture. In fact the Supreme Court does consider the jurisprudence of 
European domestic legal orders but the Justices can usually rely on the 
ECtHR to outline the position of national legal systems. Sir Nicholas Bratza, 
the then President-elect of the European Court of Human Rights, has 
explained that it is ‘the wider role of the Court’ to ‘[examine] the law and 
practice in other Member States in resolving issues of general importance for 
the development of the Convention’.501 Bell has pointed out that this applies 
to the jurisprudence of supranational courts generally:  
[i]t is through [the decisions of the supranational courts] that the 
state of the law in other European countries comes to the notice of 
the UK justices. Strasbourg and Luxembourg consider the different 
ways a common problem is handled by national courts and select 
a permitted range of acceptable solutions (often by deferring to 
national decisions, rather than imposing a single right answer). As 
a result, it is not necessary for lawyers or justices to look directly at 
national law.502 
The reliance on comparative research from supranational courts is also a 
reflection of the fact that the Supreme Court is a very busy court and does !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
500 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 497, 89. 
501 Nicolas Bratza, ‘The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg’ [2011] EHRLR 
505, 507. 
502 John Bell, ‘Comparative Law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’, above n 417, 24; Michael 
Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n 497, 93; See also 
Jane Wright, ‘Interpreting Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998: towards an indigenous 
jurisprudence of human rights’ [2009] PL 595, 614-615, arguing that while ‘customary for the 
ECtHR to recite international materials on any question … the reasoning of the ECtHR is 
generally premised upon European authorities’. 
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not always have time to conduct research into the approach of other 
jurisdictions. Lord Phillips explained this when interviewed:   
We basically don’t have time to go to the other European countries 
and look at the way they’ve addressed [an issue] with some 
exceptions. There is quite enough case law in Strasbourg itself … 
we’re looking at how Strasbourg deals with the decisions of courts 
in other member states and when you do that you are also looking 
to see how that particular court dealt with a problem and then how 
Strasbourg has viewed the approach of that court. And so, in 
some cases, we’re looking quite closely at the domestic decision 
in the field of human rights.503 
 
An alternative explanation for the tendency to draw from common law courts 
is that linguistic barriers preclude meaningful comparison with non-English 
speaking jurisdictions. Thus some comparative law scholars have been 
persuaded that different languages and styles are likely to be a significant 
barrier to judicial comparativism.504 Discussion of this suggestion was one of 
the common themes from the interviews. As mentioned in the methodology 
chapter, it is interesting that the Justices held different views about the 
significance of linguistic barriers and that these views broadly correlated with 
whether or not the Justice had raised the matter of their own accord or if they 
were directly questioned on it. Thus when asked about the propensity to use 
jurisprudence from the main common law courts, Lord Mance replied that  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
503 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, above n 454. 
504 Norman Weiss, ‘The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on German 
Jurisprudence’, in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United 
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law, 2003) 60-61; Elaine Mak, Judicial 
Decision-Making in a Globalised World, above n 414, 114-115. 
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… for language reasons, obviously, it is easier to use common law 
courts. Unless you speak the language pretty fluently it’s not so 
easy to use most other European courts. Although if you do speak 
the language, it is interesting to be able to do so.505 
Lord Mance went on to explain that he is comfortable reading German and 
that he often found the German jurisprudence to be useful.506 Lord Collins 
raised similar issues: 
There is a language issue in all of this, and … there is also 
unfamiliarity with the legal system. On the whole we don’t get 
presented with anything from France or Germany or Italy, … I 
suppose, if there is a really important issue and that the French 
Conseil d’Etat has heard or the German Constitutional Court, 
maybe we would be told about it … but then we would just be told 
what they did …507 
Baroness Hale explained the problem to be one of confidence: confidence in 
any translation that one may use and confidence in one’s own standard in the 
relevant language:  
The linguistic barrier is, I think, a very strong one because good 
translation is difficult to come by and very expensive. We may 
think that we understand French and one of my colleagues has 
good German but nevertheless you’ve got to be very confident that 
you have good legal French and good legal German.508 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
505 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011). 
506 In one judgment, published in the days before submission of this thesis, another Supreme 
Court Justice made reference to jurisprudence from the German Constitutional Court: R (HS2 
Action Alliance Limited) v The Secretary of State for Transport and another [2014] UKSC 3. 
Two references to judgments of the German Constitutional Court are made by Lord Reed at 
[106] and [111], approving a principle applied by the German court (that the rulings of the 
CJEU should not be read as undermining national constitutions). 
507 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 441. 
508 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425. Other Justices 
expressed similar sentiments. 
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The point was put most simply by Lord Clarke:  
With the best will in the world you have to speak very good French 
to understand legal French. … I once spent six months on a farm 
in France and spoke quite good French at the end, but that doesn’t 
really qualify you to read dense texts at the Conseil d’Etat.509 
 
Others among the Justices attributed much less influence to language as a 
barrier to the use of jurisprudence from non-English speaking jurisdictions. 
Lord Sumption, for example, felt that ‘the linguistic barrier is not terribly 
important’; ‘Most judges speak French’. In fact, Lord Sumption considered 
that it was ‘the duty of every civilised man to read another language if not 
more than one’.510 Lord Kerr was also dismissive of the idea that judges were 
prevented from using such materials by a lack of language proficiency and 
gave an altogether different explanation:  
It is certainly not a linguistic barrier [that prevents use of case law 
from European domestic courts], because it is always possible to 
get a translation of the particular judgment. It’s just that we have, 
generally, a wealth of material to get through and … if you attend 
an appeal hearing that’s going to last 2 or 3 days in the Supreme 
Court and which involves a number of human rights issues, you 
will see vast bundles of authorities—most of which are never 
referred to.511  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
509 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, above n 426. 
510  Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumption, above n 294. In another context, Lord 
Sumption is reported to have lamented the loss of a ‘general culture’ among the newest 
generation of barristers and solicitors: ‘It is very unfortunate, for example, that many of them 
cannot speak or read a single language other than their own’. Lord Sumption in conversation 
with Stephen Turvey and Matthew Lawson for Counsel Magazine (July 2012), published by 
LPA legal <http://lpalegal.com/news/conversation-with-lord-sumption> accessed 21 
December 2013.  
511 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 420. 
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Although acknowledging language as a factor, Lord Walker’s explanation for 
the lack of citations of jurisprudence from European domestic courts 
proceeded along slightly different lines:  
I think it is much more [to do with] habits of judgment writing. 
English judgments … are far too long and most continental 
judgments are—to our taste—a good deal too short. I remember 
being shown a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
and it was so short and so devoid of reasoning. I mean no doubt 
all the reasoning was there, but it was concealed in their 
discussions and not really set out in their judgment.512 
Finally, there is a more general problem surrounding the research framework 
involved in finding relevant foreign jurisprudence. As Lord Sumption 
concluded, ‘the main barrier is not knowing where to start on the research’.513  
 
 
5.5 The effect of changing judgment styles 
There is also a close connection to be made between the use of foreign 
jurisprudence and judgment types. As Dickson wrote, one feeling about the 
shift from the House of Lords to the new Supreme Court was that there might 
be new opportunities to develop the methods adopted by the House of Lords, 
‘so as to operate in a more modern and accessible way’:514  
The Justices do now compile and deliver their judgments slightly 
differently from the way their predecessors did, with the first !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
512 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, above n 466. 
513 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumption, above n 294. 
514 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 3. 
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judgment no longer always being that of the most senior judge but 
rather that of the judge who has written the most detailed 
judgment explaining why the decision has gone a certain way; any 
dissenting judgments are usually placed after the judgments of all 
the judges in the majority. Moreover, Justices are increasingly 
issuing joint judgments...515 
Dickson’s last point touches on one of the most interesting findings from this 
research, that the Supreme Court now commonly hands down plurality style 
judgments. The idea of a plurality judgment was explained by Baroness Hale 
in an interview for the UK Supreme Court Blog, published in The Guardian 
Newspaper in 2010:  
The idea of plurality judgments as the norm is very radical. It 
would mean that the majority who agreed on the result would have 
one judgment which reflected their common views (with possible 
post-scripts from adherents) rather than numerous judgments 
reasoning in almost identical ways towards the same result.516 
In a speech shortly after that interview, Baroness Hale explained that the 
Parliamentary procedure in the House of Lords made these kinds of 
judgments difficult:517  
In the House of Lords, we could have a considered opinion of the 
whole appellate committee, individual opinions with which the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
515 Ibid. At page 4 Dickson also notes changes surrounding the decisions as to whether more 
than five judges should hear the appeal. The criteria, he notes, has been made more explicit. 
Dickson takes this to be an indication ‘that the Court wishes to be more transparent about the 
way it operates and that it envisages a larger bench being convened reasonably frequently’. 
Moreover, ‘[d]ecisions by larger benches have the potential to allow the Court to present a 
more powerful and united front to the outside world’.  
516 Dan Tranch and Laura Coogan ‘Baroness Brenda Hale: "I often ask myself 'why am I 
here?'” The Guardian (London, 16 September 2010) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/sep/16/uk-supreme-court-judiciary> accessed 13 
August 2013.     
517 See also Alan Paterson, Lawyers and the Public Good (Cambridge University Press 
2012) 159, 164 et seq. 
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others simply agreed, or a series of individual opinions; but jointly 
authored or plurality opinions were difficult and rarely tried.518 
 
The trend from the early years of the Supreme Court’s activity is towards a 
significant change in that pattern. In her speech, Baroness Hale gave figures 
collected by one of the JAs from that year. It is worth reproducing this 
information in full, since it also provides the explanation of how a ‘plurality’ or 
‘effectively plurality’ judgment has been defined here:  
Richard Reynolds, one of this year’s judicial assistants (to whom I 
am greatly indebted for his researches on this subject), has 
surveyed our first 57 decided cases. He found that in 20, there 
was a ‘judgment of the court’; and in a further 11, there was either 
a single judgment (with which all the other Justices agreed), or a 
single majority judgment (with which all the Justices in the majority 
agreed), or an ‘effectively’ single or single majority judgment 
(because separate judgments were simply footnotes or 
observations). So 31, or more than half, came out as plurality or 
effectively plurality judgments.519 
This is consistent with the results of the data collection conducted for the 
purposes of this study. Following the same criteria, if all decided cases are 
included (i.e. including cases concerning procedural matters that are 
otherwise ignored for the purposes of this particular study), 31 cases from the 
first year were also found to be plurality or effectively plurality judgments. The 
figure is revised to 26 when the procedural cases or conjoined appeals are 
discounted. The proportion remains constant as the years go on. Of the total !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
518 Brenda Hale, ‘Judgment Writing in the Supreme Court’ (First Anniversary Seminar, 30 
September 2010) <http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_100930.pdf> accessed 13 
August 2013, 1.   
519 Ibid 2.   
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246 cases handed down by the Supreme Court between 2009 and 2013,520 
there were 130 with plurality or effectively plurality judgments. Interestingly, 
only 33 of the remainder actually comprised a full set of separate judgments; 
although the other 83 could not be classified as being a plurality or effectively 
plurality judgment, in each case at least one member of the court chose to 
associated himself (by the expression of agreement) with the judgment of 
another.521 Dickson has added useful figures on the numbers of Justices 
contributing judgments as well as the number of Justices hearing cases:   
In its first three ‘legal’ years, 2009–12, out of 164 separate sets of 
judgments issued by the Justices, no fewer than 35 involved 
seven Justices and a further 12 involved nine Justices. Of the 35 
cases, 14 concerned human rights issues, and of the 12 cases 
seven involved human rights issues. Altogether, 29 per cent of all 
the cases dealt with involved more than five Justices, and 45 per 
cent of the cases involving more than five Justices concerned 
human rights issues. In the last three years of the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords, by way of contrast, only two of 
the 180 cases involved more than five Law Lords (just over 1 per 
cent), each of which raised human rights issues.522 
 
This is not altogether surprising, since it is often said that the move to the 
new Supreme Court has promoted a greater sense of collegiality. For 
example, Paterson has described the establishment of ‘team-working’ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
520 An explanation of the calculation of the 246 figure is given in chapter three, text to n 182. 
521 The data for each year and the total figures given are set out in Annexe two. 
522 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 3. 
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practices under Lord Phillips and Lord Neuberger as far greater than had 
been the case at the House of Lords.523 Mak explains:  
Since October 2009, the judges have been experimenting with a 
system in which one judge writes the lead opinion and the other 
judges on the panel may choose to concur with this judge, to write 
a separate opinion, or to write a dissenting opinion.524  
By changing its working methods in this way, ‘the Court aims to create more 
transparency’.525 The reasoning is that ‘working with majority opinions leads 
to more consistency and gives clearer guidance to the lower courts on how to 
operate in the future’. 526  Darbyshire has a more practical take on this 
development in judgment writing. ‘Jurisprudentially, judges claim they are 
sparing us the pain of extracting the ratio decidendi from multiple judgments’ 
but ‘[p]ractically, single judgments have become a labour saving device’.527  
 
Not all commentators agree that plurality style judgments are a positive 
move. Writing in 1998, Robertson was cautions: 
… the Lords have moved to the expectation that there will only 
usually be one major speech … Whatever value this may have for 
legal certainty … it has reduced the extent of genuine argument 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
523 Alan Paterson: Final Judgment, above n 430, 141. 
524 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’ [2011] CLJ 420, 430. 
525 Ibid. 
526 Ibid. Indeed, this is itself an area where the Supreme Court may have learned from courts 
of other jurisdictions. When Baroness Hale made the case for developing towards plurality 
judgments in OBG Ltd v Allan it was clear that some support was derived from the practices 
applied abroad: [T]here would be much to be said for our adopting the practice of other 
supreme courts in having a single majority opinion to which all have contributed and all can 
subscribe without further qualification or explanation. OBG Ltd v Allan, Douglas v Hello! Ltd 
(No.3), Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young [2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 AC 1 at [303], cited in 
James Lee, ‘A defence of concurring speeches’ [2009] PL 305. 
527 Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment, above n 442, 344-345. 
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and discussion of issues in a way that not only academic lawyers 
but many leading counsel find distinctly unhelpful.528 
A further drawback has been pointed out by Paterson, relating to a ‘loss of 
individualism in our Justices’:529  
Single judgments representing the outcome of the internal debates 
iwthin the Supreme Court which are not publicly rehearsed, 
remove the humanity of individual difference and potentially 
undermine transparency. … Fewer dissents and concurrences in 
return for more single judgments mean more judgments devised 
by a committee and consequently more compromise. 
Paterson cites Lord Rodger of Earlsferry as a supporter of this view, setting 
out evidence obtained through interview: 
If the powers that be have their way, and the new Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom adopts more single judgments, then there 
will be less scope in future for humour or indeed for any other 
expressions of the judges’ individuality. By definition the author of 
a composite judgments is not writing just as himself and will alter 
his voice accordingly. ….The much touted efficiency savings of a 
single judgment will be clearly bought if, as a result, we lose 
individual hallmark contributions of [the] quality [of Lords 
Macnaghten, Wilberforce and Bingham].530 
 
The effect of plurality style judgments on the use of foreign jurisprudence 
appears to be significant. Interestingly, one of the judges interviewed by Mak 
‘indicated that the use of foreign jurisprudence need not be hampered by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
528 David Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (Oxford University Press 1998), 
77-78; More recently, see e.g. Alan Paterson: Final Judgment, above n 430, 91-95; Penny 
Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment, above n 442, 387-390. 
529 Alan Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 430, 315. 
530 Ibid, 315-216. 
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increased use of majority opinions’ because ‘an individual judge might still 
choose to write a separate opinion about foreign law if … not satisfied with 
the majority opinion’. 531  However, the findings from this study indicate 
otherwise. As figures 6, 7 and 8 show, the proportion of citations of foreign 
jurisprudence is smallest in plurality type judgments, greater in cases with 
more than one written judgment and greatest in cases where a full set of 
separate judgments were given.532 The proportions are similar in both human 
rights and non-human rights cases. The spike in 2010-11 also correlates to 
the year in which the highest proportion of plurality judgments cited foreign 
jurisprudence (30.4%, compared to just 11.5% in 2009-10, 10.7% in 2011-12, 
17.0% in 2012-13).  
 
If not to do with the loss of individualism as discussed above, the lesser 
frequency of foreign jurisprudence citations in plurality judgments may be 
explained on the basis of the nature of the cases themselves. As explained in 
later chapters, some of the Justices indicated in the interviews that foreign 
jurisprudence would be helpful for ‘insight’,533 especially where the law is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
531 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’, above n 524, 430; Elaine 
Mak, ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the Netherlands: 
Explaining the Development of Judicial Practices’ (2012) 8(2) Utrecht Law Review 20, 26. 
532 The percentages in these figures add up to greater than 100%. This is because the charts 
do not represent the proportion of judgment types where foreign law is cited out of all 
judgments citing foreign law. Instead, the charts show the proportion of cases that cite foreign 
jurisprudence out of each judgment type. I.e. in figure 2, out of 130 cases that can be 
categorised as plurality style judgments, 22 contain citations of foreign jurisprudence; foreign 
jurisprudence is cited in 16.9% of plurality style judgments. The figures are supported by data 
in Annexe two. 
533 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011). 
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‘uncertain’.534 A number of the Justices also acknowledged a tendency to 
seek reassurance from foreign jurisprudence, seeking to learn from the 
experience of other course ‘about the impact of particular laws’, 535 which 
might in turn lead a Justice to be ‘encouraged or emboldened’ by what other 
jurisdictions have done. 536  It wouldn’t be surprising, therefore, if foreign 
jurisprudence would be most likely to find its way into the more difficult or 
morally contested cases, which, in turn, would be more likely to produce 
multiple judgments.  This would fit with the citation of foreign jurisprudence in 
the controversial assisted suicide cases: Pretty, 537  Purdy and, 538  most 
recently, Nicklinson.539 In these circumstances, where the Justices may find it 
harder to reach a concensus, separate judgments are more likely. These in 
turn increase the chance of foreign jurisprudence citation, which may 
otherwise have been cut out of the final product after a degree a 
compromise. Alternatively, since foreign jurisprudence citation is optional, the 
citation of these sources is dependent on the inclination of the Justice that is 
writing the judgment. If a single judgment were to be handed down which has 
been authored by a Justice that is less keen on comparative law, one could 
speculate that the explicit citation of foreign jurisprudence would be less likely 
overall.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
534 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 
2011). 
535 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012). 
536 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, retired Justice of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012). 
537  R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2001] UKHL 61. 
538 R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45. 
539 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38. 
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Figure 6: Citations of foreign jurisprudence by judgment type 2009-13, in all cases. 
 
Figure 7: Citations of foreign jurisprudence by judgment type 2009-13, in non-human rights 
cases. 
 
Figure 8: Citations of foreign jurisprudence by judgment type 2009-13, in human rights cases. 
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Alternative explanations for the rise and fall in the use of foreign jurisprudence 
can, of course, be offered on a qualitative analysis of the cases themselves. For 
example, it is not necessarily the case that citations of foreign jurisprudence 
indicate heavy use of those materials. Indeed, drawing from Mak’s earlier 
research on the reasons for citing foreign jurisprudence,540 Bell concluded that 
in the 2010-11 cases, foreign jurisprudence does not discernibly contribute to 
the outcome of those cases. These are conclusions that are discussed at 
greater length in a later chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that the simple 
citation of foreign jurisprudence does not necessarily indicate the importance 
attached to those decisions or the attention and depth of analysis that they have 
been afforded. 
 
 
5.6 The decline of comparativism in human rights cases  
The emerging picture from human rights cases appears to be that of a decline 
in the number of explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence. Figure 9 illustrates 
this by plotting the number of foreign cases cited each year on a line graph. The 
fluctuation in numbers is largely due to citations in non-human rights cases. In 
human rights cases, the trend is more constant. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
540 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’, above n 524. 
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Figure 9: Total foreign jurisprudence citations at the UK Supreme Court by year. 
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remained between 22-29, with the lowers number (22) in 2010-11, the year in 
which the most human rights cases were found to have citations of foreign 
jurisprudence. As suggested earlier, it likely that the influence of certain Justices 
could have had an impact on these trends: one of the heaviest users of foreign 
jurisprudence, Lord Collins, cited those sources in 63.6% of his written 
judgments in the 2010, 541 before retiring in 2011.  
 
Another explanation for the decline in the number of citations is to do with an 
increase in the body of UK human rights jurisprudence since the coming into 
force of the HRA in October 2000.542 Indeed, with citations in about 30% of its 
case law, the United Kingdom sits among the lesser users of foreign 
jurisprudence when compared to other common law courts. For example, a 
recent study found that the South African Constitutional Court had cited foreign 
jurisprudence in 52% of its decisions since its establishment.543 The High Court 
of Australia’s citation practices were similar, with foreign jurisprudence in 52.3% 
of its constitutional cases.544 The Supreme Court of Canada and the Supreme 
Court of Israel come closer to the UK Supreme Court’s proportions, citing 
foreign jurisprudence in 37.9% and 28% of constitutional cases respectively. 
Indeed the only exception is the United States, where the practice of citing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
541  In 2010 Lord Collins heard 23 cases, gave written judgments in 11 and cited foreign 
jurisprudence in 7.  
542 This would support the idea that judges largely refer to comparative sources where the 
indigenous jurisprudence is lacking. The ‘gap-filling’ thesis is discussed further in chapter six. 
543  Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, above n 414, 412. 
544 Ibid. 
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foreign jurisprudence is highly controversial.545 The UK jurisprudence also ranks 
highly for foreign jurisprudence citations in other countries. In Australia and 
Ireland, the UK jurisprudence is cited more often than the decisions of other 
foreign courts and is frequently cited by the Canadian, Indian and New Zealand 
courts.546  
 
The connected possibility is that the decline in the number of citations of foreign 
jurisprudence in human rights cases is a product of the attention paid to the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.547  As other commentators have suggested, a 
combination of resource strain and an obligation to take into account certain 
sources of law may simply mean that there is little time for judges to look 
beyond those parameters. As Bodek has explained:  
…there appears to be a correlation between the amount of the 
mandatory foreign sources and the likeliness of any further, non-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
545 E.g. Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’ in 
Jane Holder and Colm O'Cinneide (eds) Current Legal Problems (2006) Vol 59, (Oxford 
University Press 2007), Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: 
Reflections’ (2008) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 15/2008 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1268487> accessed 03 February 2011; Norman Dorsen, ‘A 
conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’ (2005) 3(3) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 519; Vicki Jackson 'Comparative constitutional federalism and transnational 
judicial discourse' (2004) 2(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 91; Richard Posner, 'No 
Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws' Legal Affairs July/Aug 2004 
<http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp> accessed 
01 August 2013. 
546  Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, above n 414, 412. Ibid. Although the use of UK jurisprudence by other 
Commonwealth courts is not surprising, given the common constitutional and legal origins and 
shared historical influences. I am grateful to Michael Walker for this reflection. See further e.g. 
Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by 
Constitutional Judges, above n 414; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human 
Rights?’, above n 415; Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, 
above n Error! Bookmark not defined., 91-93. Bobek has gone so far as to ask whether 
references to the law of selected few common law nations, especially the British dominions like 
Australia, Canada, or New Zealand, are references to foreign law at all. 
547 Section 2 Human Rights Act 1998 obliges domestic courts to ‘take into account’ the relevant 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.  
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mandatory foreign inspiration. The relationship is one of inverse 
proportion: the more mandatory foreign, the less likelihood of any 
non-mandatory foreign. The impression that one obtains … is that … 
any available judicial energy will be spent on researching and 
navigating within the mandatory foreign. …  the exponential growth of 
the European and international must sources takes away much of the 
free space and energy for the may ones.548  
The close attention paid to the Strasbourg jurisprudence is well documented in 
the case law and commentary on the Human Rights Act and it would not be 
surprising if foreign jurisprudence citations gave way to the Strasbourg Court’s 
case law, where relevant. It may simply be that in the later years, the 
Strasbourg had recently spoken, 549 and had provided clearer guidance. Since 
the Supreme Court is under a duty to ‘take into account’ the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and it is that jurisprudence which provides the authoritative 
interpretation on Convention rights, there is little incentive to use foreign 
jurisprudence if an authoritative judgment is to be found in the Strasbourg case 
law.550 
 
Indeed, the influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence is so clear as to be 
evident in some jurisdictions not signatory to that instrument. For all the 
common law jurisdictions mentioned above, the decisions of the ECtHR are 
considered ‘foreign law’ (on the basis that the states are not signatory to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
548 Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 195. 
549 Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (2010) 5(2) JUSTICE Journal 10, 13: 
[T]here is nothing in the [Human Rights] Act … to support the reluctance … to seek such 
guidance as we can from the jurisprudence of foreign courts … especially on subjects where 
Strasbourg has not recently spoken. 
550 The influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence is given further discussion from n 654, below. 
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Conventions and therefore do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg 
Court). But as Groppi and Ponthoreau found, the decisions of the ECtHR ‘are 
experiencing an increasing influence’.551  
The many reasons explaining this phenomenon … include the 
accessibility for English-speaking countries of the [European Court of 
Human Rights] decisions and the fact that human rights are a more 
fertile ground for foreign citations.552 
 
A final possibility for the decline in the number of foreign jurisprudence citations 
shown in figure 9 represents one of the drawbacks of using a relatively small 
data sample for statistical representation. The four-year data collection period 
may represent an unusual period of Supreme Court activity (not least because 
these are the first four years of its activity) and may not therefore provide an 
accurate picture of this trend. It would be interesting to revisit this trend after a 
few more years of Supreme Court activity. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
The quantitative analysis illustrates the central patterns in the use of foreign 
jurisprudence at the Supreme Court. It is clear, for example, that the Supreme 
Court does make reference to foreign jurisprudence. It is also clear that the 
proportion of cases in which foreign jurisprudence is cited has remained fairly 
constant across the first four years of the Court’s activity, although there are 
some yearly fluctuations to note—especially in 2010-11. The number of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
551 Ibid 420. 
552 Ibid. 
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individual citations, however, appears to be declining in human rights cases in 
particular.553  
 
The data set also reveals some surprising results and made clear the 
importance of direct qualitative evidence derived from interviews with the 
protagonists, exposing the likelihood of implicit use of foreign jurisprudence. For 
example, one surprising finding from the data analysis was that there were very 
few citations of German jurisprudence: just five cases—including three human 
rights cases—cited German jurisprudence out of the possible 246 handed down 
between 2009 and 2013. Given the reputation that Lord Mance, in particular, 
has regarding enthusiasm for German law, it was expected that the number 
would be much greater. Having said this, figure 5 shows German cases were 
the next most cited after the common law jurisdictions.  
 
For the same reason, it was surprising to see that Lord Rodger did not come out 
as one of the more frequent users of foreign jurisprudence. Lord Rodger’s 
enthusiasm for using comparative law is well documented, including in recent 
contributions by Lord Mance and Tetyana Nesterchuk (a former JA) in a volume 
of essays published in Lord Rodger’s memory.554 One possible implication of 
these results is that that foreign jurisprudence is used more extensively than is 
possible to tell on the face of the judgments. It is perhaps for this reason that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
553 Although it is acknowledged that an obvious drawback of the relatively small four-year data 
collection period may not provide an accurate picture of this trend. 
554 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ and Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind 
the Bench’, in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory 
of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013).  
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Lady Justice Arden commented during interview that there is ‘far more use of 
comparative law than appears on the face of the judgments … it’s informing the 
judges behind the scenes’. 555  There is an obvious explanation for the 
surprisingly low number of explicit citations from these Justices, otherwise 
known to be enthusiastic about comparative law: foreign jurisprudence may not 
always be being used as ‘authority’ or cited our of courtesy to counsel, as 
mooted in chapter four. Instead, it is possible that foreign jurisprudence is being 
used more determinatively, as an analytical lens, to help with a process of 
reflection on a problem but which does not necessarily contribute to the 
outcome of a case. As Lord Mance recently put it: 
when judges look to comparative and international material, they may 
do so for information, inspiration, or confirmation, just as they use 
domestic decisions that are not binding on them.556 
The potential for using foreign jurisprudence simply as a heuristic device is 
explored further in chapter six. For now, it is sufficient to be reminded that 
foreign jurisprudence may legitimately be treated like any other persuasive 
source, which need not be cited.  
 
Whether used implicitly or explicitly, it was clear from the interviews that 
practical considerations are some of the main forces driving the manner and 
frequency with which foreign jurisprudence is used at the Supreme Court. The 
Court continues to rely on counsel for references to legal materials that are to 
be used in the process of judicial reasoning, although it would not be unusual !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
555 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden, above n 422. 
556 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’, above n 594, 87. 
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for judges to ask counsel to address comparative material if it was felt to be 
useful. Beyond this, the Justices might be willing to undertake their own 
research, but this is likely to be closely connected to the individual approach of 
each judge. It is worth noting that those Justices who did express greater 
willingness to embark upon research of this kind also tended to be heavier 
users of foreign jurisprudence.557  
 
When foreign jurisprudence is sourced independently of counsel’s submissions, 
online databases and collections in libraries provided the most obvious avenue. 
To a lesser extent, the JAs might also have raised comparative material but this 
would be less usual. Accessibility and time pressures are additional factors. The 
Supreme Court does have a little more time for research on complex points of 
law than the lower courts but, as several of the justices explained during the 
interviews, there are limits to what can be done.558 As a result, the feeling 
prevails that citations of foreign jurisprudence remain unsystematic. Baroness 
Hale seemed to agree: 
We do all sorts of things for all sorts of reasons, just as things come 
to us in all sorts of ways. … There is a large random element to all of 
this…559  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
557 Further analysis of the correlation between personal attributes and the frequency of foreign 
jurisprudence citations is given by Michael Bobek in his study of the supreme courts in Europe: 
Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, above n Error! 
Bookmark not defined., 57. 
558  Cf. Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, ibid 44-45: 
‘[c]omparative analysis is, in terms of time, expertise, and resources, a demanding exercise’ and 
‘it is at the level of supreme jurisdictions where human resources (analytical backup) and also 
procedural tools (lesser docket, selection of cases) may be available. These allow judges to 
concentrate on contentious legal issues in greater detail’. 
559 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 425. 
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An effective time saving measure is to refer to the works of leading academics 
in the relevant field. This, in turn, is likely to influence the jurisdictions that are 
used since the discretion is with the author rather than the judge. Other related 
influences, despite having less practical significance, are the various judicial 
exchanges and international meetings or conferences. These meetings may 
perpetuate the tendency to resort to jurisprudence from a small family of courts, 
but there is little evidence to suggest that new material is introduced as a result 
of such meetings. Even where this appears to be more likely, it is arguably 
better to explain uses of foreign jurisprudence as part of a prior willingness to 
draw from selected foreign jurisprudence in the first place, rather than as a 
product of judicial exchanges per se. Indeed Lord Steyn’s use of the Israeli 
perspective in Daly comes as no particular surprise given the general openness 
to foreign jurisprudence exhibited by some of his earlier judgments. For 
example, in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, 560 Lord Steyn explained that he 
would have used foreign jurisprudence mainly to assist in his own reflections 
about the case. Lord Steyn also argued that comparative law has the 
‘inestimable value of sharpening our focus on the weight of competing 
considerations’.561  
 
For that purpose, it is most likely that the Justices simply refer to jurisprudence 
from the jurisdictions that they feel most confident with, either because there is 
an impression about the quality of the jurists from a particular court or because 
it is simply easier to consider decisions from English speaking jurisdictions. As !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
560 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59. 
561 Ibis [81] (Lord Steyn). 
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Markesinis and Fedtke have written, ‘one must not ignore the very pragmatic 
limitation that language limitations may restrict the extent of these “fishing 
expeditions”’.562 Despite the fact that not all the Justices agreed that language 
would be a barrier to foreign jurisprudence, it is not surprising that, where there 
are citations of foreign jurisprudence, there is an enduring allegiance to the 
courts of established common law jurisdictions.563 Flanagan and Ahern reported 
similar results from their electronic questionnaires: 
A large majority of judges, 81 per cent, indicated that a democratic 
form of government was a prerequisite for the citation of the law of 
another jurisdiction in a judgment about domestic rights. Conversely, 
17 per cent of judges indicated they set no jurisdictional prerequisites. 
Only a single judge indicated a set of traits that did not include 
democracy, namely, that it be a common law jurisdiction. Other than 
democracy, the most cited prerequisite was that it be a common law 
jurisdiction (26 per cent), followed by commonality of language (14 
per cent). There were seven comments to the effect that, were a 
jurisdiction to possess the ‘same language’ and ‘common law’ traits, 
it would be more readily comparable, but that, democracy aside, 
such traits were not a sine qua non.564 
The effect of the HRA 1998 might have been thought to promote greater interest 
in the position of European domestic courts but, as in other areas, practical 
considerations usually drive the Supreme Court to rely on the Strasbourg 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
562 Sir Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke (eds), Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A new source 
of inspiration? (University College London Press 2006), 71. 
563 Alan et al have made similar findings in the context of the use of foreign jurisprudence in New 
Zealand: James Allan, Grant Huscroft and Nessa Lynch, 'The citation of overseas authority in 
rights litigation in New Zealand- How much bark? How much bite?' (2007) 11 Otago Law Review 
433, 438. 
564 Brian Flanagan and Sinead Ahern, ‘Judicial Decision-Making and Transnational Law: A 
Survey of Common Law Supreme Court Judges’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1, 21. 
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jurisprudence to inform them on such matters. Undoubtedly, the changes in 
judgment styles since the last years of the House of Lords have also had an 
obvious effect. For example, it is clear that the Justices are inclined to work 
towards plurality style judgments,565 which in turn appear to yield significantly 
fewer citations of foreign jurisprudence.  
 
These are changes that must be balanced against the value of foreign 
jurisprudence. The potential to derive assistance from foreign jurisprudence is 
not in doubt and many of the Justices interviewed confirmed the usefulness of 
these sources. For example, writing in memory of Lord Rodger, Lord Mance 
expressed the feeling that it was his ability and willingness to take a 
comparative view of matters which formed an important part of Lord Rodger’s 
legacy as a judge. It is worth reproducing the passage at length: 
Part of Lord Rodger’s legacy as a judge will lie in the weight he 
attached to looking at matters from all angles and from the viewpoint 
of others. That is the essential role of the comparativist, for whom 
languages are correspondingly important. Too often in the highest 
court, issues arise which one feels must have been considered in 
other major legal systems. Too often, difficulties of obtaining 
appropriate information or an appropriate interlocutor to explore or 
explain a foreign system stand in the way of cross-fertilization of this 
sort. Lord Rodger’s knowledge and experience straddled different 
legal systems and was, in that respect, unique. His departure invites 
the thought that the Supreme Court should itself aim to acquire a 
comparative legal and linguistic expertise that its present admirable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
565 Paterson has found that the proportion of single judgments has increased greatly since the 
House of Lords and that along with there there has been ‘a parallel growth in judgments by one 
Justice with which one of more colleagues will join or agree. See further Alan Paterson: Final 
Judgment, above n 430, 102-107.  
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judicial assistants do not generally bring. Other European courts, 
supranational and national, have within their organization young 
lawyers, often with the highest academic qualifications. … Their role 
is to research issues where comparative legal input could be relevant 
and to liaise with their homologues in similar positions.566 
Lord Mance continued: 
There have been numerous cases at the highest level where this 
might have proved of interest. … [and] [i]n all these cases, it could 
have been valuable to have a direct in-house facility for comparative 
law research. It is an idea worth pursuing after Alan Rodger’s much-
mourned departure from the court.567  ! !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
566 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’, above n 554, 96-97. 
567 Ibid 97. 
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6 Foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device 
 
‘The question of real importance is —what is its purpose?’ 568 
 
It was concluded in chapter four that the legitimacy of using foreign 
jurisprudence must be contingent—at least in part—upon the reason for which it 
is used. That conclusion is not controversial: Saunders has recently suggested 
that legitimacy is intimately connected to the purposes for using foreign 
jurisprudence.569 In fact, for Saunders, the latter was said to assume the former. 
Thus Saunders’ thesis was that the legitimacy of using any foreign 
jurisprudence would necessarily vary according to the purpose for which a court 
employs it.570  The result is that foreign jurisprudence can be a legitimate 
judicial recourse in some conditions and not in others.  
 
The conditions in which the use of foreign jurisprudence might give rise to 
problems can be summarised as ones in which the result is the adoption of 
foreign norms or the development of domestic jurisprudence in reliance on 
those norms. The crux of the problem is the enduring debate about sovereignty. 
If a court uses foreign jurisprudence to develop domestic law in a direction not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
568 Harold Cooke Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of 
Legal Study and Research (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1949), 5. 
569 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’ in 
Jane Holder and Colm O'Cinneide (eds), Current Legal Problems (Vol 59, Oxford University 
Press 2006). 
570 Ibid. 
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envisaged by the legislature, it effectively assumes legislative sovereignty.571 
This is particularly clear in the US debate about the legitimacy of recourse to 
foreign jurisprudence. Cram explains: 
[One] strand of US exceptionalism objects to foreign norm citation on 
sovereignty grounds. The suggestion here is that where the 
Constitution does not authorize or formally give a status to foreign 
norms, resort to such norms by the court is improper, occurring as it 
does without a proper mandate from the people or their 
representatives. … These difficulties are further compounded where 
the judiciary enjoy a power of review over primary legislation and 
when the foreign source is being used by the domestic court to strike 
down a measure that has been passed by the democratically elected 
legislature. It is unsurprising therefore when resort to comparative 
legal resources is labeled as foreign interference and something to 
be resisted. 572 
Criticisms of this kind are perpetuated by the relative lack of transparency about 
the methods or purposes involved in the use of foreign jurisprudence. In a 
limited number of cases, explanations for the citation of foreign materials can be 
derived from the context of a judgment. However, in by far the greatest 
proportion of cases, little to no explanation is given why the foreign 
jurisprudence has been cited.  
 
Further uncertainty is created by the disparity between the data collected from 
the judgments and the evidence obtained through interviews, which suggested !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
571 E.g. Roger Alford, ‘Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution’ (2004) 98 
American Journal of International Law 57, 59; Roger Alford, ‘In Search of a Theory for 
Constitutional Comparativism’ (2005) 52 ULC Law Review 639. 
572 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with 
reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 123-124. 
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that judges use foreign jurisprudence to a greater extent than is detectable from 
the judgments themselves. If that is so, it is worth clarifying the reasons for 
these additional recourses to foreign jurisprudence. Certainly, the evidence from 
the interviews described in chapter four was that the citations of foreign 
materials are not usually made for purely decorative or ornamental purposes. 
Moreover, if this were to be the case, foreign jurisprudence would always be 
detectable on the face of the judgment.  
 
The thesis in the following three chapters is that there are three main purposes 
for using foreign jurisprudence in Supreme Court human rights cases (and, 
often, in Supreme Court cases generally). The first is the purpose considered by 
this chapter: that foreign jurisprudence is used as a heuristic device. Foreign 
jurisprudence represents an opportunity for reflection on a given issue. Although 
this may be prompted by a lack of relevant or helpful domestic jurisprudence, 
the ‘gap-filling’ thesis propounded in much of the literature is not supported. The 
Supreme Court is not concerned with filling gaps per se. Rather, the Justices 
are using foreign jurisprudence as an analytical lens, 573  through which to 
theorise on the domestic issue. These recourses to foreign jurisprudence are 
most likely to be conducted as an ‘extra’ but will not usually make a substantive 
contribution to the reasoning in any one case. As such, foreign jurisprudence 
used for this purpose would not necessarily convert into explicit citations in a 
published judgment. Chapters seven and eight detail the other two main 
purposes for which it is argued that the Supreme Court uses foreign !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
573 The term ‘analytical lens’ is used in Esin Örücü (ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human 
Rights Cases (United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 2003).  
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jurisprudence in human rights cases: to identify and maintain consensus or 
uniformity; and instrumentally, to support conclusions at odds with the relevant 
domestic (or Strasbourg) jurisprudence. 
 
6.1 Gap filling  
Gutteridge wrote in 1949 that ‘at some future date more extensive use will, no 
doubt, be made of foreign law for the purpose of assisting our judges to fill the 
gaps that are still to be found in our law’.574 Some years later, a strong theme 
remains that foreign jurisprudence may offer a useful perspective where the 
indigenous jurisprudence is lacking or unsettled. In such circumstances, it is 
usually argued that foreign jurisprudence can contribute solutions to similar 
legal problems. It is a functionalist approach, which proceeds on the basis of 
‘usefulness and need’ and the logic is intelligible: ‘…only a fool would refuse 
quinine just because it didn’t grown in his back garden’.575  Lord Bingham 
referred to such circumstances in his 2009 Hamlyn lecture: 
There are perhaps two situations in which foreign authority may exert 
a significant if not a decisive influence. One is where domestic 
authority points towards an answer that seems inappropriate or 
unjust. The other is where domestic authority appears to yield no 
clear answer.576  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
574 Harold Cooke Gutteridge, Comparative Law, above n 568, 40; More recently see eg Cheryl 
Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’, above  n 569, 
114. 
575  Rudolph von Jhering, quoted in Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1998), 17.  
576 Tom Bingham, Widening Horizons (Cambridge University Press 2010), 7-8. 
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It is fairly clear that counsel would tend to approach foreign jurisprudence in this 
way, making use of it as evidence for a movement in the domestic position or to 
persuade a court about the way domestic jurisprudence ought to be construed 
and developed. Legal practitioners are trained to give evidence for their 
arguments and the accessibility of foreign jurisprudence through the Internet 
has enlarged the pool of potential authorities. As McCrudden has written: 
For the human rights advocate the role of comparison is that of 
persuasion to an essentially moral position. Lawyers in the human 
rights context often use comparison to legitimate their argument that 
a particular interpretation of an existing human rights norm should be 
adopted, or as part of the process of generating further norms.577 
It is clear that some Justices of the Supreme Court expect counsel to behave in 
this way. Lord Kerr explained:  
I suppose there must be a tendency on the part of counsel to have 
resort to foreign jurisprudence that deals with the point if there isn’t 
any unambiguous answer to be found in domestic jurisprudence.578 
 
Whether or not judges articulate ‘gap-filling’ as a purpose, there are examples 
of cases in which foreign jurisprudence appears to have been used in this way. 
For instance, the development of the common law breach of confidence action, 
so as to protect the privacy right enshrined under Article 8 of the ECHR, owes 
much to a decision of the Australian High Court.579 The approach has been 
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577 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’ in Esin Örücü and 
David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing 2007) 371, 376. 
578 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, above n 535 
579  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats [2001] HCA 63; Roger 
Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ 
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similar where the jurisprudence of the ECtHR (which the HRA 1998 obliges 
domestic courts to ‘take into account’) is silent or unhelpful.580 As Baroness 
Hale has confirmed (extra judicially): 
[T]here is nothing in the [Human Rights] Act … to support the 
reluctance … to seek such guidance as we can from the 
jurisprudence of foreign courts … especially on subjects where 
Strasbourg has not recently spoken.581 
 
One of the best examples is given by two cases handed down prior to the move 
to the Supreme Court, by the House of Lords. In Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v MB,582 the issue turned on the minimum requirements for a 
fair hearing in control order cases, for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR. In 
brief, the question was whether disclosure of closed material to a special 
advocate would enable a controlled person to have a fair trial. When MB was 
before the House of Lords, the Strasbourg Court’s approach to the level of 
disclosure required to render a hearing fair was unclear. As Baroness Hale 
wrote, ‘Strasbourg [had] not yet had to deal with a case exactly on all fours with 
the present’.583 The Grand Chamber had not yet decided A and others v United 
Kingdom, which considered breaches of procedural guarantees in Article 5(4) of 
the Convention (providing similar requirements about the lawfulness of a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
[2004] PL 725, 726; Gavin Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common 
Law Right of Privacy Under the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 65 MLR 726, 731. 
580 Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 obliges domestic courts to ‘taking into account’ 
relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence in cases that raise a Convention point; Francesca Klug, ‘The 
Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v Hart and All That’ [1999] PL 246, 251: Domestic courts will 
therefore draw from foreign jurisprudence especially where there is ‘little or no steer from the 
Strasbourg organs’. 
581 Baroness Hale, ‘Who Defines Convention Rights?’ (2010) 5(2) JUSTICE Journal 10, 13. 
582 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46; [2008] 1 AC 440. 
583 Ibid [67] (Baroness Hale). 
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decision, as determined by a court).584 In the absence of clear and constant 
Strasbourg authority, the House were forced to attempt to identity some of the 
guiding principles from the existing Strasbourg case law. In doing so, Lord 
Bingham made heavy reference to the approach of the Canadian and United 
States courts on the issue. The references to those jurisdictions did not 
themselves provide the ‘magical ace of trumps’,585 but it is clear that the House 
found them to be a useful resource and used them to confirm that the 
Strasbourg case law had developed along the same lines. It was after quoting 
passages from the Canadian and United States Supreme Courts,586 that Lord 
Bingham noted that ‘[s]tatements to similar effect, less emphatically expressed, 
[were] to be found in the Strasbourg case law’.587 
 
By the time Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) reached 
the House of Lords,588 the Grand Chamber judgment in A v United Kingdom had 
been handed down.589 As Baroness Hale later explained (extra judicially): 
Although A v United Kingdom was concerned with detention, and the 
control order cases were not, the House of Lords in AF (No 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
584 Article 5(4) reads: Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
585 Tom Bingham, Widening Horizons, above n576, 7-8. 
586 Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2007] 1 SCR 350; Hamdi v Rumsfeld 
(2004) 542 US 507. 
587 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46; [2008] 1 AC 440, [30]-
[31] (Lord Bingham).  
588 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and another [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 AC 
269. 
589 A v the United Kingdom [2009] EHRR 301. 
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3) considered it inevitable that Strasbourg would take the same view 
of the procedural requirements for confirming control orders.590  
While the Canadian and United States authorities were again cited (when 
referring to MB), the effect of the decision in A v United Kingdom prompted Lord 
Rodger’s well-known conclusion: ‘Argentoratum locutum, iudicium finitum - 
Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed’.591  
 
The MB and AF (No 3) cases demonstrate that a wider net might be thrown 
where the Strasbourg position is unclear, but it is difficult to link such examples 
to an attitude of using foreign jurisprudence as ’gap fillers’ generally. If the gap-
filling explanation were accurate, the assumption would be that the use of 
foreign jurisprudence would significantly decline—or be non-existent—where 
domestic law is settled, unless its suitability is questioned in some way:592 while 
it is said that only a fool ‘would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grown in his 
back garden’, it is also said that ‘[n]o one bothers to fetch a thing from afar 
when he has one as good or better at home’.593 The first problem with this 
reasoning is that it is not easy to find examples of cases where foreign 
jurisprudence would have been cited but for the existence of relevant domestic 
law. The Justices are hardly likely to highlight such possibilities in their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
590 Brenda Hale, ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme? (2012) 
12 (1) Human Rights Law Review 65, 67. 
591 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF and another, above n 588, [98] (Lord 
Rodger). 
592  Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20(4) OJLS 499, 523. Cf. Albert Kiralfy, ‘The 
Persuasive Authority of American Rulings in England,’ (1948-9) XXIII Tulane Law Review 209, 
210; Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’ in 
Jane Holder and Colm O'Cinneide (eds) Current Legal Problems (2006) Vol 59, (Oxford 
University Press 2007), 101. 
593 Rudolph von Jhering, quoted in Zweigert K and Kötz H, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 
above n 575, 17. 
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judgments, which the Justices are in any case aiming to reduce in complexity 
and length. The second problem is that, even in cases where the attitude is 
possible to discern, the matter is not necessarily put so clearly. Lord Rodger’s 
short statement in AF (No 3) is unusual. As Lord Mance has written, the ‘brevity 
and wit were here a misleading guide to the approach which Lord Rodger might 
have taken in other contexts’.594 Further obscurity is created by the fact that the 
House of Lords in the later cases did repeat the citations to the foreign 
jurisprudence used in AF, which is not unexpected given the House was 
considering the identical issue and was reviewing the reasoning of the House in 
the earlier case. Indeed, when reviewing the cases handed down by the 
Supreme Court between 2009 and 2013, it was noted that many references to 
foreign jurisprudence were prompted by discussion of previous cases that had 
considered those sources, rather than as a result of a fresh contribution.595  
 
The gap-filling thesis is therefore very hard to confirm. In fact, if there were to be 
cases where judges were inclined to look abroad notwithstanding a relevant 
body of domestic jurisprudence, the risk would be that citations would begin to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
594 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), 
Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013), 
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595 Other examples include: Smith and Others (FC) v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [87] 
where Lord Hope considered a decision of the Australian High Court by reference to an earlier 
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look opportunistic. The point is a regular feature of the debate about the use of 
foreign jurisprudence in United States constitutional cases. For example, 
arguing against references to foreign material in Knight v Florida,596 Justice 
Thomas suggested: 
the only reason why this material was resorted to was there was no 
support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court’s 
precedent .... [for the conclusion reached] … [Had there been] any 
such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for 
proponents of the claim to rely on European Court of Human Rights, 
the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the 
Privy Council.597 
Perhaps the most vocal critic has been Justice Scalia of the US Supreme Court. 
For Justice Scalia, if domestic jurisprudence is lacking ‘…[t]hat's the end of the 
question … [w]hat good would reading Canadian opinions do, unless it was my 
job to be the moral arbiter, which I don't accept?’598 
 
The ferocity of the US debate is not mirrored in the UK where recourse to 
foreign jurisprudence has not been the subject of great concern. Besides, the 
argument that recourse to foreign norms would imply greater creativity on the 
part of a judge is not itself logically sound. It is entirely possible that the use of 
foreign jurisprudence in such cases is motivated by a desire to elucidate an 
issue or provide an analytical lens, rather than signalling the opportunity to 
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596 Knight v Florida (1999) 120 S Ct 459. 
597 Ibid 460 (Thomas, J). 
598  Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’ (2005) 3(3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 519, 535 (Justice Scalia). 
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support an otherwise illegitimate conclusion.599 It is not difficult to read Lord 
Bingham’s judgment in MB as taking this sort of approach.600  
 
In any case, the idea that foreign jurisprudence has some substantive influence 
on the outcome of the case where there is dearth of domestic law is a little 
extreme. The Justices provided some insight during the interviews. While Lord 
Dyson seemed to agree with Lord Bingham’s Hamlyn lecture formulation—that 
foreign jurisprudence was useful especially where there was ‘not a great deal of 
domestic [material]’ or if a case raised a ‘relatively new point’,601 Lord Kerr was 
evidently less convinced about the impact of foreign jurisprudence on gap-filling 
situations:  
Just because there is a dearth of authority, doesn’t mean to say that 
we have to close the gap by recourse to foreign jurisprudence. … 
Very often, cases come here because there is no clear—or 
unambiguous—answer, and that is entirely as it should be. We have 
to try to come up with the proper principled response to whatever 
problem is presented to us. Now, we would be unwise to neglect to 
have recourse to whatever assistance we can derive in order to help 
us in that process. But I think it would be wrong to overestimate the 
influence that foreign jurisprudence has in circumstances where 
there isn’t any clear national or domestic authority.602  
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599 It is presumed that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas would consider a conclusion that was 
not supported by domestic jurisprudence to be illegitimate. 
600 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB, above n 587. 
601 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Dyson MR, former Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme 
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It has in any case not been possible to find any clear empirical examples of 
foreign jurisprudence being transplanted to fill a gap in domestic law in the way 
that the gap-filling thesis often suggests.   
 
 
6.2 Analytical lens 
A more realistic version of the gap-filling thesis is that an absence of relevant 
domestic (or Strasbourg) authority might prompt judges to use foreign 
jurisprudence as an analytical lens, through which to test ideas and reflect on 
their own analysis of the law. Judges themselves often claim a role for foreign 
jurisprudence far removed from the notion of persuasive authority. Thus 
Emeritus Justice Laurie Ackermann, formerly a Justice of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, has described the purpose of recourse to foreign 
jurisprudence as ‘seeking information, guidance, stimulation, clarification, or 
even enlightenment … [o]ne is doing no more than keeping the judicial mind 
open to new ideas’.603 Justice Breyer, of the US Supreme Court is well-know to 
support such an approach:  
…I would say that I understand that a judge cannot read everything. 
But if the lawyers find an interesting and useful foreign case, and if 
they refer to that case, the judges will likely read it, using it as food 
for thought, not as binding precedent. I think that is fine.604 
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604 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 598, 524 
(Justice Breyer). 
 213 
Aharon Barak, former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, similarly 
described the possibility that comparative law ‘awakens judges to the potential 
latent in their own system’ and ‘allows for greater self knowledge’. 605  As 
Saunders has explained:  
…foreign law has potential to contain, rather than expand, the 
discretion of a judge, identifying directions that others have taken and 
enabling evaluation of their consequences, while leaving the judge 
free to craft a domestic solution … A ‘comparative legal approach’ 
can give judges insight into their own prejudices and assist in 
eliminating personal preferences.606 
 
Similar explanations were given by the UK judges. The only Court of Appeal 
judge to have been interviewed, Lady Justice Arden, explained that she had 
‘most often’ used foreign jurisprudence:  
…as part of my own thinking about the case [looking] at what other 
courts have done and … at the examples they have come up with. Or 
fact situations they have had to deal with and then test it and look at 
the difficulties there might be if the rule was X rather than Y.607  
When asked whether there was something particular about the nature of foreign 
jurisprudence that makes it more useful than other persuasive sources for this 
purpose, Lady Justice Arden replied: 
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… there’s a big difference between a judgment and an article, which 
is not related to any specific case, because the point about a 
decision is that it has been used to alter people’s rights and therefore 
it has had a considerable effect. It has been tested in the fire of 
actual practical use.608 
 
The feeling continues in the Supreme Court. Lord Mance explained that foreign 
jurisprudence ‘gives you insights and helps ensure that you’ve thought about all 
possible aspects of a problem’.609 Lord Collins—perhaps the most enthusiastic 
user of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court—justified his use of foreign 
jurisprudence in similar terms: 
[It is] useful just to see, in formulating my conclusions, how other 
people have done it and whether there is anything to be learned from 
other people. Not only where there are gaps … because in theory 
there are never gaps. Something that is done abroad won’t be 
persuasive authority in the sense that you’ll follow it, you’ll just see 
what conclusion they have come to.610 
This sort of motive was clearly the driving force in Jones v Kaney,611 the case in 
which Lord Collins all but reprimanded counsel for their failure to cite what he 
considered to be relevant foreign authorities. So unusual were his comments, it 
is worth quoting the passage at some length: 
It is highly desirable that at this appellate level, in cases where 
issues of legal policy are concerned, the court should be informed 
about the position in other common law countries. This court is often !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
608 Ibid. 
609 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The 
Supreme Court, London, 6 December 2011). 
610 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, above n 536. 
611 Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13; [2011] 2 A.C. 398. 
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helped by being referred to authorities from other common law 
systems, including the United States. … On this appeal the claimant 
did not rely on the United States material, although it is helpful to his 
case. The defendant's counsel drew attention to some of the United 
States cases on the basis of research which (it was said) was 
‘slightly hampered by the renovation of the Middle Temple's 
American room’. But there is an outstanding collection of United 
States material in the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in London 
University, and (provided the barristers or solicitors concerned are 
prepared to make the expenditure) all of the material is readily 
available online. Lord Wilberforce said in Buttes Gas & Oil 
Co v Hammer (No 3) … ‘When the judicial approach to an identical 
problem between the same parties has been spelt out with such 
articulation in a country, one not only so closely akin to ours in legal 
approach, the fabric of whose legal doctrine in this area is so closely 
interwoven with ours, but that to which all the parties before us 
belong, spelt out moreover in convincing language and reasoning, 
we should be unwise not to take the benefit of it’.612 
The vast American jurisprudence on ‘precisely the same arguments of policy 
which [had] been argued before [the UKSC]’ were, to Lord Collins, of obvious 
assistance. This was despite the fact that the culture relating to expert evidence 
was different in the United States, because ‘the underlying principle is the 
same’. 613  Thus, as Bell concluded, the Commonwealth and United States 
jurisprudence in Jones v Kaney was effectively cited as a way of ‘checking that 
no relevant argument had been ignored’.614 
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However, examples like Jones v Kaney are relatively rare; the same 
methodological difficulties of identifying cases that have used foreign 
jurisprudence in this way arise here as with gap-filling above. Where foreign 
jurisprudence has been used as an analytical lens, it will not necessarily be 
obvious from the text of the judgment. Lady Justice Arden explained that 
‘comparative law in that sense is very useful but it is not obvious on the face of 
the judgment, because it wouldn’t be relevant to cite it’.615 This kind of use is 
therefore a good example of reasons why this thesis attempts to look beyond 
explicit citations. If foreign jurisprudence is referred to but frequently omitted 
from the list of citations in a judgment, it represents an implicit rather than 
explicit use of foreign jurisprudence. It is therefore not a use that will be 
captured by a quantitative analysis of the cases. It is also a use that, if ignored, 
would significantly distort any conclusions about the way that foreign 
jurisprudence is used in UK courts.  
 
Yet this sort of purpose is important. In the human rights context it is worth 
remembering that UK judges have been, until recently, relatively unfamiliar with 
human rights adjudication and with the duties imposed upon them by the HRA 
1998. For example, prior to the HRA, the balancing act required by the qualified 
rights had almost exclusively been the jurisdiction of the supranational court. A 
positive duty to ‘take into account’ one particular pool of otherwise persuasive 
jurisprudence, to read domestic law compatibly with an international convention 
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and to declare any incompatibilities that could not be so remedied,616 have all 
led domestic courts to grapple with greater depth and detail on questions 
hitherto unfamiliar to the role of the judge. It would not be surprising if judges 
were to consider the jurisprudence of other similar systems, particularly those 
with similar human rights instruments, in order to draw any assistance that they 
may provide when theorising about a particular problem at home. It is one of the 
major justifications for comparativism is therefore that it can aid not only in 
applying the under-theorised jurisprudence, but can also encourage the 
domestic court to adopt a more theorised approach to human rights.  
 
6.3 Reassurance 
Closely connected to the gap-filling and analytical lens theories is the idea that 
foreign jurisprudence can provide reassurance. Slaughter has argued that 
‘[r]eferences to the activity of fellow courts in other states can act as … a 
security blanket …’617 and Justice Barak talked of comparative law ‘granti[ng] 
comfort to the judge and giv[ing] him the feeling that he is treading on safe 
ground’. 618  This purpose is distinct from the gap-filling and analytical lens 
theories because it constructs judicial comparativism as a sort of yardstick: by 
seeing that courts in other jurisdictions have come to the same or similar 
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conclusions about a particular problem, a judge can feel more confident in his 
own conclusions, which are reached independently of the jurisprudence from 
those jurisdictions.619 In other words, the gap-filling and analytical lens theories 
capture uses of foreign jurisprudence in the very early stages of a judgment, 
while uses of foreign jurisprudence for the purpose of reassurance is likely to 
come a little later, once the judge has come to at least some tentative 
conclusion. Despite this difference, it is a purpose that is considered in this 
section because the circumstances that give rise to using foreign jurisprudence 
in this way are likely to be similar to those suggested to give rise to uses for 
gap-filling or to provide an analytical lens. If a judge requires reassurance it is 
likely to be because the domestic law is unsettled or underdeveloped. The then 
President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, explained the relevance of 
foreign jurisprudence in this way:  
I think we like to look elsewhere: if we’ve got an area where we are 
uncertain; an area where we are developing the law; an area where, 
particularly, where we would like to develop the law in a particular 
direction, then you are particularly keen to see if you can get any 
support for what your thinking is from foreign jurisdictions.620 
 
This sort of explanation also tends towards a view of foreign jurisprudence as 
an instrumental tool, used to legitimate ones own decision. It lends support to 
those who feel that the legitimacy of judicial comparativism is often 
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compromised by the tendency on the part of judges to ‘cherry pick’ decisions of 
foreign jurisdictions according to those that best support their own conclusions. 
The most cynical view of this is that in using foreign jurisprudence in this way, 
judges neglect to take a balanced view of the position in foreign jurisdictions. 
For the reasons given elsewhere, that argument is not accepted as an 
explanation for the Supreme Court’s approach to foreign jurisprudence. For the 
instant purpose, it is important to note just that the Supreme Court might use 
foreign jurisprudence in areas of uncertainty or where the law is under 
development. In those situations, Lord Phillips continued, ‘to see how similar 
jurisdictions, dealing with similar problems have developed their jurisprudence 
is a valuable thing to do’.621 
 
Using foreign jurisprudence as a type of checking mechanism was common 
among the explanations of the other Justices interviewed. Although Lord Kerr 
felt it ‘… difficult to be prescriptive about the use to which [foreign jurisprudence] 
is put’, it was possible to ‘envisage two main strands’:622 The first strand, was 
that ‘even if it does not necessarily provide a template that one would wish to 
follow’, analysis conducted by a foreign court, or the court’s line of reasoning 
‘does provide a yardstick against which you can measure your own process of 
reasoning’. Lord Kerr’s second strand echoed Lady Justice Arden’s explanation 
that it was helpful to get an empirical view of the effect of certain 
developments,623 ‘in relating to the experience of the courts about the impact of 
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particular laws’.624 Lord Collins agreed: ‘You might be, I suppose, encouraged 
or emboldened by what someone else has done…’.625  
 
For most of the Justices, it seemed that the extent to which foreign 
jurisprudence is used in this way would likely be connected to the arguments 
made by counsel. For example, Lord Reed explained that counsel using foreign 
jurisprudence essentially present the Court with  
… material from analogous legal systems. The argument is that the 
point has been considered by a superior court in that jurisdiction, and 
what they had to say about it is at least interesting and may give [the 
court] an idea about how the common law should be developed in 
this country.626 
Therefore, foreign authorities are cited ‘in order to persuade us to develop the 
common law in a particular way. … to show us that another leading common 
law court … has taken [a] step without the heavens falling in’.627 In human rights 
cases specifically, the justification is that the Court is concerned with 
considering the underlying values. As Baroness Hale put it:  
It is obviously of interest to us in this court if a foreign court has been 
interpreting a human rights instrument, which is not unlike the 
European Convention, to look at its approach. That is because 
human rights are all about values—underlying values—and it’s good 
to see how similar societies, similar legal systems, see those 
underlying values. … If … you find that the same result has been 
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reached on the same set of facts, by a completely different route, it 
gives you some view of the underlying values.628  
 
6.4 Conclusions 
In the early or formative stages of a judgment, particularly where the domestic 
law is unsettled or under-developed, the stock argument about judicial 
discretion is an obvious problem. If the domestic jurisprudence is unsettled, or 
there is an absence of clear guiding principles, the discretion of the judge is in 
any event approaching its outer limits,629 and reference to foreign jurisprudence 
for the purpose of ‘gap-filling’ is likely to attract attention. As the United States 
debate shows, using foreign jurisprudence for this purpose is likely to invite the 
accusation that a judge has made opportunistic citations of foreign 
jurisprudence in order to support a point that is otherwise not supportable in 
domestic law. However, it has been argued in this chapter that the ‘gap-filling’ 
thesis does not explain the UK Supreme Court’s use of foreign jurisprudence. 
Certainly, none of the Justices interviewed fully accepted the theory.  
 
Rather, it is more realistic to consider that foreign jurisprudence provides the 
Supreme Court with a fresh perspective—an analytical lens—through which to 
reflect on its own reasoning about a problem. In this way, foreign jurisprudence 
is used mainly as a heuristic device. This is what appeared to be happening in 
the House of Lords control order cases, MB and AF (No3) and this is what !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
628 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012). 
629 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’, 
above n 569, 114. 
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seemed to drive Lord Collins’ insistence on the consideration of American 
decisions in Jones v Kaney.630 The evidence from the interviews supports this 
construction. None of the Justices interviewed felt this use of foreign 
jurisprudence to be problematic, largely because no particular reliance is placed 
on these materials in any event. Lord Collins, who was the heaviest user of 
foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme Court prior to his retirement, was ‘sure 
that [he had] never been turned by foreign law’.631  At best he ‘might have been 
confirmed in [his] feelings’.632  
 
As Saunders has suggested, the reality is simply that ‘such cases must be 
determined … with or without the insights offered by comparative law’ and ‘in at 
least some such cases, foreign experience can help to elucidate the issues and 
options for their resolution’.633 In some circumstances this may translate into 
using foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device: a yardstick, against which to 
measure a Justices’ own thinking about a problem. The purpose served by 
foreign jurisprudence in these circumstances is simply to provide an opportunity 
for reflection or ‘part of the process of reaching a more fully theorised … 
agreement’.634 In fact Lord Kerr gave reasons along these lines for dismissing 
the significance that might be attributed to the use of foreign jurisprudence: 
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… to add to the authorities that we consider by casting around in 
domestic courts is probably not going to be a profitable exercise. 
Ultimately … the outcome of these cases depends critically on your 
own powers of analysis. Reference to authority, be it domestic, 
supranational, international or whatever, is always going to be by 
way of supplement to your own reasoning in the case. Hopefully to 
confirm the views that you have formed and, occasionally, to shape 
those views. But I see that very much in a secondary—an extremely 
important but nevertheless secondary—role.635 
 
These uses of foreign jurisprudence are also likely to be the more obscure in 
the judgment, since it would not usually be relevant to cite them explicitly, 
unless they had contributed something of substance to the instant case. This 
finding goes some way towards explaining the anomalies in the data set 
discussed in chapter five, where it was explained that the data collected on 
explicit citation did not show some Supreme Court Justices—known for their 
enthusiasm for comparative law—as heavy users of foreign jurisprudence. 
Where judges use foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device, as an analytical 
lens, yardstick or benchmark against which to measure thinking, or when 
seeking for reassurance, it is easy to understand the lack of explicit citations.636 
It was perhaps purposes of this kind that prompted Lady Justice Arden’s 
comment (although not speaking for the Supreme Court) that there is ‘far more 
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use of comparative law than appears on the face of the judgments … it’s 
informing the judges behind the scenes’.637 Just as there is no obligation to use 
persuasive authorities, neither is there an obligation to cite them.  
 
Foreign jurisprudence may provide the Supreme Court with a valuable 
perspective—an analytical lens—through which Justices may reflect on their 
own reasoning about a problem. This is in keeping with one of the major 
justifications for comparativism: that it can also encourage the domestic court to 
adopt a more theorised approach to human rights. As McCrudden recognised, 
‘[e]ven where the result of the foreign judicial approach has not been adopted, it 
has often been influential in sharpening the understanding of the court’s view of 
domestic law’.638 Foreign jurisprudence may ‘perform a cognitive function … the 
confrontation of both legal systems may force some consideration and better 
understanding of the nature of domestic law’.639 
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7 Foreign Jurisprudence used for consistency  
In chapter six it was argued that the Supreme Court Justices use foreign 
jurisprudence as a heuristic device. Foreign jurisprudence might therefore 
elucidate issues or provide a useful yardstick against which judges can 
reassure themselves about their own conclusions, especially where domestic 
jurisprudence is unsettled or underdeveloped. That purpose represents a 
receptive use of foreign jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court uses the 
decisions of domestic courts as part of a wider pool of resources. It is a one-
way transaction, based on the functionalist theory of ‘usefulness and need’. 640 
In this chapter, it is argued that there is also a second category of purposes for 
which judges have recourse to foreign jurisprudence: that foreign jurisprudence 
is used as a tool to ensure consistency or uniformity when grappling with a 
common problem and to communicate the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it. 
 
The use of foreign jurisprudence for consistency as explained here is similar to 
but distinct from the use of foreign jurisprudence for reassurance described in 
chapter six. In that chapter it was explained that where a judge uses foreign 
jurisprudence for reassurance, those sources represent a sort of yardstick 
against which their own feelings about the case can be measured. By seeing 
that courts in other jurisdictions have come to the same or similar conclusions 
about a particular problem, a judge can feel more confident in his own 
conclusions, which are reached independently of the jurisprudence from those 
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jurisdictions at first. By contrast, where a judge uses foreign jurisprudence for 
consistency, the primary aim of the exercise to identify the position in those 
other jurisdictions, in order to then aim for an interpretation or conclusion that is 
in line with it.  
 
7.1 Using foreign jurisprudence to promote uniformity 
It has often been mooted that courts may use foreign jurisprudence as a tool to 
promote greater harmonisation or integration within a group of countries. This 
may be in response, for instance, to a common agreement or a shared heritage. 
One of Slaughter’s conclusions was that the use of foreign jurisprudence would 
be likely where there was an ‘awareness of a common enterprise’.641 That 
awareness ‘could flow either from a particular self-conception or a common 
substantive focus’.642 For example:   
… the courts of some subset of countries may see their primary 
function as the protection of individual rights against the government. 
From this perspective, it is not surprising that one of the most active 
areas of transjudicial communication outside the European 
Community is among courts specifically charged with the 
interpretation and application of international instruments concerning 
human rights.643  
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In these situations, foreign jurisprudence is used as part of an information 
gathering exercise,644 with the aim of seeking to maintain uniformity with other 
jurisdictions.  
 
In the context of human rights this discussion tends to draw from the on-going 
debate about universalism. For some, this is problematic. It is said that the 
citation of foreign jurisprudence assumes reliance on a fictional shared 
understanding. Posner, for example, has remarked that ‘to cite foreign law as 
authority, is to flirt with the discredited (I had thought) idea of a universal natural 
law; or to suppose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single, elite 
community of wisdom and conscience’.645 If the citation of foreign jurisprudence 
does suppose that there is some common understanding about human rights, 
the unyielding debate between universalism and cultural relativism will continue 
to pose questions and carry implications for those judges that tend towards 
comparativism. A connected issue is that judicial comparativism may pose 
greater risks in such circumstances since the inclusion of common principles in 
these texts may act to disguise divergent views about their application as well 
as any theory supporting them.646 
 
The debate is further complicated by the shift in focus away from universal 
instruments and towards regional systems of more selective integration. For !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights greatly influenced the 
drafters of the ECHR, which is arguably the primary text for human rights 
regulation in the European Legal Order. As McCrudden has pointed out, one of 
the attractive aspects of regional instruments ‘is that states that appear to share 
more common cultural and ethical roots can come together to establish human 
rights regimes that go beyond the state, but stop short of the global’.647 For 
McCrudden, this ‘gives rise to the question as to whether regionally shared 
conceptions of human rights are emerging, for example, a European ius 
commune’.648 This understanding would presumably lead UK domestic judges 
to consider relevant European jurisprudence in cases which engage a 
Convention point ahead of, say, Commonwealth jurisprudence. Yet the 
evidence suggests that the reality is quite the reverse, largely a product of the 
existence of jurisprudence from the ECtHR. As Lord Mance has written:  
When interpreting legislation to give effect to international treaties, 
the need for international consistency provides a strong justification 
[for the use of foreign jurisprudence]. In areas such as fundamental 
rights, international instruments invite international discourse, though 
sometimes raising the question how far different social backgrounds 
and standards justify differences in application. Within Europe, the 
frameworks of the European Union and the European Convention on 
Human Rights encourage uniformity. Indeed, the role of the Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights in establishing the 
‘true’ effect of the European Treaties and European Convention 
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means that such uniformity may be achieved even without 
consensus among national courts.649 
The hint in the last sentence is that aspirations towards adopting uniform 
positions also play a role in limiting the use of foreign jurisprudence.  
 
7.2 Uniformity under the Human Rights Act 
It is a common feature of judicial reasoning under the HRA that the Convention 
must be understood and applied uniformly amongst all contracting states. The 
better known formulation is found in the Ullah case where Lord Bingham 
stressed that while member States could legislate so as to provide for: 
… rights more generous than those guaranteed by the Convention, 
national courts should not interpret the Convention to achieve this: 
the Convention must bear the same meaning for all states party to 
it.650  
Accordingly his Lordship felt that the task of domestic courts was ‘no more, 
[and] no less’ than keeping pace with Strasbourg. This restrained approach has 
been adopted in a line of cases since Ullah. In R (Clift) Lord Hope added that 
‘[a] measure of self-restraint is needed, lest we stretch our own jurisprudence 
beyond that which is shared by all the States Parties to the Convention’.651 Lord 
Brown gave endorsement to this cautious approach in Al-Skeini, further 
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suggesting that ‘no more, but certainly no less’ could be read as ‘no less, but 
certainly no more’. 652  
 
A major justification for this approach is based on ‘the general desirability of a 
uniform interpretation of the Convention in all member states’,653 designed to 
avoid confusion and relativism. The net result of this interpretation is that UK 
courts have taken a deferential approach to the case law of the ECtHR in 
Strasbourg. Masterman argued that the loyalty domestic courts were showing to 
the Strasbourg line would have the result of binding domestic courts to 
Strasbourg.654 In similar terms, Lewis described the approach as ‘the mirror 
principle’ and felt the result to be that domestic human rights law would 
effectively be ‘nothing more than Strasbourg's shadow’.655 
 
This is not difficult to understand. It reflects ‘the fact that the Convention is an 
international instrument, the correct interpretation of which can be 
authoritatively expounded only by the Strasbourg Court’. 656  There is little 
incentive to use foreign jurisprudence if the Strasbourg court has handed down 
an authoritative judgment. As Masterman suggested, the jurisprudence of 
jurisdictions not signatory to the ECHR is ‘unlikely to point to the direction in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
652 R (Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26; [2008] 1 AC 153, 
[106].  Cf In Re P and Others [2008] UKHL 38; [2008] 3 WLR 76, [50] (Lord Hope). 
653 In Re P and Others [2008] UKHL 38, [36]. 
654  Roger Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act: Binding domestic courts to 
Strasbourg?’ [2004] PL 725. 
655 Jonathan Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720, 730; Lord Justice 
Laws, ‘The limitations of Human Rights’ [1998] PL 254; Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a ‘municipal law of human rights’ under the 
Human Rights Act' [2005] 54 ICLQ 907; Stephen Grosz, Jack Beatson and Peter Duffy, Human 
Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention (Sweet and Maxwell 2000) 20. 
656 Ullah, above n 650, [20] (Lord Bingham). 
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which the common law should be developed to ensure compatibility with the 
Convention rights’.657  
 
Even where it would be of interest to the Supreme Court to review the position 
of the other states signatory to the Convention, it is clear that the Court prefers 
to accept the results of the Strasbourg Court’s research on the point. The 
practical reasons were considered in chapter five: the Supreme Court simply 
doesn’t have time ‘to go to the other European countries and look at the way 
they’ve addressed [an issue]’.658  Baroness Hale also explained the lack of 
citations from the domestic courts of other European states along these lines, 
suggesting that it was simply ‘easier’ to look at the Strasbourg Court’s findings 
about the state of the national law in the various contracting states than for the 
Supreme Court to undertake its own analysis:  
It is not easy for us to find out what Europe is doing on a particular 
point; it is much easier for Strasbourg. …We may know about it [but] 
I don’t think that we, as a matter of policy, would ask ourselves what 
is going on in France or Germany or whatever. … We might decide 
to do it in a particular case, but mainly we rely on what Strasbourg 
tells us about the way in which things are developing elsewhere.659  
 
The approach is surprising, given the well-recognised problems with the quality 
and consistency of the Strasbourg Court’s decisions. As Amos has written, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
657  Roger Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account: developing a 
‘municipal law of human rights’ under the Human Rights Act' [2005] 54(4) ICLQ 907, 923. 
658 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011). 
The full quote was given in chapter five. 
659 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 19 October 2011). 
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Strasbourg case law ‘can be unclear, confusing, and admitting of many possible 
interpretations’.660 The best examples are those where the Strasbourg Court 
has simply got it wrong, such as in the well-known Osman v United Kingdom 
case.661 In other cases, the judges have commented on the lack of clarity or the 
mixed messages given by the complexity of several judgments.662  Another 
possibility is that Strasbourg’s review of the European jurisprudence is itself out-
dated. It is implicit in the construction of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ that 
interpretations and the consensus among member states may evolve. 663 The 
Strasbourg Court has thus explained that the Convention ‘is first and foremost a 
system for the protection of human rights’ and that ‘the Court must [therefore] 
have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for 
example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved…’.664 
Nevertheless, it is the language of ‘uniformity’ and ‘consensus’ that has so far 
led domestic courts to defer to the Strasbourg Court. The risk was clearly put by 
Sedley: ‘in trying to stay level, we shall fall behind’.665  If consistency and 
uniformity are the aim, the Supreme Court should be willing to engage in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
660 Merris Amos ‘The Principle of Comity’ [2009] Yearbook of European Law 503, 525; See also 
Lord Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 MLR 159, 162-164, 
expressing ‘doubts … about the suitability, at least for this country, of having questions of human 
rights determined by an international tribunal made up of judges from many countries’. 
661 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245; See also Lord Steyn, ‘2000–2005: Laying 
the Foundations of Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom’ 2005 EHRLR 349, 361. 
662 E.g. R (Countryside Alliance) v Her Majesty’s Attorney General [2007] UKHL 52, [139]; R (Al 
Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [67], and other examples cited by 
Merris Amos ‘The Principle of Comity’, above n 660, 525. 
663 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 [31]. It was argued in a previous thesis that the 
‘living instrument’ places a duty on domestic court to keep track of the development in 
Convention jurisprudence: Helene Tyrrell, Strasbourg Jurisprudence in Domestic Courts under 
the Human Rights Act, Durham thesis, Durham University, available at 
<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/271/> accessed 1 November 2013. 
664 Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 32, [68]. 
665 Stephen Sedley, Ashes and Sparks: Essays on Law and Justice (Cambridge University 
Press 2011), 384. 
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research to that end, including the use of foreign jurisprudence as necessary. 
This would at least be relevant where the Strasbourg jurisprudence is unhelpful 
or unclear. As Warbrick has written: ‘…to collaborate fully with the Court, 
national tribunals have to keep on top of the developments in the Court’s 
practice, and even anticipate how it might resolve an issue’.666  
 
There has been some evidence of the willingness to engage with foreign 
jurisprudence in this way in Convention cases, especially when seeking to 
confirm the conclusions of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. A good example of this 
is the Supreme Court’s decision in Cadder.667 Cadder was, in effect, an appeal 
against the High Court of Justiciary in HM Advocate v McLean.668 Both cases 
involved persons detained under section 14 of the Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995 and admissions made by the detainee during police 
interviews without prior access to legal advice. In McLean, the High Court of 
Justiciary had concluded that reliance on admissions made by a detainee in 
such circumstances was not incompatible the detainee’s right to a fair trial 
under Article 6 of the ECHR. The appellant in Cadder contended that McLean 
had been wrongly decided. The question for the Supreme Court was therefore 
whether the use of material obtained in a police interview without legal 
representation did in fact render a subsequent trial unfair.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
666 Colin Warbrick, ‘The View from the Outside’, in Helen Fenwick, Roger Masterman and Gavin 
Phillipson (eds.) Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge University 
Press 2007) 37. 
667 Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43 
668 HM Advocate v McLean [2009] HCJAC 97, 2010 SLT 73. 
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Pursuant to their duty under section 2(1) HRA 1998, the Justices of the 
Supreme Court took into account the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence as a 
starting point: Salduz v Turkey. 669  In common with the detainees in both 
McLean and Cadder, Salduz had not had the benefit of legal advice when in 
police custody. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in that case held 
(unanimously) that there had been a violation of Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(c) ECHR. 
Turning to the question of whether the Supreme Court must follow Salduz v 
Turkey, the Supreme Court applied the ‘clear and constant’ test derived from 
Alconbury.670  The court felt the test to be satisfied by evidence that Salduz v 
Turkey had been followed in a subsequent line of cases. To illustrate this point, 
Lord Hope referred to a list of authorities provided by JUSTICE (intervening). 
Although the five cases cited from that list were decisions of the ECtHR, 671 it 
appears from a later section of the judgment (quoted below) that the full list 
provided by JUSTICE had also included foreign jurisprudence from the 
domestic courts of other member states. It was by reference to a selection of 
this material that Lord Hope drew further support: 
As JUSTICE has shown by the materials referred to in its written 
intervention, the majority of those member states which prior to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
669  Salduz v Turkey  36391/02 [2008] ECHR 1542. 
670 R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 
AC 295 [26] (Slynn LJ), ‘…Although the Human Rights Act 1998 does not provide that a national 
court is bound by [Strasbourg] decisions it is obliged to take account of them so far as they are 
relevant. In the absence of some special circumstances it seems to me that the court should 
follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’. 
671 Cadder v HM Advocate (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 43, [2010] 1 WLR 2601, [47] (Lord Hope). 
The cases referred to are as follows: Sükran Yildiz v Turkey (Application No 4661/02) 
(unreported) given 3 February 2009; Amutgan v Turkey (Application No 5138/04) (unreported) 
given 3 February 2009, [17-18]; Plonka v Poland (Application No 20310/02) (unreported) given 
31 March 2009, [35]; Pishchalnikov v Russia (Application No 7025/04) (unreported) given 24 
September 2009, [70]; Dayanan v Turkey (Application No 7377/03) (unreported) given 13 
October 2009, [32]-33]; Fatma Tun_ v Turkey (Application No 18532/05) (unreported) given 3 
October 2009, [14]-[15]. 
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Salduz v Turkey did not afford a right to legal representation at 
interview (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Ireland) are now 
recognising that their legal systems are, in this respect, 
inadequate.672  
Lord Hope went on to review the approach of a selection of foreign domestic 
courts more closely: 
In the Netherlands the Supreme Court has held that a suspect 
arrested by the police must be offered the opportunity to consult a 
lawyer before being interviewed and that an arrested minor was 
entitled to have the assistance of a lawyer while being interviewed 
… . In France the Conseil Constitutionnel has held that articles 62 
and 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorise the 
questioning of a person remanded in police custody … but do not 
allow the person held against his will to have the benefit of legal 
assistance while undergoing questioning, are unconstitutional 
because they could not be reconciled with articles 9 and 16 of the 
Declaration of 1789 des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. … The 
Conseil d’Etat in its turn has drawn the government’s attention to the 
fragility, in the light of article 6 of the Convention, of article 706 -88 of 
the Code de procédure pénale, which prevents access to legal 
assistance at this stage...673  
Lord Hope concluded that ‘if Scotland were not to follow the example of the 
others it would be almost alone among all the member states in not doing so’.674 
Moreover, the system of detention under sections 14 and 15 of the 1995 Act 
was devised in view of a balance to be struck between the public interest and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
672 Cadder v HM Advocate (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 43, [49] (Lord Hope). 
673 Ibid. The decisions referred of the Netherlands Supreme Court, French Conseil Constitutional 
and Conseil d’Etat are, respectively: LJN BH3079 NJ (Netherlands Law Reports) 30 June 2009; 
Decision No 2010-14/22 QPC (unreported) 30 July 2010; Section de L’intérieur, Projet de loi 
relatif à la garde à vue, 7 October 2010 (No 384.505). 
674 Cadder v HM Advocate, above n 672, [49] (Lord Hope). 
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the rights of the accused that was irreconcilable with the Convention rights.675 
This view had been reached ‘without any attempt at comparative jurisprudence 
on [the] issue’ and as a result of ‘shutting their eyes to the way thinking 
elsewhere was developing’.676  
 
The Supreme Court was by many considered to have taken too slavish an 
approach to the Strasbourg case law in Cadder, with enormous repercussions 
for the Scottish legal system and the many victims whose cases were 
overturned.677 Lord Hope explicitly recognised the unpopularity of the decision 
in a lecture given to the Scottish Young Lawyer’s Association in April 2011: 
As Lord Bingham has said, our task is to apply the law, not to decide 
cases according to our personal preferences. Of course, the decision 
was not popular, especially among those who must answer to the 
electorate. But, as Justice Stephen Breyer of the US Supreme Court 
has said, do not imagine that our decisions are popular. It is not our 
job to be popular.678 
 
Nevertheless, Lord Hope did alter his approach to the issue in another Article 6 
case later in the same judicial year: Ambrose v Harris.679 In Ambrose the issue 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
675 Ibid [51] (Lord Hope). 
676 Ibid. Lord Rodger’s judgment in Cadder did not replicate this review of foreign jurisprudence 
although it is clear that Lord Roger’s reasons are given as supplementary to those outlined by 
Lord Hope. Indeed, on the separate but important issue as to the consequences of allowing the 
appeal, both Lord Hope and Lord Rodger drew heavily from a judgment of Chief Justice Murray 
of the Irish Supreme Court - the relevant section is reproduced in each of their judgments, see 
e.g. [99]-[103] (Lord Roger).  
677 E.g. Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart 
Publishing 2013), 244. 
678 Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘Scots law seen from south of the border’ [2012] Edinburgh Law 
Review 58, 74. 
679 Ambrose v Harris (Procurator Fiscal, Oban) [2011] UKSC 53.  
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was whether the questioning of a suspect by police prior to being taken into 
custody constituted a violation of the suspect’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 
of the Convention. Lord Hope felt that the consequences of the Supreme Court 
establishing such a rule would be ‘profound’ and relied on the absence of clear 
Strasbourg jurisprudence to avoid that result: ‘if Strasbourg has not yet spoken 
clearly enough on this issue, the wiser course must surely be to wait until it has 
done so’.680 The others in the majority took the same approach. Lord Clarke 
also noted the implications for the investigation of crime,681 and agreed that 
‘Strasbourg jurisprudence, to date, does not support the … contention … that 
the European court has gone as far as to say that the right [to a fair trial] 
emerges as soon as a suspect is to be questioned by the police in whatever 
circumstances’.682  
 
The interesting feature of the majority reasoning in Ambrose is that the absence 
of Strasbourg guidance was supplemented by an analysis of relevant 
jurisprudence from Canada and America.683 When expressing his reasons for 
rejecting Lord Kerr’s dissenting view, Lord Hope denied that there was ‘any 
support in the Strasbourg cases, or in such international authorities as we have 
been shown’,684 and explained his own analysis of the Canadian and American 
jurisprudence in those terms.  In particular, Lord Hope relied on the well-known 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
680 Ibid [15].  
681 Ibid [116]: ‘such a requirement could hamper proper and effective investigations in situations 
which are often dynamic, fast moving and confused’. 
682 Ibid [115]. 
683 R v Grant [2009] 2 SCR 353 and Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436 respectively. 
684 Ambrose v Harris, above n 679, [59]. 
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American case—Miranda v Arizona.685 Lord Hope devoted five paragraphs to 
the Miranda judgment,686 finding that the basis for the ruling in that case was 
that police custody creates particular pressures which mean that the person’s 
will is more likely to be overcome when he is being questioned under conditions 
of that kind. The observation from the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, Salduz 
v Turkey, was that ‘the rationale of the generally recognised international 
human rights standards relates in particular to the protection of the accused 
against abusive coercion on the part of the authorities’ which Lord Hope felt 
‘fit[ted] in with this line of reasoning’.687 Thus Lord Hope’s view was that ‘this 
feature is likely to be absent when questions are being put at the locus or in the 
person’s home…’.688  
 
Further, Lord Hope appeared to imply support for the Miranda judgment into the 
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence; although recognising that the Strasbourg 
court had not referred to Miranda in any of its judgments, Lord Hope felt it could 
be ‘assumed that the court will not have overlooked it in its search for generally 
accepted international human rights standards’.689 Lord Hope continued:  
It is not unreasonable to think that Miranda’s case and subsequent 
cases that the ruling in that case have given rise to in the United 
States will influence the thinking of the Strasbourg court.690 
Lord Kerr, in his dissent, analysed the foreign jurisprudence rather differently:  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
685 Miranda v Arizona, above n 683. 
686 Ambrose v Harris, above n 679, [50]-[54]. 
687 Ibid [54]. 
688 Ibid. 
689 Ibid [52]. 
690 Ibid [53]. 
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… [o]ne must be careful about making assumptions about the 
Miranda experience or believing that it can be readily transplanted 
into European jurisprudence in any wholesale way. The implications 
of that decision must be considered in the context of police practice 
in the United States of America. Nothing that has been put before 
this court establishes that it is common practice in America to ask 
incriminating questions of persons suspected of a crime other than in 
custody. Indeed, it is my understanding that as soon as a person is 
identified as a suspect, police are trained that they should not ask 
that person any questions until he or she has been given the Miranda 
warnings.691 
 
A cynical observation is that the use of foreign jurisprudence in Ambrose was a 
vehicle for the Supreme Court’s reluctance to decide the case in a way that was 
perceived to be advancing on the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Some support for 
that suspicion is given by Lord Kerr’s later explanation about the majority 
reasoning Ambrose case, extra judicially: 
I have no objection to a mode of analysis which takes account of the 
fact that Strasbourg has not spoken, provided that this is by way of 
incidental observation or subsidiary reasoning, rather than being the 
sole basis for the decision to refuse to recognise the right. And, while 
this is not quite how the majority expressed themselves, their 
approach can perhaps be said to be consistent with that way of 
dealing with the question. I make that tentative claim because there 
can be detected in the judgments of my colleagues, particularly from 
their consideration of jurisprudence from America and Canada, clear 
indications that, irrespective of Strasbourg’s silence, they did not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
691 Ibid [167]. 
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consider that article 6 could have the breadth of application that was 
claimed for it.692  
As Lord Kerr points out, it is that continued reference to the absence of clear 
Strasbourg case law that made the use of comparative jurisprudence 
unconvincing. Indeed, as explained above, the majority reasoning (and Lord 
Hope in particular) tended towards reading the conclusion in Miranda into the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. Thus Lord Kerr concluded that he would be ‘much 
more comfortable with the decision’ if the ‘absence of Strasbourg jurisprudence 
on the point [could] be relegated to a subsidiary status’.693 
 
The example indicates that, although the scope for using foreign jurisprudence 
is likely to be more limited in Convention cases, the Supreme Court is at least 
willing to make use of those sources where they can provide assistance in 
confirming the conclusions of the Strasbourg Court and confirming the 
consensus on a position. The feeling lingers, however, that the focus remains 
on the status of the Strasbourg jurisprudence as a primary concern. Thus where 
there is relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, the Supreme Court is likely to pay 
less attention to foreign jurisprudence. Where the Supreme Court is content to 
follow Strasbourg jurisprudence, as in Cadder, it may draw support from foreign 
jurisprudence in its reasoning. Ambrose demonstrates that the Court is most 
likely to review foreign jurisprudence where there is no clear Strasbourg 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
692 Lord Kerr, ‘The modest underworker of Strasbourg?’, Clifford Chance Lecture (London 25 
January 2012) <http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_120125.pdf> accessed 13 
October 2013, 17. 
693 Ibid 18. 
 241 
jurisprudence, although this may be driven by the inclination to keep pace with 
the Strasbourg position.  
 
7.3 Absence of a supranational court 
Identifying a consensus among foreign jurisdictions on a particular issue will be 
especially important where there is no relevant supranational court 
jurisprudence. The hypothesis is relatively straightforward. Where an instrument 
is given an authoritative interpretation by a supranational court, domestic courts 
faced with questions of interpretation will usually have a tendency to look to that 
jurisprudence in the first instance. The approach taken by UK courts to the 
ECtHR’ case law provides a good example. By contrast, where there is no 
supranational court to give an authoritative interpretation of a convention, 
domestic courts do not have an obvious body of jurisprudence to consult. 
Courts are nevertheless still concerned to maintain consistency in the 
interpretation of an international convention, since the very purpose of these 
instruments is to harmonise standards on a particular issue. As Dickson has 
explained: 
The courts take account of Strasbourg’s thinking on human rights 
because they have been directed by Parliament to do so. Parliament 
has likewise transposed other international human rights standards 
into UK law and the courts are obliged to apply them too. The only 
difference is that for these other standards there is no international 
court the decisions of which the UK Parliament can direct UK courts 
to take into account. At best these other standards are overseen by 
treaty-monitoring bodies which are not courts, or by national courts in 
other countries which have transposed the standards into their 
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domestic law. Parliament has chosen not to direct UK courts to take 
account of what those treaty-monitoring bodies or national courts 
may have said about the standards, although Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 does say that in the 
interpretation of treaties ‘recourse may be had to supplementary 
means of interpretation’ when, after applying the approach to 
interpretation set out in Article 31, the meaning is still ‘ambiguous or 
obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable’. The House of Lords often looked at these other 
sources of its own motion, especially when interpreting treaties the 
effectiveness of which depended on the same interpretation being 
adopted by all States Parties to the treaty (eg treaties on international 
transport).694 
Consider, for example, the preamble to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), which recognises that ‘a 
satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized 
the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without 
international co-operation’ (emphasis added).695 Similarly, the preamble to the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child includes ‘Recognizing the 
importance of international cooperation for improving the living conditions of 
children in every country’ (emphasis added).696 The limitations associated with 
using foreign jurisprudence where there is relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence 
are presumably non-existent in these circumstances. 
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694 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 34-35. See also Shaheed Fatima, Using International Law in Domestic Courts (Hart 
Publishing 2005) 141. 
695  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
(entered into force 4 October 1967), preamble. 
696 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, (entered into force 2 
September 1990), preamble.  
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It is worth clarifying that this use is connected to, but distinct from, the ‘gap-
filling’ theories discussed in chapter six. It was explained that one of the most 
obvious reasons for using foreign jurisprudence is to draw assistance where 
domestic jurisprudence is unhelpful or non-existent. Thus one of the reasons 
that comparativists give for the use of foreign jurisprudence is based on ‘gap-
filling’—offering a useful perspective where the indigenous jurisprudence is 
lacking or unsettled. 697  The argument in this section is different; far from 
resorting to foreign jurisprudence where there is a dearth of domestic 
jurisprudence, it is suggested that in some cases foreign jurisprudence may 
appropriately be of equal or greater importance than the domestic case-law, 
irrespective of the nature or absence of domestic jurisprudence.  
 
7.3.1 Background from non-human rights cases 
As most human rights issues before the Supreme Court are likely to fall within 
the framework of the ECHR (and consequently, the HRA 1998), the use of 
foreign jurisprudence under conventions with no supranational court is likely to 
be most relevant in non-human rights cases. As Baroness Hale explained in the 
interview:  
If we are interpreting an international treaty, which has got nothing to 
do with human rights, and which may not have a supranational body !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
697 See e.g. Harold Cooke Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative 
Method of Legal Study and Research (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1949), 40; Cheryl 
Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’ in Jane Holder 
and Colm O'Cinneide (eds) Current Legal Problems (2006) Vol 59, (Oxford University Press 
2007), 114; Rudolph von Jhering, quoted in Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press 1998), 17. 
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which is the final arbiter, that’s the situation in which what other 
countries are doing with that treaty is particularly important. … in a 
way, it’s the non-human rights cases that may be more important.698 
Baroness Hale considered that in such cases it was ‘quite important to know 
what the other countries who are signatories to that Convention are doing’.699 
Others among the Supreme Court Justices agreed. Lord Reed considered that 
in these cases ‘a bit of knowledge of a foreign system can be helpful in not 
looking at international convention in too parochial a way’.700 Both Lord Mance 
and the then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, felt that greater 
weight is ‘undoubtedly’ attached to comparative material in these cases.701 Lord 
Phillips added:  
if you are looking at any law under an international convention, you’ll 
look very closely at decisions in other countries. There are not all that 
many cases and so you’ll be looking around the world to see where 
there had been similar jurisprudence.702  
 
A number of examples can be found to corroborate this in the case law of the 
Supreme Court.  One of the most recent is the judgment in Schutz (UK) Ltd v 
Werit UK Ltd.703 Schutz involved an issue of statutory interpretation where the 
statutory language had been designed to conform with an international 
convention. The basic issue was whether the actions of one party constituted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
698 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 659. 
699 Ibid.  
700 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The 
Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012) 
701 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The 
Supreme Court, London, 06 December 2011); Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth 
Matravers, above n 658. 
702 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, above n 658. 
703 Schutz (UK) Ltd v Werit UK Ltd [2013] UKSC 16; [2013] Bus LR 565. 
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the ‘making’ of a patented item according to section 60(1) of the Patents Act 
1977 (which would infringe the patent at issue) or simply ‘repairing’ the item 
(which would not infringe the patent). Lord Neuberger considered various 
factors which ought to be taken into account in ascertaining the proper 
interpretation word ‘makes’ in the 1977 Act, one of the significant ones being 
the conformity with an international convention. Lord Neuberger (with whom 
Lord Walker, Baroness Hale, Lord Mance and Lord Kerr agreed) explained that:  
…the fact that the word ‘makes’ is in a section of the 1977 Act which 
is intended to conform with the provisions of an international 
convention is particularly significant where … the convention 
contains a set of principles which are intended to apply consistently 
across signatory states.704 
 
Lord Neuberger went on to cite a number of German authorities, on the basis 
that they were ‘not only decisions of a highly expert, experienced and respected 
court on the very point which is raised in this case’,705 but also because they 
were decisions of a court of another signatory state to the Convention being 
interpreted. For those reasons, Lord Neuberger explained that the Supreme 
Court ‘should therefore accord them considerable respect, and sympathetically 
consider the extent to which we should adopt any points of principle or practice 
which they raise’.706 And although this did not amount to an obligation to ‘follow 
the approach of the German courts’, Lord Neuberger concluded that it was 
‘sensible for national courts at least to learn from each other’ and that they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
704 Ibid [37] (Lord Neuberger). 
705 Ibid [39] (Lord Neuberger). 
706 Ibid. 
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should ‘seek to move towards, rather than away from, each other's 
approaches’.707 
 
This practice of citing foreign jurisprudence in international convention has been 
consistent in the jurisprudence of the United Kingdom’s highest court for some 
years. There are numerous examples of this prior to the transfer of jurisdiction 
to the new Supreme Court. One such example was recalled by Baroness Hale 
during the interview of October 2011: In Deep Vein Thrombosis v Air Travel 
Group Litigation the House of Lords were interpreting the Warsaw Convention 
(regulating the ‘international carriage of persons, baggage, or cargo performed 
by aircraft for reward’),708 in order to determine whether Deep Vein Thrombosis 
fell within the scope of that instrument. The case is not a human rights case but 
does provide useful insights into the use of foreign jurisprudence under 
international conventions where there is no supervisory body.  
 
In that case the House of Lords referred to case law from Canada, Australia and 
the United States of America.709 In fact, the UK jurisprudence played a relatively 
minor part and accounted for just nine of the twenty-six cases cited in the 
judgments. By contrast, the House of Lords referred to thirteen cases from the 
United States, two from Canada and two from Australia. There is some 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
707 Ibid. 
708 Convention relating to Unification of Certain Rules in International Carriage by Air, signed in 
Warsaw on 12 October 1929, effective on 13 February 1933. 
709 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation [2005] UKHL 72; [2006] 1 AC 
495. 
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evidence that German jurisprudence was considered, although not cited.710 
Indeed, Lord Scott of Foscote (with whom the other members of the House of 
Lords agreed) expressly acknowledged the importance of adopting an 
interpretation of the Convention that was consistent with the interpretation 
adopted by other signatory countries. Heavy reliance was placed on a decision 
of the Australian High Court and the House of Lords’ conclusions were 
consistent with the outcome of that case.711 
 
This approach is not without its dangers. One significant possibility is that courts 
reasoning by reference to foreign jurisprudence on the interpretation of an 
international convention run the risk of distorting the language of the convention 
itself. Lord Scott of Foscote gave a clear explanation of this risk in the DVT 
case, which is worth reproducing:  
The language of the Convention itself must always be the starting 
point. The function of the court is to apply that language to the facts 
of the case in issue. In order to do so and to explain its decision, and 
to provide a guide to other courts that may subsequently be faced 
with similar facts, the court may well need to try to express in its own 
language the idea inherent in the language used in the Convention. 
So a judge … will often describe in his or her own language the 
characteristics that an event or happening must have in order to 
qualify [under an international convention provision]. But a judicial 
formulation … should not, in my opinion, ever be treated as a 
substitute for the language used in the Convention. It should be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
710 Lord Scott of Foscote recognised that claims under the article of the Warsaw Convention in 
question (Article 17) based on the airline's failure to warn passengers about DVT had been 
‘rejected in Australia, Canada, Germany and the United States’: In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and 
Air Travel Group Litigation, ibid [19]. 
711 Povey v Qantas Airways Ltd [2003] VSCA 227; [2005] HCA 33 
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treated for what it is, namely, an exposition of the reasons for the 
decision reached and a guide to the application of the Convention 
language to facts of a type similar to those of the case in question.712 
Baroness Hale agreed with Lord Scott’s judgment and added a few words only 
to associate herself with those cautionary remarks about ‘the dangers of 
interpreting words of the decision of a court, which is interpreting the words of 
the Convention, as if the court's words were those of the Convention’.713 The 
sentiment was repeated by Lord Hope in the more recent Supreme Court 
judgment, JS (Sri Lanka), discussed in further detail below. In that case, Lord 
Hope noted:  
There is always a risk, as one court after another seeks to formulate 
the principles that are to be applied in the interpretation of an 
international instrument of making things worse, not better. A 
misplaced word here or there can make all the difference between an 
interpretation that will be respected internationally because it accords 
with the true purpose of the instrument and one that will not.714  
The observations made in this chapter are therefore subject to these important 
qualifications. The argument made here is not that courts are applying the 
foreign jurisprudence in international convention cases with less scrutiny than in 
other areas. The point is simply that in these cases, domestic courts have a 
tendency to consider the foreign jurisprudence more readily. Indeed, it is 
perhaps in recognition of that tendency that the Justices have expressed 
awareness of the risks described above.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
712 In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, above n 709, [12] (Lord Scott of 
Foscote). 
713 Ibid [49] (Baroness Hale).  
714 R (JS (Sri Lanka)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 15, [41]. 
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7.3.2 Refugee Convention Cases 
One of the international conventions that the Supreme Court considers most 
often is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee 
Convention’), 715  which provides a useful example. Because there is no 
supranational body acting as the final arbiter on the interpretation of the 
Refugee Convention, it is not surprising to see citations of foreign cases in 
these judgments. Baroness Hale explained the usefulness of foreign 
jurisprudence in such cases:   
… there’s no supranational body which is the final arbiter of what [the 
Refugee Convention] means, so again it is of very great interest to 
know what other countries are doing in relation to certain problems. 
… I think we take some trouble to look at those…716 
Lord Bingham’s judgment in Fornah (decided by the House of Lords) put the 
matter in similar terms:  
Since the Convention is an international instrument which no supra-
national court has the ultimate authority to interpret, the construction 
put upon it by other states, while not determinative … is of 
importance.717  
 
Of the 246 judgments handed down by the Supreme Court between the start of 
its work in October 2009 and the end of the judicial year in July 2013, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
715  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
(entered into force 4 October 1967). 
716 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 659. 
717 Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46]; [2007] 1 AC 412, 
[10]; See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Adan [2001] 2 AC 477.  
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Refugee Convention has been cited in 13 (5% of all the Supreme Court’s 
judgments). Of the 13 cases in which the words ‘Refugee Convention’ are 
found, 5 concern the interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. 718  It is 
interesting but not surprising (given the approach to the interpretation of 
international conventions described above) to note that foreign jurisprudence is 
cited each of these 5 cases. The first of these cases was JS (Sri Lanka) in 
which the main issue was the interpretation and application of article 1F(a) of 
the Refugee Convention.719 Article 1F(a) provides that a person would not be 
recognised as a refugee under the Convention where there are serious reasons 
for considering that he ‘has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a 
crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments’.720 It was 
the first in series of cases at the Supreme Court concerning Article 1F. 
 
The respondent in JS (Sri Lanka) was a Sri Lankan Tamil who, for a number of 
years, was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The Secretary of 
State had refused his claim for asylum on the basis of the membership with an 
organisation responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
Secretary of State appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal, which 
had quashed the decision that Article 1F(a) applied in this case. The questions 
for the Supreme Court were whether the respondent could be regarded as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
718 R. (JS (Sri Lanka)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 15; HJ (Iran) 
(FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31; R (ST (Eritrea)) (FC) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 12; RT (Zimbabwe) and others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38; Al-Sirri (FC) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 54. 
719 R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714. 
720 Article 1F(a) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. (entered into force 4 October 1967).  
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having committed a crime within the meaning of article 1F(a) and, more 
specifically, if an individual is a member of an organisation who are committing 
war crimes, what—beyond membership of such an organisation—must be 
established before an individual is himself personally to be regarded as a war 
criminal.721 The leading domestic authority was the decision of the Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal (IAT) in Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,722 which had been endorsed (obiter) by the Court of Appeal in 
another case.723 The effect of the IAT’s decision in Gurung was that a person 
was a war criminal (i.e. could be excluded from refugee status under Article 1F) 
if the individual was a member of an ‘extremist terrorist organisation’, despite 
not having personally participated in the criminal activities of the group.724 Thus 
counsel for the Home Secretary sought to persuade the Supreme Court that the 
respondent’s membership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was a factor 
justifying exclusion from refugee status according to Article 1F(a).  
 
In the course of the arguments, counsel in both the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court made extensive references to the case law of foreign 
jurisdictions. Counsel for Home Secretary argued that there had been a 
significant degree of international consensus as to the correct approach to 
article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention prior to the Court of Appeal’s decision !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
721 R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, [1]. 
722 Gurung v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] Imm AR 115. 
723 MH (Syria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 226; [2009] 3 All 
ER 564. 
724 Although the IAT in Gurung recognised that mere membership of a terrorist organisation was 
not sufficient to bring an individual within Article 1F, it added that if an organisation had become 
predominantly terrorist in character ‘very little more will be necessary’, Gurung v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2003] Imm AR 115, [102]-[105]. 
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and that the Court of Appeal had not paid enough attention to that material. The 
Canadian courts were said to have ‘the most developed jurisprudence in 
relation to article 1F(a) in the common law world’ and Court of Appeal had 
‘failed to explain why it was departing from the approach in those cases’ 
(emphasis added) as applied in Gurung.725 In reply, counsel for the respondent 
sought to rule out the Canadian jurisprudence (on the basis of age) and drew 
the Supreme Court’s attention to (more recent) Commonwealth cases, which 
had endorsed the Court of Appeal’s approach.726  
 
The Supreme Court ultimately distanced itself from the approach of one of the 
Canadian cases, Ramirez, 727  in which it had been suggested that mere 
membership may be sufficient for an organisation whose aims, methods, and 
activities are predominantly terrorist in character. It was instead concluded that 
each case should be considered according to its specific facts. In this respect, 
the JS (Sri Lanka) case is a good example of the risk awareness described 
above; the tendency to consult the approach of other jurisdictions does not 
extend to a tendency to follow it as well. As Lord Hope pointed out, '[t]here is 
always a risk, as one court after another seeks to formulate the principles that 
are to be applied in the interpretation of an international instrument, of making 
things worse, not better’. 728  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
725 R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, 33 A-B. 
726 R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, 35 D-E. 
727 Ramirez v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992) 89 DLR (4th) 173. 
728 R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, [41]. 
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Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court drew some support for 
‘departure’ from the Ramirez approach by reference to other Canadian cases as 
well as jurisprudence from other jurisdictions. As Lord Kerr explained:  
The Canadian cases … seem for the most part to at least imply that 
the participative element involves either a capacity to control or at 
least to influence events. They appear to contemplate a minimum 
requirement that the mind of the individual be given to the enterprise 
so that some element of personal culpability is involved. A notable 
exception to this theme is to be found in the obiter statements … in 
Ramirez v Canada … where it is suggested that voluntary knowing 
participation can be assumed from membership of a brutal 
organisation. These statements have not been relied on by the 
Secretary of State in this case and, in my judgment, wisely so. The 
broad thrust of authority in this area is to contrary effect.729 
Lord Brown also drew from a decision of the German Federal Administrative 
Court when considering the issue as one of ‘complicity’ from an international 
criminal law perspective (the clear outcome of this case is that the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court is now the starting point for 
considering whether an applicant was disqualified from asylum by virtue of 
article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention). Lord Hope endorsed this point, again 
referencing the German Administrative Court.730 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
729 R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, [57]. 
730 Ibid [49] (Lord Hope): ‘Lord Brown JSC puts the test for complicity very simply … I would 
respectfully endorse that approach. The words “serious reasons for considering” are, of course, 
taken from article 1F itself. The words “in a significant way” and “will in fact further that purpose” 
provide the key to the exercise. Those are the essential elements that must be satisfied to fix the 
applicant with personal responsibility. The words “made a substantial contribution” were used by 
the German Administrative Court, and they are to the same effect’. 
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Lord Brown also cited a United States case to support his conclusions that 
‘article 1F disqualifies those who make “a substantial contribution to” the crime, 
knowing that their acts or omissions will facilitate it’, agreeing that ‘article 1F 
responsibility will attach to anyone “in control of the funds” of an organisation 
known to be “dedicated to achieving its aims through such violent crimes”, and 
anyone contributing to the commission of such crimes “by substantially assisting 
the organisation to continue to function effectively in pursuance of its aims”’.731 
Lord Brown continued:  
This approach chimes precisely with that taken by the Ninth Circuit in 
McMullen v Immigration and Naturalization Service (1986) 788 F 2d 
591: “[ Article 1F ] encompasses those who provide [the gunmen etc] 
with the physical, logistical support that enable modern, terrorist 
groups to operate”.732 
 
Despite the conclusion that each case ought to be considered on its specific 
facts, the Supreme Court judgment in JS (Sri Lanka) provides a useful 
illustration of the use of foreign jurisprudence in cases concerning the 
interpretation of international conventions with no supranational court. Several 
others follow in this theme. For example, although the Supreme Court judgment 
in ST (Eritrea) made less use of foreign jurisprudence than in JS (Sri Lanka), 
the foreign cases cited were again used to address questions of 
interpretation.733 Considering the balance that the framers of the Convention 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
731 R (JS (Sri Lanka)), above n 714, [35]. Note McMullen v Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (1986) 788 F 2d 591 had also been cited in the Gurung case. 
732 Ibid. 
733 R (ST (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 12. In ST 
(Eritrea) the question was whether the appellant was entitled to the protection of article 32 of the 
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intended to strike between the protection of victims of oppression and the wish 
of sovereign states to maintain control over their territory, Lord Hope cited 
jurisprudence from Australia and the United States.734 In doing so, Lord Hope 
was mindful that ‘however generous and purposive its approach to 
interpretation may be, the Court's task remains one of interpreting the document 
to which the contracting parties have committed themselves by their 
agreement’. Moreover,  
… parties to an international agreement are not to be treated as 
having agreed something that they did not agree, unless it is clear by 
necessary implication from the text or from uniform acceptance by 
states that they would have agreed or have subsequently done so’ 
(emphasis added).735  
These cases provide clear examples of the Supreme Court using foreign 
jurisprudence as a means of limiting their discretion: it is by reference to those 
sources that the Court ensures that it does not inflate the agreements reached 
between the various contracting parties. This awareness and tendency to 
exercise restraint in these sorts of cases is demonstrative of the judges’ role as 
interpreters rather than lawmakers.  
 
However there are circumstances in which it may be appropriate to interpret 
such instruments purposively, such that it reflects a change in attitudes or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Refugee Convention, which prevents contracting states from expelling refugees who are lawfully 
in their territory. Counsel for the appellant argued that the Convention had to be interpreted in 
the light of its purpose, and that the purpose of Art.32 was to ensure that a refugee who had 
been admitted to the appeal process of a contracting state was not removed to a country that 
could not provide the full panoply of rights to which a refugee was entitled under the Convention. 
734 The cited cases are: Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 
CLR 225; Rodriguez v United States (1987) 480 US 522. 
735 R (ST (Eritrea)), above n 733, [41] (Lord Hope). 
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traditions among the contracting parties. It is in these cases that identifying 
uniformity and consensus is most important and the Supreme Court has shown 
willingness to use foreign jurisprudence in this way: the HJ (Iran) case provides 
the clearest example.736 The issue in HJ (Iran) was the test to be applied when 
considering whether a gay person (claiming asylum under the Convention) has 
a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ in his or her home state, based on 
membership of that particular social group, so as to come within the meaning of 
the term ‘refugee’ for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.737 The two 
appellants were gay men from Iran and Cameroon, claiming to have a well-
founded fear that they would be persecuted if they were to be returned to their 
home countries. The respondent Secretary of State had refused asylum in both 
cases and appeals against that decision had been dismissed by the IAT. In the 
Court of Appeal, the Secretary of State accepted that practising homosexuals 
are a particular ‘social group’ for the purposes of article 1A of the Convention. 
The issue was then how those with a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ could be 
identified. The Secretary of State considered that the issue was whether the 
applicant could reasonably be expected to tolerate the need for discretion in 
their home country. In other words, the two appellants could reasonably be 
expected to conceal their identities as gay man and so avoid the persecution 
feared. Counsel for the appellants argued that a requirement to conceal sexual 
identity in order to avoid harm was incompatible with the Convention.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
736 HJ (Iran) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. 
737 Article 1A(2) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. (entered into force 4 October 1967) provides that the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to a 
person that “… owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country”. 
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As Lord Hope recognised, the difficulty was that the High Contracting Parties 
did not perceive persecution for reasons of homosexuality as a problem when 
the Convention was being drafted. 738  Nevertheless the reality before the 
Supreme Court was that there is now a ‘huge gulf in attitudes to and 
understanding of gay persons between societies on either side of the divide’ 
and that ‘more and more gays and lesbians are likely to have to seek protection 
here, as protection is being denied to them by the state in their home 
countries’.739 Yet it was ‘crucially important that they are provided with the 
protection that they are entitled to under the Convention—no more … but 
certainly no less’ (emphasis added).740 The issue, therefore, was identifying the 
protection that this social group were entitled to. 
 
In the arguments on this point, counsel had cited cases from Australia, Canada, 
the United States, South Africa and New Zealand. The Court of Appeal had,741 
in particular, been referred a decision of the High Court of Australia. 742 Lord 
Justice Buxton had accepted that the judgments in that case contained a 
number of statements to the effect that, if an applicant's way of life would be 
subjected to persecution in his home country, he cannot be denied asylum on 
the basis of a conclusion that he could avoid that persecution by modifying that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
738 HJ (Iran) (FC), above n 736, [2] (Lord Hope): ‘It was the practice for leaders in these 
countries simply to insist that homosexuality did not exist’. See further S Chevlan, ‘Put your 
hands up (if you feel love)’ [2011] JIANL 56, 57. 
739 Ibid [3] (Lord Hope). 
740 Ibid [3] (Lord Hope). 
741 Z v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1578, [2005] Imm AR 75 
742 Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration (2003) 216 CLR 473. 
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way of life. In the Supreme Court, therefore, counsel for the appellant sought to 
persuade the Justices that the comparative jurisprudence illustrated the ‘proper 
approach’.743 By contrast, counsel for the Secretary of State acknowledged that 
the comparative case law was ‘informative’ but argued that it was not 
‘dispositive’. 744 Examples of inconsistent case law from Australia were given to 
show that the approach in other jurisdictions was neither unanimous not 
uniform. Indeed Lord Walker noted that the Supreme Court had been given ‘23 
bundles of authorities containing 250 different items’.745 Lord Hope devoted a 
section of his judgment to explaining this; five paragraphs under the heading 
‘Comparative Jurisprudence’ deal with the approach in Australia, South Africa, 
New Zealand, Canada and the United States.746 His Lordship ultimately agreed 
that the comparative jurisprudence did not ‘reveal a consistent line of authority’ 
and that it did not indicate ‘an approach which is universally accepted 
internationally’.747 Nevertheless, the respect paid to these sources is evident. By 
way of example, a judgment of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals 
Authority was said to have contained ‘impressive analysis of the relevant 
principles’.748  
 
After lengthy analysis, all members of the Supreme Court agreed that the Court 
of Appeal had misunderstood a particular Australian case that had provided the 
thrust of support for adopting the ‘reasonable tolerability’ test. As Lord Collins !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
743 HJ (Iran), above n 736, 603 [A]. 
744 Ibid 617 [H].  
745 Ibid [87] (Lord Walker).   
746 Ibid [30]-[34] (Lord Hope). 
747 Ibid [30] (Lord Hope). 
748 Ibid [30] (Lord Hope); Refugee Appeal No 74665/03 [2005] INLR 68 
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put it, the test ‘was based on a misunderstanding of the passage in the 
judgment of McHugh and Kirby JJ in Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for 
Immigration (2003) 216 CLR 473‘. Reviewing the passage again, Lord Collins 
concluded that  
the idea of reasonable toleration was plainly being mentioned in the 
context of what amounts to persecution and not in the context of 
what they described as ‘taking avoiding action’ or where members of 
the group ‘hide their membership or modify some attribute or 
characteristic of the group’ to avoid persecution.749  
Moreover, drawing on a number of other comparative cases, Lord Collins 
clarified that a person concealing sexual identity because of a well-founded fear 
of persecution does not cease to have that well-founded fear even if the 
concealment is successful.750 Lastly, Lord Collins pointed out that ‘a similar, 
though not identical, approach has been adopted in Canada and the United 
States’.751 
 
Lord Rodger, in particular, paid significant attention to the comparative 
jurisprudence, also recognising the Court of Appeal’s misunderstanding of the 
judgment in S395/2002. Like the other members of the Court, Lord Rodger 
considered the requirement to actively avoid persecution from the perspective of 
the Australian case. It was of assistance that the point made by the English 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
749 Ibid [102]-[103] (Lord Collins).  
750 Ibid [103] (Lord Collins). The cases referenced on this point were: Applicant NABD of 2002 v 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 216 ALR 1; SZATV v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18; Refugee Appeal No 74665/03 
[2005] INLR 68 (NZ Refugee Status Appeals Authority, Mr Haines QC). 
751 Ibid [104] (Lord Collins). 
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authority had been made ‘with considerably more elaboration’ in the Australian 
judgment:  
[McHugh and Kirby JJ] begin by pointing out … that ‘persecution 
does not cease to be persecution for the purpose of the Convention 
because those persecuted can eliminate the harm by taking avoiding 
action within the country of nationality’. In the remainder of para 40 
they point out that, if the position were otherwise, the Convention 
would not protect those who chose to exercise their right, say, to 
express their political opinion openly.752 
In fact Lord Rodger’s reasoning appears to rely heavily on the Australian 
jurisprudence—his Lordship reproduces large sections of the judgments in the 
course of his analysis, 753  before expressly confirming the weight of that 
authority:  
The decision of the High Court is accordingly powerful authority, 
which I would respectfully follow, for the proposition that, if a person 
has a well-founded fear that he would suffer persecution on being 
returned to his country of nationality if he were to live openly as a gay 
man, then he is to be regarded as a refugee for purposes of the 
Convention, even though, because of the fear of persecution, he 
would in fact live discreetly and so avoid suffering any actual harm. 
The High Court has followed the same line of reasoning in 
subsequent cases (emphasis added).754 
Further, Lord Rodger acknowledged that the 'same approach has been followed 
in New Zealand’.755 His Lordship concluded the point on this evidence:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
752 Ibid [55] (Lord Rodger). The Australian case referred to is Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for 
Immigration (2003) 216 CLR 473. 
753 Ibid [55], [66]-[72] (Lord Rodger) 
754 Ibid. 
755 Ibid [72] (Lord Rodger). 
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For present purposes I take the decision of the [New Zealand 
Refugee Status Appeals] authority … as clear support for the High 
Court of Australia's approach that an applicant cannot be denied 
asylum on the basis that he would, in fact, take effective steps, by 
suppressing his sexual identity, to avoid the harm which would 
otherwise threaten him.756 
 
Similar support was drawn from the comparative case law when dismissing the 
approach taken by the Court of Appeal. Lord Rodger’s view was that it was not 
possible to proceed ‘on the basis that a man or woman could find it reasonably 
tolerable to conceal his or her race indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution. 
Such an assumption about gay men and lesbian women is equally 
unacceptable’.757 Lord Rodger felt that most significantly, ‘it is unacceptable as 
being inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the Convention’, citing 
Canadian jurisprudence as authority for that point.758 A similar analysis was 
conducted by Lord Dyson, agreeing that ‘[l]ike Lord Rodger JSC, I would follow 
this approach which has been substantially followed in Australia’. His Lordship’s 
final reason for rejecting the reasonable tolerability test is instructive:  
… there is no support for the Court of Appeal approach in any other 
jurisprudence. This is important in view of the implicit rejection of it in 
a number of other jurisdictions, including at least Australia and New 
Zealand, and the fact that it is desirable that, so far as possible, there 
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756 Ibid. 
757 Ibid [76] (Lord Rodger). 
758 Ibid [76] (Lord Rodger); Atta Fosu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 
FC 1135.  
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should be international consensus on the meaning of the 
Convention.759 
 
 
7.4 Conclusions 
It has been argued in this chapter that the Supreme Court may use foreign 
jurisprudence as part of an information gathering exercise, particularly where 
there is a desire to interpret a common legislative scheme consistently among 
contracting states. As a starting point it is clear that the Supreme Court 
approaches the Strasbourg jurisprudence in this way. Notions of consistency 
and uniformity are prevalent in the HRA jurisprudence and are in fact a 
significant barrier to explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence where relevant 
Strasbourg decisions exist. As chapter five suggested, this is in part because 
the Supreme Court relies on the Strasbourg court to inform them about 
developments in contracting states, through its jurisprudence. The risk in this 
approach is that the Supreme Court is placing heavy reliance on the Strasbourg 
Court’s own review of the position in the various contracting states to the 
Convention. If the goal is to identify a common consensus or maintain the 
uniformity of interpretation, it will be important to remember that reliance on the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence may not always provide the most valuable or up to 
date analysis.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
759 Ibid, [127] (Lord Dyson). 
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The influence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence is all the more evident when the 
approach in Convention cases is compared with cases turning on the 
interpretation of instruments that have no associated supranational court. In 
such cases the Supreme Court considers that one of the primary aims is to 
establish a common understanding or position among contracting states. 
Dickson has made a similar point. After an analysis of the Convention cases in 
which the Supreme Court (and House of Lords before it) adopted the ‘mirror 
principle’ approach to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, Dickson points out that it is 
in non-HRA cases that the Supreme Court is more willing to assert itself:  
A good example of judicial creativity in non-Convention human rights 
law is the decision of the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, where the Justices held that gay 
men who would risk persecution if they were returned to their home 
country and did not conceal their sexuality were entitled to be 
considered for asylum in the United Kingdom.760  
In such cases it is clear that the Court is willing to pay significant attention to the 
foreign jurisprudence. In doing so, the Court keeps similar concerns in mind to 
those usually offered as a reason for restraint or deference in Convention 
claims. Indeed, the importance of ensuring that the Court does not interpret the 
relevant provision so as to provide for rights over and above the common 
understanding of other member states is arguably of even greater importance 
than in the Convention context. In these cases there is no supranational court to 
correct over-generous interpretations and prevent courts from imposing 
obligations on contracting states that they did not mean to undertake.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
760 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 43 (emphasis added). 
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The use of foreign jurisprudence in cases concerning international conventions 
with no supranational court therefore proceeds on the basis of identifying a 
consensus as to interpretation. It is clear that identifying a consensus on a 
particular issue is one of the most obvious reasons for which judges might draw 
from foreign jurisprudence. 761 A consensus is more than a simple accumulation 
of authorities, it represents ‘a dense network of checking and rechecking 
results’.762  Where there is no supervisory body for a particular instrument, 
identifying and maintaining a consensus position serves to ensure that the 
instrument will continue to be interpreted in the same way in different 
jurisdictions. Many of the Supreme Court Justices interviewed spoke on the 
subject in these terms, highlighting the importance of consensus in such cases. 
Lord Mance explained:  
It is a very traditional and well recognised fact that courts try to 
achieve a purposive uniform international construction if they can, … 
in that context, there is an imperative to arrive at a uniform 
interpretation that will mean that there is no particular advantage of 
suing in one country rather than another…763 
In fact, Lord Mance explained that the ‘imperative’ extends so far that judges 
will be ‘prepared to suppress certain hesitations about the actual intention in 
order to achieve uniformity’.764 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
761 Vlad F. Perju, ‘The Puzzling Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate’ (2007) 1 Utah Law 
Review 167, 175; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 119 
Harvard Law Review 129, 139. 
762 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, Ibid, 145. 
763 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, above n 701. 
764 Ibid. 
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It is against that background that the risks outlined in several judgments 
(discussed above) are best understood. To repeat Lord Scott of Foscote’s clear 
statement of this, ‘a judicial formulation … should not … ever be treated as a 
substitute for the language used in [a] Convention’. Lord Mance felt this to be 
obvious during the interview: ‘if you disagree, of course, then you disagree’.765 
The Refugee Convention cases discussed in this chapter bear this attitude out 
well. While foreign jurisprudence was cited in each of those cases and were of 
evident assistance to the Supreme Court, it is clear that the tendency to have 
recourse to those materials in the first instance did not necessarily give rise to a 
tendency to apply them as well.  
 
It is worth pointing out that ‘foreign jurisprudence’ in these cases also extends 
beyond foreign cases. When interviewed, Lord Collins felt this to be an 
important clarification, explaining that it was ‘not so much foreign law but foreign 
practice’ which would be of greater weight in an international convention case: 
‘if it is an international convention you ought to have uniformity of practice if 
possible’.766  However, it is clear that further complications may arise where 
there are many signatories to a Convention—since it is likely to be more difficult 
to establish an interpretation based on state practice in those circumstances. 
This is in addition to the fact that, despite a shared agreement or a common 
membership of a legal system, a legal order does not necessarily require 
homogeneity. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between what countries 
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765 Ibid. 
766 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins, retired Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012). 
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are doing under the Convention and what they are doing as a matter of 
discretion over and above Convention obligations, in order to avoid the well-
articulated risks of re-writing the instrument.767  As Lord Brown put it in a 
Refugee Convention case before the House of Lords:  
It is one thing to invite this House to construe the Convention as a 
living instrument generously and in the light of its underlying 
humanitarian purposes; quite another to urge your Lordships 
effectively to rewrite it.768 
 
Given the Court’s ability to maintain this awareness and balance in these cases, 
it is not obvious (other than for purely practical reasons) why there is such 
reluctance to engage in research of this kind into the jurisprudence of the 
European member states. Moreover, taking a more proactive approach to the 
interpretation of the Convention could provide the Court with an opportunity to 
conduct its own review, providing the findings as support for its reasoning where 
required. After all, the use of foreign jurisprudence as reasons for a decision 
was among the clearest explanations given by the Justices interviewed. As 
Baroness Hale explained: 
In a sense, you are trying to give the best possible explanation that 
you can for the conclusions that you have arrived at. … obviously if 
that is a set of reasons that satisfy you, you hope that it will satisfy 
your colleagues and you hope, if it is a Strasbourg case—or a case 
that could go to Strasbourg—that it satisfies Strasbourg. …769 !  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
767 R (Hoxha) v Special Adjudicator [2005] 1 WLR 1063.  
768 Ibid 1088. 
769 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 659. 
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8 Foreign Jurisprudence Used Instrumentally 
One of the most frequent criticisms made of the judicial use of foreign 
jurisprudence is that is performs mainly a legitimation function, supporting a 
judge’s conclusions where the relevant authority could not have done so. Such 
criticisms are usually linked to the fear that judges are liable to ‘cherry pick’ the 
jurisprudence most helpful for that instrumental purpose.  The US debate on 
that theme and Justice Scalia’s well-known denunciation of the use of foreign 
decisions for those reasons were considered in chapter four. In the UK, the 
problem is much less pronounced and comparatively little attention has been 
paid to the judicial of use of foreign jurisprudence in the English courts. 
Nevertheless, as Cram has written, ‘resort to comparative legal materials 
nonetheless poses similarly awkward questions concerning judicial forays into 
the policy-making realm of the constitution and the erosion of parliamentary 
sovereignty…’.770  
 
The risks are obvious: if a judge is not able to support a conclusion with 
domestic statute or common law, the conclusion has the potential to provide for 
an outcome that was not intended by Parliament. Thus reliance on foreign 
jurisprudence might be thought to provide a smoke screen for a judge’s own 
discretion or law making. However, the interviewed Justices largely dismissed 
the idea that they might engage in the ‘cherry picking’ of sources to suit 
preconceived conclusions. Lord Kerr answered the charge as follows: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
770 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence with 
reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 125. 
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I wouldn’t accept that criticism at all. … We don’t really look for 
validation or endorsement from foreign jurisprudence. That would be 
a most curious way of adjudication, quite honestly: to reach a view 
and then to cast about to try to find some other court that has 
reached the same view. … I just find that completely alien to my own 
personal experience.771  
Lord Mance was also dismissive of the idea, maintaining that the use of foreign 
jurisprudence was not ‘selective’ and that, if it were used, it would be necessary 
to also ensure that one had accounted for foreign jurisprudence that worked 
against one’s conclusions: 
… I think the criticism which is often made, ‘you look abroad only to 
find what suits what you already think’ in other words, very selectively, 
is unfair actually. … I don’t think one would think, if one was 
conscious of two streams of authority, of simply selecting the one 
which you liked. That wouldn’t be respectable. If you’re going to 
address foreign law, you have to address it warts and all, and if you 
disagree with some aspects of it, you have to face up to that. I think 
the criticism of selectivity is a little unfair … even if you were simply 
faced with authorities that were all against the position you wanted 
to… you wouldn’t suppress them, you’d face up to them. You’d say, 
‘the following were cited (normally they would have been cited but I 
think even if they came to your notice without being cited, and any 
were directly in point, you’d still feel the need to address it.) And this 
is part of one’s desire to produce something which is intellectually 
sustainable and which you yourself respect. So I think selectivity, well 
it’s a cynical view of judging and I don’t think it really corresponds to 
the way we think or operate.772  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
771 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012). 
772 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The 
Supreme Court, London, 06 December 2011). 
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Others among the interviewed Justices were less determined to dismiss the 
idea of selective citation. Lord Phillips, for example, felt this approach would be 
‘fairly natural’ and commented on this as part of his explanation of the reasons 
for using foreign jurisprudence:  
… if we’ve got an area where we are uncertain, an area where we 
are developing the law, an area where … we would like to develop 
the law in a particular direction, then you are particularly keen to see 
if you can get any support for what your thinking is from foreign 
jurisdictions. … [O]ne is always glad to find some foreign 
jurisprudence that actually supports one’s own decision.773 
The use of foreign jurisprudence is not necessarily ‘selective’ but it nevertheless 
may be used instrumentally, for some particular purpose. The purpose is most 
frequently articulated as the giving of reasons: recall Baroness Hale’s interview 
comments, cited earlier:  
In a sense, you are trying to give the best possible explanation that 
you can for the conclusions that you have arrived at. … obviously if 
that is a set of reasons that satisfy you, you hope that it will satisfy 
your colleagues and you hope, if it is a Strasbourg case – or a case 
that could go to Strasbourg – that it satisfies Strasbourg.774 
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773 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, former President of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 23 November 2011). 
774 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, Justice of the United Kingdom 
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8.1 Confirmatory function / bolstering conclusions 
The use of foreign jurisprudence for the purpose of giving reasons can 
nevertheless give the impression that the sources are used for legitimation, 
bolstering a predetermined conclusion. That is to say that foreign jurisprudence 
is used as a supporting tool, for a conclusion that a judge or court is inclined to 
reach notwithstanding the existence of the foreign jurisprudence. In particular, 
this may occur where the court is supporting a conclusion that is likely to be 
controversial, either because the issue in the case is morally charged or 
because the outcome would be surprising on the basis of other relevant 
jurisprudence. In this way, foreign jurisprudence may be used as evidence toto 
justify a particular conclusion. 
 
In this way the use of foreign jurisprudence for confirmation or bolstering is to 
be distinguished from the categories of ‘reassurance’ and ‘consistency’ 
discussed in chapters six and seven respectively. Using foreign jurisprudence 
for reassurance would be an internal exercise, designed to lend comfort or 
confidence to the judge (and as such may not attract explicit citation). Using 
foreign jurisprudence for consistency entails gathering evidence from elsewhere 
as a starting point (usually on a point of interpretation) and ensuring that the 
approach in the instant case is in line with the approach taken in those other 
jurisdictions. Using foreign jurisprudence for confirmation or to bolster 
conclusions is quite different in the sense that it performs a defensive or 
justificatory function. Here foreign jurisprudence represents evidence that the 
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conclusions in the instant case are reasonable, especially where they are likely 
to be surprising or unpopular.  
 
The use of foreign jurisprudence for this purpose might also extend to the 
Strasbourg Court. During the interview, Baroness Hale cited a House of Lords 
judgment as an example:775 
A good example, I suppose, is the Pretty case, in which the House of 
Lords quoted a case that they had had in Canada. I think that that 
was bolstering the conclusion that they had already wanted to reach. 
I suspect that was what it was, and in fact it was also quoted in 
Strasbourg.776 
The facts of the case are well known. Dianne Pretty suffered from the 
degenerative and incurable motor-neurone disease and sought assurances 
from the Director of Public Prosecution that her husband would not be 
prosecuted under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 for aiding and abetting 
her suicide. Mrs Pretty claimed a right to her husband's assistance in 
committing suicide and, if the 1961 Act effectively prohibited that assistance, 
that the Act would be incompatible with the ECHR. The House of Lords made 
extensive use of a judgment from the Supreme Court of Canada: Rodriguez v 
Attorney General of Canada.777  Rodriguez involved a woman with a similar 
disease who had also sought to end her life with medical assistance. The 
Canadian Supreme Court had upheld the equivalent provision of the Canadian 
Criminal Code, although several of the Justices of that court had concluded that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
775 R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions and Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2001] UKHL 61. 
776 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 774. 
777 Rodriguez v Attorney General of Canada [1994] 2 LRC 136.  
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the relevant section of the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights Canadian 
did confer a right to personal autonomy, extending even to decisions on life and 
death. Counsel for Mrs Pretty naturally sought to rely upon those statements by 
analogy with Article 8 of the ECHR. The House of Lords, however, found that 
the case better supported the alternative conclusion: that the Suicide Act was 
not incompatible with the Convention.  
 
The curious feature of the case is that Rodriguez was cited extensively at all. 
The issue had been clearly determined by relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
which the House of Lords were bound to ‘take into account’ under the HRA 
1998. Lord Bingham reviewed the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence and 
concluded that it did not support the Mrs Pretty’s contention. 778  Yet Lord 
Bingham also felt it necessary to review the Canadian case closely, copying 
several passages into his own judgment. 779  Lord Bingham explained the 
relevance of the Canadian case on the basis that it was the ‘most detailed and 
erudite discussion known to me of the issues in the present appeal’.780 Lord 
Steyn made the contribution of the foreign jurisprudence more obvious: 
Given the fact that Mrs Pretty's case is based on the European 
Convention I have concentrated on European developments. It is, 
however, noteworthy that in the United States and Canada 
arguments similar to that of Mrs Pretty ultimately failed...781 
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778 Pretty v DPP, above n 775, [24]. 
779 Ibid [19]-[23]. 
780 Ibid [19] (Lord Bingham). 
781 Ibid [55] (Lord Steyn); citing Vacco v Quill (1997) 521 US 793; Washington v Glucksberg 
(1997) 521 US 702; Rodriguez v Attorney-General of Canada [1994] 2 LRC 136 
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The language of Lord Steyn clearly implies that the foreign jurisprudence is 
considered as an additional point, which supported the decision reached 
primarily on the European jurisprudence. It serves to bolster the conclusion that 
had already been determined.  
 
Lord Hope offered a subtle variation, explaining that the Canadian case may 
have been of greater importance if it provided evidence of an international 
consensus, which could make a ‘strained’ reading of Article 8 appropriate.  
… Mrs Pretty has a right of self-determination. In that sense, her 
private life [according to Article 8 ECHR] is engaged even where in 
the face of a terminal illness she seeks to choose death rather than 
life. But it is an entirely different thing to imply into these words a 
positive obligation to give effect to her wish to end her own life by 
means of an assisted suicide. I think that to do so would be to stretch 
the meaning of the words too far. … A strained reading might have 
been appropriate if there was evidence of a consensus of 
international opinion in favour of assisted suicide. But there is none. 
As Sopinka J said in Rodriguez v Attorney General of Canada [1994] 
2 LRC 136, 176A, no new consensus has emerged in society 
opposing the right of the state to regulate the involvement of others in 
exercising power over individuals ending their lives.782 
The implication is that Lord Hope might have been tempted to ‘stretch’ the 
meaning of Article 8, but for the lack of evidence of international consensus. Put 
another way, it was the lack of that evidence in the foreign jurisprudence which 
bolstered the conclusion to dismiss Mrs Pretty’s appeal.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
782 Ibid [100]-[101] (Lord Hope). 
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The Pretty case provides a useful example of foreign jurisprudence being used 
instrumentally to support a conclusion that is in keeping with the relevant 
Strasbourg authority (the Strasbourg Court unanimously found no violation with 
the Convention when Mrs Pretty’s case was appealed).783 However, a more 
interesting issue arises where the Supreme Court uses foreign jurisprudence in 
a claim where the Strasbourg case law is clear and constant but where it 
nevertheless wishes to reach a different conclusion. In these cases, the 
purpose is to support a conclusion at odds with the otherwise relevant 
Strasbourg authority. These uses are surprising given the relatively deferential 
attitude towards the Strasbourg Court, caused in part by the HRA 1998.  
 
8.2 The ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
As discussed briefly in chapter four, section 2(1) HRA 1998 provides that 
domestic courts ‘must take into account’ the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence 
when addressing 'a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention 
right’.784 In the absence of any normative guidance about the precise meaning 
of the words ‘take into account’, domestic courts have guided themselves to 
‘follow any clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘in the absence of 
special circumstances’.785 In fact, as a result of that provision, the courts have 
often been criticised for taking too slavish an approach to the Strasbourg case 
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783 Pretty v United Kingdom (2346/02) [2002] ECHR 423. 
784 Section 2(1) Human Rights Act 1998. 
785 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transports and the Regions ex p. Alconbury 
Developments Limited and others [2001] UKHL 23; R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Do v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] UKHL 26 [20] (Lord Bingham); R (Animal Defenders 
International) v Secretary of State For Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15. 
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law. It is said that the judicial interpretation of section 2(1) as requiring domestic 
courts to ‘follow’ or ‘keep pace’ with the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, 786  has led to a treatment of the Strasbourg case-law as 
something more than persuasive authority. Fenwick’s conclusion was that ‘the 
obligation under s.2 as interpreted … comes close to affording binding force to 
the jurisprudence’,787  and Amos added that ‘[i]n the majority of cases, the 
obligation to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence is construed as an 
obligation to follow it as well’.788  Kearns has suggested that loyalty to the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court is ‘a practice that is becoming gradually 
habitual for our judiciary … the effects of which would be difficult to reverse’.789 
Krisch agreed, writing that ‘the dominant position among the judges is … one of 
close attention and loyalty to Strasbourg judgments’.790 Perhaps the most well-
known example of this attitude in the case law comes from the AF case where 
Lord Rodger’s short concurring paragraph adds just this:  
Even though we are dealing with rights under a United Kingdom 
statute, in reality, we have no choice: Argentoratum locutum, 
iudicium finitum - Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed.791 
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786 R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 23; [2003] 1 AC 
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 277 
But there are signs of change. The fluctuations in the top court’s approach to 
the section 2 duty and the Strasbourg jurisprudence were noted in chapter four, 
drawing from the possession proceedings cases.792 The willingness to reject the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence has also filtered down to the Court of Appeal. In R (on 
the application of the Children’s Rights Alliance for England), as a postscript to 
his decision, Laws LJ added the following: 793 
…I hope the Ullah principle may be revisited. There is a great deal to 
be gained from the development of a municipal jurisprudence of the 
Convention rights, which the Strasbourg court should respect out of 
its own doctrine of the margin of appreciation, and which would be 
perfectly consistent with our duty to take account of (not to follow) the 
Strasbourg cases.794  
This appears to be in tune with a more recent example from the Supreme Court 
in Sugar v BBC. 795 In that case Lord Wilson outlined his view of the manner in 
which the Ullah interpretation of the duty under section 2 HRA 1998 had 
developed: 
It was in Ullah that, in para 20, Lord Bingham suggested that it was 
the duty of the House to keep pace with the evolving jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (‘the ECtHR’) ‘no more, but 
certainly no less’. It was in Al Skeini that, in para 106, Lord Brown 
suggested that its duty was to keep pace with it “no less, but certainly 
no more”. I would welcome an appeal … in which it was appropriate 
for this court to consider whether, of course without acting 
extravagantly, it might now usefully do more than to shadow the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
792 Chapter four from n 310. 
793 R (Children’s Rights Alliance for England) v Secretary of State for Justice, [2013] EWCA Civ 
34. 
794 Ibid [62]-[64]. 
795 Sugar v British Broadcasting Corporation [2012] UKSC 4. 
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ECtHR in the manner hitherto suggested—no doubt sometimes in aid 
of the further development of human rights and sometimes in aid of 
their containment within proper bounds.796 
 
In part, these fluctuations in the approach to the Strasbourg jurisprudence since 
Ullah may simply reflect the political context. The Supreme Court does not 
operate in a political vacuum. As Paterson has pointed out, the political 
dynamics surrounding the 2010 general election, the threats to the Human 
Rights Act from the political right, the Brighton Declaration and the more recent 
prisoner voting saga may all have had an impact on the Supreme Court’s 
relationship with the Strasbourg jurisprudence.797 Indeed some commentators 
have suggested that the Strasbourg Court has itself altered its approach in light 
of the UK proposals for reform of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
political outcry over some of it’s most unpopular decisions.798  
 
The future of the relationship between Strasbourg and the top court and the 
prevalence of the Ullah principle is likely to depend to some extent on the 
further development of human rights reform, both at the domestic and 
supranational level. As Masterman has written on a well-known blogsite: 
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796 Ibid [59] (Lord Wilson). 
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… the Bill of Rights debate … has arguably had a damaging effect on 
political perceptions of the HRA and the link the Act creates between 
domestic law and the Convention jurisprudence.  The relationship 
between domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights 
that Ullah embodies is out of touch with the widely-held view that the 
content of our domestic human rights law should not be ‘dictated’ to 
us by the European Court. 799 
   
For now, Masternman has posited a series of circumstances that the case law 
has establish might underpin a departure from the apparent application of 
the Ullah principle. Some of these include: where applying the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence would compel a conclusion which would be ‘fundamentally at 
odds’ with the United Kingdom’s separation of powers;800 where there are 
‘special circumstances’;801 and where the court can think of a ‘good reason’ that 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence not be applied. 802  Other more interesting 
opportunities are where the area is governed by common law and the court is 
minded to exercise its discretion to depart from the Strasbourg line;803 where the 
court wishes enter into a ‘dialogue’ with the ECtHR (on the basis that the 
applicable case law may be wrong or badly-informed or both);804  and the 
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UKSC 2, [113]-[114]. 
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domestic court prefers to follow non-Strasbourg authority. 805  In all such 
situations, the Supreme Court must be prepared to decide the case without the 
benefit of clear Strasbourg jurisprudence.  
 
8.3 Supporting conclusions where the relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is unclear or unhelpful.  
Several factors may encourage domestic courts to decide matters 
independently of Strasbourg. The most obvious, perhaps is that Strasbourg 
jurisprudence may be out-dated; implicit in the construction of the ECHR as a 
‘living instrument’,806  is the presumption that domestic courts may properly 
conclude that Convention jurisprudence has lost its relevance with age. The 
Convention itself does not require reliance on its own jurisprudence. As Klug 
pointed out, this is virtually a mirror image of the classical common law 
approach: instead of a doctrine of precedent, the Strasbourg Court has 
operated a doctrine of evolutionary law in which the most recent case law is 
usually the most persuasive.807  
 
According to Feldman, ‘should there be reason to believe that the European 
Court would not follow one of its own previous decisions, that would be a good 
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reason for domestic courts and tribunals to interpret a provision differently’.808 
Other commentators too have noted the need to keep ‘constantly up to date’:809 
... [I]t would appear to be insufficient simply to identify a previous 
decision of the ECtHR on the matter in issue and to follow it; some 
consideration would also be required, if that decision were not a 
recent one, of whether it held good in the face of changes in society 
that had occurred in the meantime.810 
The possibility that the HRA and the Convention might have this effect was not 
at first popular with the judiciary. In Anderson, for example, Lord Brown opined 
that ‘it would seem somewhat presumptuous for us, in effect, to pre-empt [the] 
decision [of the Strasbourg Court]’.811 Similarly in N Lord Hope explained that ‘It 
is for the Strasbourg Court, not for us, to decide whether its case law is out of 
touch with modern conditions’.812 
 
However the courts have shown willingness to undertake these sorts of 
exercises. The decision in Re P is a good example of the willingness to 
construct conclusions on the basis of the way the Strasbourg jurisprudence was 
thought to be developing.813 The issue in that case was the effect of a blanket 
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809 Merris Amos, Human Rights Law, above n 788, 18. 
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812 N v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 31; [2005] 2 WLR 1124, [25] 
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ban on unmarried adoptions in Northern Ireland.814  It was argued that the 
discrimination against unmarried couples violated Article 14 of the Convention 
(read in conjunction with Article 8). No case had yet reached Strasbourg on the 
precise issue of discrimination that was raised in Re P. Two cases raising 
similar issues had been handed down, which the House considered in turn: In 
Fretté v France the Strasbourg court had decided by a majority of four to three 
that it was within the margin of appreciation allowed to member states of the 
Council of Europe to discriminate against homosexuals as applicants to be 
adoptive parents. 815 A few years later, however,  ‘the court appear[ed] to have 
changed course’:816 In EB v France the Grand Chamber decided the rejection of 
an application by a single homosexual woman did constitute discrimination 
according to Article 14.817 On the back of this analysis, Lord Hoffman concluded 
that it was now not at all unlikely that if the issue in this case were to go to 
Strasbourg, the court would hold that discrimination against a couple who wish 
to adopt a child on the grounds that they are not married would violate Article 
14. Indeed in reaching his conclusions, Lord Hope noted that the more recent 
case in EB was consistent with the point made by the South African 
Constitutional Court.818  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
814 Article 14 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 1 provided that an adoption order 
could only be made on the application of more than one person if the applicants were a married 
couple. 
815 Fretté v France (2002) 38 EHRR 438 
816 In Re P and Others, above n 813, [25] (Lord Hoffman) 
817 EB v France (2008) 47 EHRR 509. 
818 In Re P and Others, above n 813, [54] (Lord Hope). 
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Another obvious excuse for divergence is created by the operation of the 
‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine. The judges of the Strasbourg Court are 
‘acutely conscious that on several key issues, the European-wide consensus 
which generally provides the mainspring of their decision-making does not exist 
… precisely because of the prevalence of divergent moral standards and 
religious traditions in the affiliated states’.819 The approach of the European 
Court has therefore been that the lesser the consensus among Contracting 
States,820 the better placed national authorities are to decide on the matter and 
the more deferential the European Court has to be in its review.821 The doctrine 
arguably signifies that there are issues on which there is no relevant Strasbourg 
authority at all.822  
 
It is relatively clear that judges are willing to view the matter in this way, for 
example by reaching a conclusion that arguably goes further than the 
Strasbourg court had previously done. This appeared to justify the House of 
Lords’ conclusion in Re P,823 concerning the joint adoption of a child by an 
unmarried couple discussed above. In Lord Hoffman’s view, it would make ‘no 
difference’ if the Strasbourg Court were to revert to its earlier position and say 
that these are delicate questions which should therefore be left to the national 
margin of appreciation. Accordingly, his Lordship did not feel that the House !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
819 Ian Leigh and Laurence Lustgarten ‘Making Rights Real: The Courts Remedies, and the 
Human Rights Act’ (1999) 58 CLJ 509, 544.  
820 Fretté v France (2004) 38 EHRR 438, [41]: Where the law ‘appears to be in a transitional 
stage, a wide margin of appreciation must be left to the authorities of each State’. 
821 George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’ (2006) 26 OJLS 705, 722. 
822 Eg Francesca Klug ‘A Bill of Rights: Do we need one or do we already have one?’ [2007] PL 
701, 708. 
823 In Re P and Others, above n 813. 
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should be inhibited from declaring the 1987 Order incompatible ‘by the thought 
that [they] might be going further than the Strasbourg Court’.824  Repeating the 
tenets delivered by Lord Bingham in Ullah (that the duty of domestic courts is to 
‘keep pace’ with Strasbourg jurisprudence ‘no more, no less’) Lord Hoffman 
emphasised that ‘[t]hese remarks were not … made in the context of a case in 
which the Strasbourg Court has declared a question to be within the national 
margin of appreciation’. 825  His Lordship explained that ‘none of these 
considerations can apply in a case in which Strasbourg has deliberately 
declined to lay down an interpretation for all member states, as it does when it 
says that the question is within the margin of appreciation’.826 For that reason, 
his Lordship concluded that ‘the question is one for the national authorities to 
decide for themselves and it follows that different member states may well give 
different answers’827 and ‘it is for the court in the United Kingdom to interpret 
articles 8 and 14 and to apply the division between the decision-making powers 
of courts and Parliament in the way which appears appropriate for the United 
Kingdom.828 Lord Mance evidently agreed, adding that: 
It would be contrary to the Strasbourg court’s purpose, and circular, if 
national authorities were to take the view that they should not 
consider any question other than whether a particular solution was 
within the United Kingdom’s margin of appreciation. Under the 1998 
Act, United Kingdom authorities (legislators and courts) have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
824 Ibid [37]. 
825 Ibid [31]. 
826 Ibid [36]. 
827 Ibid. 
828 Ibid [37]. 
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domestically to address the impact of the domestically enacted 
Convention rights in the particular context of the United Kingdom.829 
 
A third opportunity for divergence is given by the nature of the Strasbourg 
authority itself. Although some commentators have argued that Strasbourg’s 
decisions are so important as to be considered as authority even in instances in 
which they did not ‘argue the point through in a coherent and thorough 
manner’,830 the prevailing attitude among the judiciary has been that there is 
‘room for dialogue’ where an English court ‘considers that the ECtHR has 
misunderstood or been misinformed about some aspect of English law’ and ‘it 
may wish to give a judgment which invites the ECtHR to reconsider the 
question’. 831  As Warbrick argued, there is ‘space for national courts to 
reconsider Strasbourg cases which appear ‘wrong’, either because they are 
founded on a misunderstanding of national law or because they are poorly 
reasoned’. 832 
 
There are some recent examples of this approach at the Supreme Court. In R 
(Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence,833 for example, Lord Collins referred to 
twelve decisions of foreign domestic courts: one decision from Canada, one 
from Australia and ten from the United States. The references to foreign !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
829 Ibid [129]. 
830 Ian Loveland ‘Making it up as they go along? The Court of Appeal on same sex spouses and 
succession rights to tenancies’ [2003] PL 222, 233. 
831 R v Lyons (No 3) [2002] UKHL 44; [2003] 1 AC 976, [46].   
832 Although Warbrick was also careful to suggest that ‘a strong case would need to be made 
that this were the case’, Colin Warbrick, ‘The View from the Outside’ in Helen Fenwick, Roger 
Masterman and & Gavin Phillipson (eds.) Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) 37. 
833 R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence & another [2010] UKSC 29. 
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jurisprudence are surprising at first glance, since the case concerned the 
meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ in the ECHR and it is not obvious that the jurisprudence 
of those countries not signatory to the Convention are likely to provide 
assistance on the interpretation of a term in that instrument. Lord Collins 
explained in the interview, however, that the jurisprudence was helpful to 
confirm his feelings about the result since the matter had been ‘treated in a very 
superficial way by Strasbourg’.834  
 
Some commentators have suggested that departing from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on these grounds usually indicates a desire to avoid the 
conflicting Strasbourg jurisprudence per se. For instance Amos has argued that 
the means by which conflicting Strasbourg jurisprudence is usually avoided is 
by a finding that the reasoning of the Court (or Commission) was inadequate, 835 
while Elizabeth Wicks identified one of the prevalent judicial approaches under 
section 2 HRA to be ‘assessing relevance by reference to own perception of 
merits’.836 In other words, ‘the Strasbourg jurisprudence is being used merely to 
substantiate domestic reasoning: it is not taken into account as a factor in 
reaching the decision; merely as a factor in justifying the decision’.837 This kind 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
834 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Collins of Mapesbury, retired Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 22 May 2012). The Supreme Court has since 
departed from Smith (No 1) in Smith (No 2): Smith and others (FC) v The Ministry of Defence 
[2013] UKSC 41. In that case, the Supreme Court made little to no discernible reference to 
foreign jurisprudence, taking their lead from the more recent Strasbourg jurisprudence handed 
down by the Grand Chamber: Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 589.   
835 Merris Amos, ‘The Principle of Comity’ [2009] Yearbook of European Law 503; Merris Amos, 
‘The dialogue between United Kingdom courts and the European Court of Human Rights’ [2012] 
61(3) ICLQ 557. 
836  Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg? The British Judiciary’s Approach to 
Interpreting Convention Rights’ [2005] EPL 405, 419. 
837 Ibid 423. 
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of explanation is difficult to deny, considering cases like Re P where the court 
appeared to construct the matter so as to reach the desired conclusion. Lord 
Hoffman, for example, evidently felt that the blanket rule in Re P was ‘quite 
irrational’.838 Lord Hoffman could see no basis for it and referred to a recent 
decision of the South African Constitutional Court, which had made similar 
points.839 Crucially, this reference to the South African Court came prior to Lord 
Hoffman’s analysis of the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence and therefore 
represents an example of the willingness to reject the Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
leaning on foreign jurisprudence when doing so. 
 
8.4  ‘Departing’ from Strasbourg 
This evaluative approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence has developed a step 
further. UK Courts are willing not only to reject that jurisprudence as 
determinative of a particular issue but also to reject its conclusions outright. This 
represents a departure from the deferential start to the relationship with the 
Strasbourg Court, and the sense that the UK courts appeared to be acting as 
‘merely agents or delegates of the ECHR and Council of Europe’.840 These 
cases are illuminating on both the relationship between the Strasbourg and UK 
courts, as well as on a more general point about the use of foreign 
jurisprudence in domestic human rights cases. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
838 In Re P and Others, above n 813, [16] (Lord Hoffman). 
839 Du Toit v Minister for Welfare and Population Development (2002) 13 BHRC 187. 
840 Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’, Lecture at University 
College of London’s Judicial Institute (London, 14 December 2011). 
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8.4.1 R v Horncastle: departure and dialogue 
Since Strasbourg jurisprudence is not binding (section 2 HRA 1998 only obliges 
domestic courts to take it into account), it is not technically appropriate to talk of 
‘departing’ from the Strasbourg Court’s case law. In this context therefore, 
‘departure’ serves only to represent cases in which the decision of the UK court 
is not in line with the relevant or ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence. It 
in these cases the Supreme Court has tended towards giving reasons for 
declining to follow the Strasbourg case law. This may simply be an attempt to 
enter into a ‘dialogue’ with the Strasbourg Court, or it may be illustrative of the 
hesitancy to ‘depart’ from its jurisprudence without clear reasoning. Many would 
describe the first case considered here, Horncastle, as an example of the 
former. Indeed, Lord Phillips appeared to have this in mind when explaining that 
the detailed reasons would be ‘likely to give the Strasbourg court the opportunity 
to reconsider…’.841 What follows is an alternative perspective; Horncastle is 
considered as a case that is illustrative of both the strength attached to the 
(clear and constant) Strasbourg jurisprudence, and of the willingness to depart 
from it. The use of foreign jurisprudence in the reasoning is illuminating on both 
points.   
 
Horncastle was the first Convention rights case in which the Supreme Court 
‘departed’ from seemingly clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence.842 The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
841 R v Horncastle and another [2009] UKSC 14; [2010] 2 AC 373, [11] (Lord Phillips).  
842Ibid. Horncastle was the seventh case to raise Convention rights issues in the Supreme 
Courts first term after R (E) v Governing Body of JFS & Anor (Rev 3) [2009] UKSC 1; R (L) v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3; R (BA (Nigeria)) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2009] UKSC 7; R (A) (FC) v London Borough of Croydon and one 
other action [2009] UKSC 8; R (Barclay and Others) v Secretary of State for Justice and others 
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case concerned two defendants convicted of serious offences on the basis of 
evidence from an absent witness (‘hearsay’ evidence). In the first, the witness 
had died after making a full written statement; in the second, the witness feared 
for her life if she were to attend the hearing. In each case the evidence had 
been admitted pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.843 In 
both cases, it was argued that the appellant’s conviction was based to a ‘sole or 
decisive’ extent on the statements of the absent witnesses. On this basis, it was 
submitted that the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses 
violated the appellants’ rights under Article 6 of the ECHR, rendering their 
convictions unsafe. 
 
The relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence was a decision of the Chamber in Al-
Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom.844 Al-Khawaja and Tahery concerned 
similar facts to the first two cases in Horncastle. Mr Al-Khawaja claimed that the 
admission of a statement given by a complainant who had later died was in 
violation of his rights under article 6(3)(d) of the ECHR. Mr Tahery claimed the 
same in relation to the admission of a statement given by a witness that later 
refused to give the evidence because of fear. In each case the UK Court of 
Appeal had held that the statements were admissible and that the convictions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
[2009] UKSC 9; R (A) v B [2009] UKSC 12.  While the Supreme Court also appeared to avoid 
applying the Strasbourg jurisprudence (Tsfayo v United Kingdom [2009] 48 EHRR 18) in R (A) 
(FC) v London Borough of Croydon [2009] UKSC 8, it was clear that the Court did not have to 
decide the related point in order to dispose of the appeal (Lord Walker [67]). Thus it was not 
necessary to fully reason that point and a number of the Justices preferred to ‘leave the point 
open’, not least because the Strasbourg jurisprudence was not ‘clear and constant’ but was ‘still 
developing’ (Lord Walker [67]; also Lord Hope [62]). 
843 Section 116(1)(2)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; section 116(1)(2)(e) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, respectively.  
844 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 1. 
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were safe.845 The ECtHR sitting as a Chamber disagreed and held that there 
would always be a breach of Article 6 if a conviction is based ‘solely or 
decisively’ on hearsay evidence.846 Counsel for the defendants placed heavy 
reliance on Al-Khawaja and Tahery but also provided extensive lists of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence supporting the argument that the ECtHR had 
‘established a clear and constantly applied principle to the effect that the 
admission of a statement from an absent witness whose testimony provides 
sole or decisive evidence at a criminal trial will breach article 6(1)(3)(d)’.847   
 
There is nothing in the judgment given by Lord Phillips (giving the judgment of 
the Court) to suggest that the Supreme Court felt that the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence was not clear and constant. Instead, Lord Phillips acknowledged 
the argument that the Supreme Court ‘should treat the judgment of the 
Chamber in Al-Khawaja as determinative of the success of these appeals’ and 
responded by providing reasons for declining to do so. 848 It is worth setting out 
the paragraph in full:  
The requirement to ‘take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
will normally result in the domestic court applying principles that are 
clearly established by the Strasbourg court. There will, however, be 
rare occasions where the domestic court has concerns as to whether 
a decision of the Strasbourg court sufficiently appreciates or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
845 R v Al-Khawaja [2005] EWCA Crim 2697; [2006] 1 WLR 1078; R v Tahery (Alireza) [2006] 
EWCA Crim 529. 
846 Al-Khawaja and Tahery, above n 844. The United Kingdom subsequently requested that the 
decision be referred to the Grand Chamber. On 5 June 2009 the panel of the Grand Chamber 
adjourned consideration of that request pending the judgment of the Supreme Court in the 
present case. 
847 R v Horncastle, above n 841, 421-422. 
848 Ibid [10]. 
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accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process. In such 
circumstances it is open to the domestic court to decline to follow the 
Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this course. This is 
likely to give the Strasbourg court the opportunity to reconsider the 
particular aspect of the decision that is in issue, so that there takes 
place what may prove to be a valuable dialogue between the 
domestic court and the Strasbourg court. This is such a case.849 
It is clear, then, that Lord Phillips was not suggesting that the Strasbourg case 
law was anything other than clear and constant. Rather, the Supreme Court 
would ‘decline to follow’ (emphasis added) it on the basis that the Strasbourg 
court had not ‘sufficiently appreciate[d] or accommodate[d] particular aspects of 
our domestic process’.850  
 
To speak of ‘following’ implies that to do otherwise would amount to a 
departure. This much is reinforced by the addition of a condition that the court 
‘gives reasons’ for doing so.851  And Lord Phillips did indeed give detailed 
reasons for declining to follow the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  After outlining the 
common law approach to fair trial in some detail, Lord Phillips set out examples 
of hearsay exceptions in other Commonwealth jurisdictions:  
Other established common law jurisdictions, namely Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand have, by both common law and statutory 
development, recognised hearsay evidence as potentially admissible, 
under defined conditions, in circumstances where it is not possible to 
call the witness to give evidence, even where the evidence is critical 
to the prosecution case. … This demonstrates that, under the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
849 Ibid [11]. 
850 Ibid. 
851 Ibid. 
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common law and statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule recognised 
in those jurisdictions there is no rigid rule excluding evidence if it is or 
would be either the ‘sole’ or ‘decisive’ evidence, however those 
words may be understood or applied.852  
The strength of these examples were further supported by a detailed analysis of 
the position in those jurisdictions, prepared by Lord Mance and annexed to the 
judgment. 853  
 
Not all the comparative jurisprudence supported the admission of hearsay 
evidence. It was explained that in the United States, the ‘right under the Sixth 
Amendment “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” has recently 
been interpreted in an absolute sense’; 854  the effect was ‘to exclude any 
“testimonial” evidence whatever in respect of which there has been or can be no 
cross-examination’. 855  But rather than take this as a balance against the 
position taken by the Commonwealth jurisdictions set out in Lord Mance’s 
annex, Lord Phillips used the extremity of the United States to show that the 
Strasbourg Court had not itself gone that far: 
Article 6(3)(d) has not been interpreted by the Strasbourg Court in 
the same way that the US Supreme Court has now interpreted the 
Sixth Amendment. The Strasbourg Court has accepted that there are 
circumstances that justify the admission of statements of witnesses 
who have not been subject to  ‘confrontation’ with the defendant.856  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
852 Ibid [41] (emphasis added). 
853 Ibid Annexe 1. 
854 Ibid [44] (Lord Phillips). 
855 Ibid [45] (Lord Phillips). 
856 Ibid [46] (Lord Phillips). 
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From that basis, Lord Phillips called once more upon the Commonwealth 
jurisprudence to make the argument clear:  
The possibility remains, however, that by propounding the ‘sole or 
decisive test’ the Strasbourg Court has condemned as rendering a 
trial unfair the admission of hearsay evidence in circumstances 
where the legislature and courts of this jurisdiction and of other 
important Commonwealth jurisdictions (Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand) have determined that the evidence can fairly be received. 
This is a startling proposition…857 
It was on this basis that Lord Phillips felt it necessary to embark upon a ‘careful 
analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence’. 858  The detailed analysis of the 
Strasbourg case law incorporated judgments before Al-Khawaja and made 
important distinctions between the approach of civil law and common law 
jurisdictions. Lord Phillips used the example of the French Criminal Procedure, 
referred to by Lord Rodger in an earlier House of Lords decision,859 and spent 
four paragraphs illustrating the differences.860  The conclusion was that the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence in relation to article 6(3)(d) had ‘developed largely in 
cases relating to civil law rather than common law jurisdictions and this [was] 
particularly true of the sole or decisive rule’.861 Further, ‘that case law appears 
to have developed without full consideration of the safeguards against an unfair 
trial that exist under the common law procedure’.862 Thus the Supreme Court 
held that ‘it would not be right for this court to hold that the sole or decisive test !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
857 Ibid (emphasis added). 
858 Ibid. 
859 R (D) v Camberwell Green Youth Court [2005] UKHL 4; [2005] 1 WLR 393, [10] – [11]. 
860 R v Horncastle, above n 841, [59]-[62]. 
861 Ibid [107]. 
862 Ibid. 
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should have been applied rather than the provisions of the 2003 Act, interpreted 
in accordance with their natural meaning’.863 Lord Phillips continued:  
In so concluding I have taken careful account of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. I hope that in due course the Strasbourg court may 
also take account of the reasons that have led me not to apply the 
sole or decisive test in this case.864 
 
On this analysis, the Supreme Court appears to have used the Commonwealth 
jurisprudence as a springboard for (a) taking a robust approach to the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, and (b) declining to follow the Strasbourg Court. 
There are, however, a couple of qualifications to note. As Lord Brown stated, 
the Supreme Court was not faced with a decision of the Grand Chamber in this 
case. It was for that reason that Lord Brown felt able to reject the appellant’s 
argument that the Court should follow the ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg 
jurisprudence,865 (as the House of Lords had done in Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v AF (No 3) when faced with a judgment of the Grand 
Chamber (in A v United Kingdom)).866 Moreover, Lord Brown not only felt that 
‘the court's ruling in Al-Khawaja [was] not as authoritative as a Grand Chamber 
decision’ but that it was also ‘altogether less clear than was the decision in A’.867 
Indeed, the Grand Chamber went on to reconsider Al-Khawaja and accepted 
that the admission of hearsay evidence would not inevitably lead to a breach of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
863 Ibid [108]. 
864 Ibid. 
865 Ibid [120]. 
866 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) [2010] 2 AC 269, A v United 
Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 625, Regina v Horncastle, above n 841, [118]. 
867 R v Horncastle, above n 841, [120]. 
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Article 6 where statements of this kind were used.868 These features make it 
difficult to conclude definitely that the Supreme Court in Horncastle is using 
foreign jurisprudence to support departures from clear and constant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, but it at least provides certain clues. As Dickson has written, it 
now appears possible to predict the situations in which the Supreme Court will 
feel itself bound to follow Strasbourg and where it will be more comfortable 
adopting conclusions at odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence: 
The case law … appears to suggest that there are two situations in 
which the Supreme Court will feel itself bound to follow Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. The first is where there has been a recent decision of 
the Grand Chamber expressly addressing the very point at issue, as 
in AF … The second is where there has been a series of recent 
Chamber decisions, not yet fully endorsed by the Grand Chamber, in 
which the attitude of the European Court to the very point at issue 
has been made clear, as in Pinnock. If the relevant Strasbourg 
decisions are in cases taken against the United Kingdom, they will 
inevitably carry even greater weight. In a case such as Horncastle, 
which falls into neither of the two categories, the Supreme Court can 
persist in adopting a national approach to the point at issue, arguing 
the validity of that approach as authoritatively as it can in the hope 
that if and when the matter later comes before the Grand Chamber 
the national position will be endorsed. This is precisely what occurred 
in the aftermath of Horncastle: when the Grand Chamber re-
examined Al-Khawaja and Tahery it effectively accepted the 
Supreme Court’s criticism of the Chamber’s judgment. … This 
episode is an excellent example … of the much-vaunted ‘judicial 
dialogue’ which is meant to characterize the relationship between the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
868 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 2127. The Grand Chamber 
found no violation of Article 6 in Mr Al-Khawaja’s case, although the safeguards remained 
insufficient to prevent a violation in Mr Tahery’s case. 
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highest courts in domestic legal systems and the European Court in 
Strasbourg.869 
It has been argued here that foreign jurisprudence played an important role in 
the Supreme Court’s mission when ‘arguing the validity of that approach as 
authoritatively as it can’.870 Moreover, the Grand Chamber responded in kind 
when it returned to the issue in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom.871 
Under the heading ‘Relevant comparative law’, 25 paragraphs of the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment are devoted to a review of the position in Scotland, 
Ireland, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Africa, and the 
United States.872  
 
8.4.2 Supporting dissenting judgments 
A slightly different but even more obvious example of using foreign 
jurisprudence to support conclusions is to be found in dissenting judgments. For !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
869 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 59. Dickson makes reference to the judgment in Manchester City Council 
v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, which is part of a long line of Article 8 cases including Qazi v Harrow 
LBC  [2003] UKHL 43; Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council [2006] UKHL 10; Doherty v 
Birmingham County Council [2008] UKHL 57; and the more recently decided Frisby v 
Birmingham County Council [2011] UKSC 8. Space precludes extensive analysis of these 
decisions in this thesis. The position up to Doherty was considered in an early thesis: Helene 
Tyrrell, Strasbourg Jurisprudence in Domestic Courts under the Human Rights Act, Durham 
thesis, Durham University, available at <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/271/> accessed 1 November 
2013. After a period of extended dialogue with the Strasbourg court, Pinnock confirmed that the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on the Article 8 issue was ‘now… unambiguous and consistent’ and 
that it should be followed. The principle that settled Strasbourg jurisprudence should be followed 
was confirmed again by the Court of Appeal in RB v Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWCA 
Civ 1608. For a recent account of judicial reasoning under section 2 HRA 1998 see Helen 
Fenwick, ‘What’s Wrong With S.2 of the Human Rights Act?’  UK Const. L. Blog (9th October 
2012) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/10/09/helen-fenwick-whats-wrong-with-s-2-of-the-
human-rights-act/> accessed 12 February 2013.  
870 Ibid. 
871  Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom (Applications Nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06) 
(2012) 54 EHRR 23. 
872 Ibid [63]-[87]; See also Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court (Oxford University Press 2013), 215 although Dickson erroneously records the number of 
paragraphs devoted to this comparative jurisprudence as 125.  
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example, in HM Treasury v Ahmed foreign jurisprudence appears to have been 
so persuasive that Lord Brown dissented from the majority view. 873 In Ahmed, 
the Supreme Court was required to consider the lawfulness of the Terrorism 
Order 2006 and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 
2006 article 3(1)(b). The Orders had been made by the Treasury under the 
United Nations Act 1946 to give effect to resolutions of the United Nations 
Security Council designed to prevent the financing of acts of terrorism. The 
effect of the Orders was to deprive designated persons of all resources, save 
for basic expenses. The Terrorism Order empowered the Treasury to give a 
direction that an individual was so designated if it had reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the individual ‘is or may be’ a person who committed, attempted 
to commit, participated in or facilitated the commission of acts of terrorism. The 
Al-Qaida Order provided that persons on a list compiled by the sanctions 
committee of the Security Council (the ‘1267 Committee’) were designated 
persons. The questions common to both Orders were: whether the Orders were 
ultra vires the 1946 Act; and whether the Orders were incompatible with the 
Convention rights under the HRA 1998.874  
 
While the Supreme Court held, unanimously, that the Terrorism Order should be 
quashed as ultra vires the 1946 Act, Lord Brown dissented on the conclusion 
that article 3(1)(b) of the Al-Qaida Order must also be quashed as ultra vires.  A 
crucial difference between the dissenting and majority judgments on this point 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
873 HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (No.2) (FC) [2010] UKSC 2; [2010] 2 
AC 534 
874 Ibid [41]. 
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was to do with the principle of legality. Unlike the majority, Lord Brown found it 
difficult to accept that the Al-Qaida Order achieves any more than was 
mandated by the relevant Security Council Regulation. Concluding on this, Lord 
Brown states that it was 
… instructive in this regard to see how certain other Commonwealth 
countries have given effect to these same UNSCRs. Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada all have legislation akin to our 1946 Act.875  
Lord Brown added that  
The way Australia, New Zealand and Canada have dealt with these 
UNSCRs to my mind tends to support the conclusions I have reached 
about the impugned Orders.876 
 
It is interesting to note that where a judge has been inclined to use foreign 
jurisprudence in this way, it is more likely that other members of the court will 
also engage with those sources. Thus when considering the way decisions 
under the listing system administered by the 1267 Committee are dealt with, 
Lord Hope appeared to derive assistance from a number of cases from Canada 
and the United States,877 and the approach adopted by Australia and New 
Zealand was also considered in relation to the principle of legality.878 However 
Lord Hope emphasised the limitations of these sources:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
875 Ibid [199] (Lord Brown). 
876 Ibid [200] (Lord Brown). 
877  Ibid [69]-[71]: Lord Hope cites: Abdelrazik v Canada (Foreign Affairs) 2009 FC 580; 
KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development Inc v Geithner (unreported) 18 August 
2009, US District Ct, Northern Ohio; Diggs v Shultz (1972) 470 F 2d 461 (DC Cir).  
878 Under the principle of legality ‘the court must, where possible, interpret a statute in such a 
way as to avoid encroachment on fundamental rights, sometimes described as constitutional 
rights’. HM Treasury v Ahmed, above n 873, [111]; See also R v Secretary of State for the Home 
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Caution must … be exercised in drawing any firm conclusions from 
these cases. The decision of the courts in Canada and the United 
States were not made under reference to an international human 
rights instrument such as the European Convention.879 
Lord Phillips was equally reluctant to follow their conclusions:  
These decisions fall short of supporting the proposition that the 
principle of legality raises a general presumption against Parliament 
delegating to the executive the power to make regulations that call for 
legislative design.880 
 
In these cases, the impulse to give reasons to an audience is arguably at its 
greatest. Horncastle is a clear example. Because the Supreme Court had 
reached a conclusion at odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, there was a 
greater impulse towards extending the reasons given by way of explanation for 
such a time as when the case was to come under review in Strasbourg. In other 
words, the Court was using foreign jurisprudence in part to defend its 
conclusions to Strasbourg. This theory draws parallels with those that explain 
citations of foreign jurisprudence as part of a pedagogical impulse. Slaughter 
has given the example of ‘the court of a fledgling democracy’ which ‘might look 
to the opinions of courts in older and more established democracies as a way of 
binding its country to this existing community of states’.881 Along these lines, 
Justice Breyer of the US Supreme Court has suggested that said, ‘[f]oreign 
courts refer to our decisions … and if we sometimes refer to their decisions, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Department ex p Pierson [1998] AC 539 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (Lord Hoffman). 
879 HM Treasury v Ahmed, above n 873, [71] (Lord Hope). 
880 Ibid [122] (Lord Phillips). 
881 Anne-Marie Slaughter ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, (1994) 29 University of 
Richmond Law Review 199, 134. 
 300 
references may help those struggling institutions’. 882  When interviewed, 
Baroness Hale thought it unlikely that this was in the forefront of the minds of 
Justices. However, she continued that ‘it may be unconscious’.883 
 
The thesis here is that the Supreme Court does use foreign jurisprudence in 
part to communicate with an audience, but that this is usually a defensive 
mechanism. It continues to be used as part of the general practice of giving 
reasons for a conclusion, which is clearest where the conclusion is likely to be 
controversial or unpopular: 
If you are finding against the Government and a thing about which 
the Government feels strongly, you obviously hope that your 
reasoning will be sufficient to convince them … that is particularly 
because the Government can’t go to Strasbourg. If you are finding 
against the claimant in a human rights case, well you are partly trying 
to convince the claimant but you are also trying to convince 
Strasbourg.884 
 
8.5 Conclusions 
One of the main criticisms made by those who object to the use of foreign 
jurisprudence in domestic courts (and particularly in the United States) is that 
the practice is essentially opportunistic. That is to say, that comparativism is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
882  Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’ (2005) 3(3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 519, 523 (Justice Breyer) 
883 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Baroness Hale of Richmond, above n 774. 
884 Ibid. 
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mainly results-driven:885 judges use that jurisprudence which is likely to support 
their own predetermined conclusions,886  or a means of ‘judicial fig-leafing’, 
designed to obscure the reality of judicial choice.887 Thus some have seen the 
use of foreign jurisprudence as ‘giving yet another way that judges will be able 
to support the political choices that judges anyway wish to make’.888 Along 
these lines, Posner has argued that: 
Judges are likely to cite foreign decisions for the same reason that 
they prefer quoting from a previous decision to stating a position 
anew: They are timid about speaking in their own voices lest they 
make legal justice seem too personal and discontinuous ... Citing 
foreign decisions is probably best understood as an effort, whether or 
not conscious, to further mystify the adjudicative process and 
disguise the political decisions that are the core, though not the 
entirety, of the Supreme Court’s output’.889 
Justice Scalia of the US Supreme Court has described the thought process as:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
885 E.g. Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights jurisprudence 
with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 139-141; Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Taking Account of 
Strasbourg?’ above n 836, 410. See also Justice Antonin Scalia, ‘The Bill of Rights: Confirmation 
of Extent Freedoms or Invitation to Judicial Creation?’ in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth 
(eds) Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing 
2002); James Allan, ‘A Defence of the Status Quo’ in Tom Campbell et al (eds), Protecting 
Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions (Oxford University Press 2003). Cf. Christopher 
McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on 
Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20(4) OJLS 499, 527: ‘One possible explanation is that the use of 
foreign judgments is simply results-driven … [leading to a] suspicion that the selective use of 
foreign judgments is inevitably associated with a rights-expanding agenda. But this would be 
mistaken’; Roger Alford, ‘Four Mistakes in the Debate on ‘Outsourcing Authority’’ (2006) 69 
Albany Law Review 653: ‘[one] mistake in the debate on outsourcing authority is to assume that 
the outcome of constitutional comparativism will be an expansion of individual liberties’. 
886 See text from 8.1, p 271 above. 
887 Richard Posner, 'No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws' Legal Affairs July/Aug 2004 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp accessed 01 
February 2011; Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University 
Press 2006), 7. 
888 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’ in Esin Örücü and 
David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing 2007) 371, 387. 
889 Richard Posner, ‘No thanks, we already have our own laws’, above n 887. 
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I want to do this thing; I have to think of some reason for it. I have to 
write something that—you know, that sounds like a lawyer. I have to 
cite something.890  
In other words, that judges draw from foreign jurisprudence in order to re-assure 
themselves (and their audience) about the merits of their judgment.  
 
In the UK human rights context it is difficult to disagree that foreign 
jurisprudence is used in this instrumental way. However the crucial difference is 
that the practice is not illegitimate. In human rights cases especially, it is 
important that the Supreme Court is able to determine cases according to their 
assessment of the legal settlement in the UK. As Feldman has put it: 
‘comparative study should not lead to attempted mimicry of others, but should 
inform the journey towards a national system which meets our distinctive 
needs’.891 This reflects the optimism shared by many around the passage of the 
HRA, that it would foster a domestic law of human rights, rather than lead 
domestic courts to copy the corpus of Strasbourg jurisprudence into domestic 
law. This much is clear from the disappointment voiced by the architect of the 
HRA. Lord Irvine, the Lord Chancellor at the time of the passing of the HRA 
1998, recently argued that the courts had misinterpreted section 2 of the Act 
and had been taken too deferential an approach to the ECtHR’ case law. 892 He 
continued that the Supreme Court ‘should not abstain from deciding the case for 
themselves simply because it may cause difficulties for the UK on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
890 Norman Dorsen, ‘A conversation between U.S. Supreme Court justices’, above n 882, 531 
(Justice Scalia) 
891 David Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional principles’ [1999] 19(2) LS 
165, 205. 
892 Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’ (Lecture at University 
College of London’s Judicial Institute, 14 December 2011).  
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international law plane’. 893 In fact, Lord Irvine suggested in that speech that it 
was the ‘constitutional duty’ of the Supreme Court’s judges to reject Strasbourg 
decisions that are flawed.894 
 
The well recorded judicial mantra to ‘follow’ or ‘keep pace’ with the ‘clear and 
constant’ Strasbourg jurisprudence is under development. Loyalty to Strasbourg 
case law is no longer a given and there is some evidence that courts are 
approaching the Strasbourg jurisprudence with increasing confidence, willing to 
take a more critical view of those decisions. The interesting and novel 
development is the use of foreign jurisprudence to support departure from the 
otherwise ‘clear and constant’ Strasbourg case law. The two cases discussed in 
the last section, Horncastle and Ahmed provide two such examples. It is also 
worth noting that in both instances the Court was determining issues arising 
under Article 6 of the ECHR. This is partly because Article 6 remains the most 
frequently invoked Convention right.895 It is also, as Dickson has pointed out, 
because Article 6 is ‘one of the Convention’s provisions in respect of which the 
European Court still permits Member States a fairly wide margin of appreciation 
in many contexts’. 896 As a result, Dickson agrees that ‘the UK Supreme Court 
appears to be conscious of this and is therefore prepared to be more assertive 
in this field than in others’:897 
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893 Ibid. 
894 Ibid. 
895 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 226. 
896 Ibid. 
897 Ibid. 
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… [T]here are signs that the Supreme Court Justices may be more 
prepared than their predecessors to ‘stand up’ to the European Court 
on points of domestic law which they feel the judges in Strasbourg do 
not fully understand. Having largely won over the Grand Chamber of 
the European Court during the ‘dialogue’ surrounding the use of 
hearsay evidence in criminal cases (the Horncastle and Al-
Khawaja affair), the Supreme Court may have gained some 
confidence in its ability to trim the sails of the Strasbourg Court.898 
 
The more general conclusion is that the relationship with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is changing. Not only are UK courts increasingly willing to reject 
Strasbourg jurisprudence as determinative of a particular issue, they are willing 
to reject the position adopted by the Strasbourg Court altogether—even where it 
is established by ‘clear and constant’ case law. While English courts may have 
a tendency to follow decisions of the ECtHR, it is crucial that they do so as a 
matter of choice, not obligation.899 This review of the deferential Ullah approach 
finds support in Strasbourg. Although Sir Nicolas Bratza, the then President of 
the ECtHR, felt that clear principles from the Grand Chamber (as in the AF 
case) should generally be followed, he also considered  ‘dialogue through 
judgments’ to be ‘of equal importance’: 900 
Even if it is not bound to accept the view of the national courts in their 
interpretation of Convention rights, it is of untold benefit for the 
Strasbourg Court that we should have those views. … [I]t is right and 
healthy that national courts should continue to feel free to criticise !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
898 Ibid 374. 
899 David Feldman (ed) English Public Law (Oxford University Press 2004) 390. 
900 Nicolas Bratza, ‘The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg’ [2011] European 
Human Rights Law Review 505, 512. 
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Strasbourg judgments where those judgments have applied 
principles which are unclear or inconsistent or where they have 
misunderstood national law or practices. … But I also believe that it 
is important that the superior national courts should, as Lord Phillips 
put it in the Horncastle judgment, on the rare occasions when they 
have concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg Court 
sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of the 
domestic process, ‘decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving 
reasons for adopting this course.’ If, as has happened in the case of 
Al-Khawaja, Strasbourg is given the opportunity to reconsider the 
decision in issue, what takes place may indeed as Lord Phillips put it, 
‘prove to be a valuable dialogue between this court and the 
Strasbourg Court.’ I firmly believe that such dialogue can only serve 
to cement a relationship between the two courts…901 
 
The main issue—often obscured by the section 2 HRA debate—is that the 
prima facie duty of UK domestic courts under the HRA 1998 is to act compatibly 
with the Convention. A duty to ‘take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
can assist with that but is not itself the main objective. For example, it is obvious 
that a lack of relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence would not prevent the courts 
from resolving a case according to the rights set out in the Convention. As Lord 
Kerr has pointed out (extra judicially): 
Where a court of the UK is faced with a claim to a Convention right, it 
seems to me clear that it cannot refuse to examine its viability, simply 
because there is no relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence.902  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
901 Ibid. 
902 Lord Kerr, ‘The modest underworker of Strasbourg?’, Clifford Chance Lecture (London 25 
January 2012) <http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_120125.pdf> accessed 13 
October 2013, 7. 
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Lord Kerr supported this assertion with three reasons, which are worth setting 
out in full:  
There are three reasons for this: the first practical, the second a 
matter of principle and the third the requirement of statute. The 
practical reason is that many claims to Convention rights will have to 
be determined by courts at every level in the United Kingdom without 
the benefit of unequivocal jurisprudence from ECtHR. It is simply not 
a practical option to adopt an attitude of agnosticism just because 
Strasbourg has not yet spoken. The second reason, the reason of 
principle, is elementary. The Human Rights Act gives citizens of this 
country direct access to the rights which the Convention enshrines 
through their enforcement by our courts. It is therefore the duty of 
every court not only to ascertain ‘where the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg court clearly shows that it currently stands’ (which is how 
Lord Hope characterised it in Ambrose); it is also, in my view, the 
court’s duty to resolve the question whether a claim to a Convention 
right is viable where there is no clear current view from Strasbourg to 
be seen. The duty to adjudicate on a claim to a Convention right 
cannot be extinguished or avoided by the fact that the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR has so far failed to supply the answer. The final reason, 
the statutory imperative, is also elementary. Section 6 of the Human 
Rights Act leaves no alternative to courts when called upon to 
adjudicate on claims to a Convention right. This section makes it 
unlawful for a public authority, including a court, to act in a way which 
is incompatible with a Convention right. That statutory obligation, to 
be effective, must carry with it the requirement that the court 
determine if the Convention right has the effect claimed for, whether 
or not Strasbourg has pronounced upon it.903  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
903 Ibid 7-8. 
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It is encouraging that the Supreme Court has been increasingly willing to move 
away from the deferential Ullah type stance and stand up to the Strasbourg 
Court where there are misgivings about the helpfulness of its jurisprudence. The 
jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts may provide an important alternative 
perspective. Certainly, cases like Horncastle demonstrate that the adoption of a 
conclusion at odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence can be supported in this 
way, providing a layer of reasoning to the Court’s judgment which may assist 
the Strasbourg court in its own review. Viewed in this way, the jurisprudence of 
foreign domestic courts is more valuable than has so far been considered. By 
taking those sources into account, the Justices may begin to take a more 
theorised approach to human rights cases, working with the Strasbourg Court in 
human rights cases, rather than under it.  
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9 Conclusions  
The relative lack of attention given to the use of foreign jurisprudence at the UK 
Supreme Court (or in UK domestic courts generally) might give the impression 
that the use of these sources is limited or of little substantive relevance to 
judicial reasoning. The research findings, both from the quantitative data 
analysis of judgments and the qualitative interviews, create a rather different 
picture.  
 
Of the 246 cases handed down by the Supreme Court in the first four years, 
explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence are found in 77, just over 30% of the 
total. The balance is broadly the same whether a case considered a human 
rights issue or not: of the total 246 cases decided by the Supreme Court in the 
time period, 144 do not engage human rights issues and explicit citations of 
foreign jurisprudence can be found in 42 of those, or 29%. The remaining 102 
can be described as human rights cases and explicit citations of foreign 
jurisprudence can be found in 35 of those, or 34%. In other words, the Supreme 
Court is likely to cite a decision of a foreign court in around one in three cases, 
no matter what the subject. The proportion is not insignificant. Yet a close 
analysis of the cases does not reveal clear explanations as to why these 
sources are used: the Justices rarely articulate the reasons for citing foreign 
jurisprudence in their judgments.904  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
904 Also noted in Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms in domestic human rights 
jurisprudence with reference to terrorism cases' [2009] CLJ 118, 140. 
 309 
Since foreign jurisprudence is being used by the Supreme Court in such a 
significant proportion of cases, it is worth considering the contribution that these 
sources make. To that end, this thesis presents findings on when, how and why 
the UK Supreme Court uses foreign jurisprudence, as well as whether the Court 
should be making greater use of it. 
 
9.1 Absence of guiding principles 
The simplest reason for the use of foreign jurisprudence is that the practice is 
nowhere prohibited: the Justices of the Supreme Court (and other judges 
generally) use foreign jurisprudence because they can. It is worth repeating 
Lord Mance’s words, quoted in chapter four: 
When judges look to comparative and international material, they 
may do so for information, inspiration, or confirmation, just as they 
use domestic decisions that are not binding on them…905 
The Supreme Court is therefore free to derive such assistance as it may find 
from foreign jurisprudence, in much the same way that they could derive 
assistance from any other non-binding authority. In fact, there is no guidance on 
using foreign jurisprudence at all. The UK has no provision similar to section 
39(1) of the South African constitution, which provides that the Constitutional 
Court must consider international law and may consider foreign law. While the 
HRA provides that domestic courts ‘must take into account’ the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, the Act is silent on the use of jurisprudence from other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
905 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), 
Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013), 
87-88. 
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jurisdictions. Indeed it was the absence of any guidance that legitimised the use 
of these sources in most cases. As Lord Mance has written, ‘without the 
constraints of a constitution or code, the legal systems of England and Scotland 
have a particular freedom to look to other systems’.906 
 
The lack of clear guiding principles has given rise to some debate about the 
legitimacy of using foreign jurisprudence in the first place. As Cram has 
suggested, resort to foreign jurisprudence has the potential to pose ‘awkward 
questions concerning judicial forays into the policy-making realm of the 
constitution and the erosion of parliamentary sovereignty’.907 However, the risk 
has not so far manifested itself before the UK Supreme Court and it was clear 
from the interviews that the Justices did not themselves consider there to be 
any serious threat on that level. Moreover, it was not found that the Supreme 
Court’s use of foreign jurisprudence supported the most prevalent criticisms 
about the practice. Decorative or ornamental citations, for example, are unlikely. 
In fact, the impression from the interviews was that such uses (of any source) 
were liable to obscure the reasoning of a judgment. Moreover, as explained in 
chapter five, the impression given by some of the Justices interviewed was that 
the Supreme Courts’ judgments should be as concise as possible.908  
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906 Ibid 87. 
907 Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’, above n 904, 125. 
908 E.g. Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, former Justice of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 15 May 2012): ‘English judgments … are 
far too long’; Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford 
University Press 2013), 3-4, commenting on the development of working methods at the 
Supreme Court, in order to ‘operate in a more modern and accessible way’. 
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9.2 The individual approaches of the Justices  
The early hypothesis was that the tendency to use of foreign jurisprudence 
would very likely be related to the background and inclination of individual 
Justices.909 However, the hypotheses about the individual approaches of the 
different Justices were not consistently supported by the quantitative data 
analysis. While some results showed either a greater or lesser likelihood that a 
certain Justice would cite foreign jurisprudence, some Justices that had a 
reputation for their enthusiasm about foreign jurisprudence did not actually 
come out as heavy users of foreign jurisprudence. For example, one surprising 
finding from the data analysis was that there were very few citations of German 
jurisprudence: just five cases—including three human rights cases—cited 
German jurisprudence out of the possible 246 handed down between 2009 and 
2013. Given the reputation that Lord Mance (in particular) has for enthusiasm 
for German law, it was expected that the number would be much greater.910 In 
fact Lord Mance did not cite foreign jurisprudence any more than the average at 
the Supreme Court; explicit citations of foreign jurisprudence were found in 
around 17% of the cases in which Lord Mance had contributed a written 
judgment, while most of the Justices hovered around the 20% mark. For the 
same reason, it was surprising to see that Lord Rodger did not come out as one 
of more frequent users of foreign jurisprudence, with citations of foreign 
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909 A point recognised by other recent works: John Bell, ‘Comparative law in the Supreme Court 
2010-11’ [2012] CJICL 20; Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’ [2011] 
CLJ 420.  
910 It is noted that reference was made jurisprudence from the German Constitutional Court in R 
(on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v The Secretary of State for Transport and 
another [2014] UKSC 3. The judgment was handed down in the days prior to the submission of 
this thesis. 
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jurisprudence in just 15% of his written judgments. Lord Rodger’s enthusiasm 
for using comparative law is well documented, including through recent 
contributions by Lord Mance and Tetyana Nesterchuk (a former judicial 
assistant) in a volume of essays published in Lord Rodger’s memory.911 The 
implication of these results was that that foreign jurisprudence must be used 
more extensively than is possible to tell on the face of the judgments. It was for 
this reason that the interviews were important; if not all uses of foreign 
jurisprudence are attributed in the judgments, research based only on explicit 
citations is not likely to reflect an accurate account of the extent to which foreign 
jurisprudence is used at the Supreme Court, or the reasons for which these 
sources are used.  
 
The interview evidence confirmed the hypothesis that the Justices take 
individualised approaches to the use of foreign jurisprudence.912 As a starting 
point, some Justices were known to have a greater interest in comparative law 
than others. More specifically, some Justices were known to have an interest in 
certain jurisdictions. Aside from Lord Mance’s reputation for interest in German 
law, reference was frequently made to Lord Collins, who was well known for 
using American authority and had access to those databases. Other Justices 
expressed confidence in other languages or frequently engaged with the judges 
from top courts in other countries. The prevalence of citations of foreign !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
911 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’ and Tetyana Nesterchuk, ‘The View from Behind 
the Bench’, in Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory 
of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press 2013).  
912 Similar findings were reported by Mak in 2012 (after the interview period for this study): 
Elaine Mak, ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the Netherlands: 
Explaining the Development of Judicial Practices’ (2012) 8(2) Utrecht Law Review 20, 30. 
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jurisprudence from other common law countries was often explained on this 
basis.  
 
Although many of the Justices agreed that linguistic ability would be a factor in 
the selection of foreign jurisprudence, ability in a foreign language does not 
necessarily correlate with the likelihood that a particular Justice would use 
foreign jurisprudence in the first place. Some of the Justices feel that a more 
significant barrier to using foreign jurisprudence is a practical one. Thus Lord 
Kerr expressed the view that the ‘wealth of material’ that was typically put 
forward to the Court would be more likely to prevent references to foreign 
jurisprudence than a lack of confidence in any given language.913 Lord Walker, 
however, felt that the issue was more likely to be to do with different judgment 
styles in different jurisdictions, 914  in that shorter judgments from civil law 
jurisdictions would not always clearly set out the reasoning.915 Finally, there is a 
more general problem surrounding the research framework involved in finding 
relevant foreign jurisprudence: ‘the main barrier is not knowing where to start on 
the research’.916  
 
An effective time saving measure is to refer to the works of leading academics 
in the relevant field. A good example of academic work being used in this way !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
913 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Justice of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 9 May 2012). Indeed, Lord Kerr pointed out that it 
was always possible to get a translation of a particular judgment.  
914 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, above n 908. 
915 On different legal styles of common and civil law systems, see e.g. Basil Markesinis ‘A Matter 
of Style’ (1994) 110 LQR 607. 
916 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumption, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
(The Supreme Court, London, 28 May 2012). 
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can be drawn from the HJ (Iran) case,917 considered in chapter seven. In that 
case, Lord Dyson did not ‘find it necessary to examine the Australian authorities 
to which [the Supreme Court] were referred’. Instead, it was ‘sufficient’ to refer 
to an academic paper exploring the impact of the troublesome Australian and 
UK jurisprudence. Lord Dyson was satisfied that the paper showed ‘the 
reasoning of the majority judgments is being generally applied in Australia…’.918 
Lord Walker also noted comparative academic work on this point and 
reproduced a lengthy paragraph from the paper to which Lord Dyson referred in 
the judgment.919 The implicit suggestion is that cases which have not been 
digested by academic work are not as likely to be used as those that have. 
Again, this is heavily reliant on the enthusiasm that an individual Justice has for 
reading about the law in foreign jurisdictions or how well stocked their 
bookcases might be.920  The feeling is that some Justices are simply more 
inclined to use foreign jurisprudence than others and take a view as to the 
potential obstacles accordingly. This relationship between the individual 
approach of a Justice and the use of foreign jurisprudence also contributes an 
explanation for decline in the use of foreign jurisprudence between 2011 and 
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917 HJ (Iran) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. 
918 Ibid [112] (Lord Dyson). Citing J Millbank, ‘From discretion to disbelief: recent trends in 
refugee determinations on the basis of sexual orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom’ 
(2009) 13 IJHR 391. 
919 HJ (Iran), ibid [92]. 
920 Lord Reed explained: ‘There is a practical problem about finding foreign jurisprudence. … 
I’ve got … a French textbook on human rights law, which obviously cites French case law. But 
not many people have got foreign textbooks on their shelves’, Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord 
Reed, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (The Supreme Court, London, 8 May 2012). 
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2013;921 Lord Collins, the heaviest user of foreign jurisprudence at the Supreme 
Court, gave just two written judgements in 2011 before retiring.922 
 
9.2.1 Foreign jurisprudence as a heuristic device 
Another clear finding is that different Justices use foreign jurisprudence for 
different reasons. In the main, foreign jurisprudence was explained as a 
heuristic device. That is to say, foreign jurisprudence provides the Justices of 
the Supreme Court with a fresh perspective—an analytical lens—through which 
to reflect on their own reasoning about a problem. This is what appeared to be 
happening in the House of Lords control order cases, MB and AF (No3),923 and 
this is what seemed to drive Lord Collins’ insistence on the consideration of 
American decisions in Jones v Kaney.924 In the latter case, the vast American 
jurisprudence on ‘precisely the same arguments of policy which [had] been 
argued before [the UKSC]’ were, to Lord Collins, of obvious assistance. This 
was despite the fact that the culture relating to expert evidence was different in 
the United States, because ‘the underlying principle is the same’.925 Thus, as 
Bell concluded, the Commonwealth and United States jurisprudence in Jones v 
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921 Explicit citation of at least one foreign decision was found in around 47.6% of human rights 
cases in the 2010-11 judicial year. In 2011-12 the figure was at 34.5% and fell further to 25% in 
2012-13.  
922 Lord Collins cited foreign jurisprudence in 42.9% of his written judgments between 2009-13. 
In 2010, that figure was at its peak, at 63.6%. 
923 Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB [2007] UKHL 46; Secretary of State for the 
Home Department v AF and another [2009] UKHL 28. 
924 Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13. 
925 Ibid [77]. 
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Kaney was cited ‘as a way of checking that no relevant argument had been 
ignored’.926 
 
None of the Justices interviewed felt this use of foreign jurisprudence to be 
problematic, largely because no particular reliance is placed on these materials. 
As Saunders has suggested, the reality is simply that ‘such cases must be 
determined … with or without the insights offered by comparative law’ and ‘in at 
least some such cases, foreign experience can help to elucidate the issues and 
options for their resolution’.927 The purpose served by foreign jurisprudence in 
these circumstances is simply to provide an opportunity for reflection or forms 
‘part of the process of reaching a more fully theorised … agreement’.928 
 
This sort of purpose is important. In the human rights context it is worth 
remembering historically the relative unfamiliarity of UK judges with human 
rights adjudication and with the duties imposed upon them by the HRA 1998. 
For example, prior to the HRA, the balancing exercise required by the qualified 
rights had been the jurisdiction of the supranational court. A positive duty to 
‘take into account’ one particular pool of otherwise persuasive jurisprudence, to 
read domestic law compatibly with an international convention and to declare 
any incompatibilities that could not be so remedied, have all led domestic courts 
to grapple with greater depth and detail on questions previously unfamiliar to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
926 John Bell, ‘Comparative law in the Supreme Court 2010-11’, above n 926, 21. 
927 Cheryl Saunders, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Is There a Problem?’ in 
Jane Holder and Colm O'Cinneide (eds) Current Legal Problems (2006) Vol 59, (Oxford 
University Press 2007), 114. 
928 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’ in Esin Örücü and 
David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart Publishing 2007) 371, 374.  
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the role of the judge. One of the major justifications for comparativism is 
therefore that it can also encourage the domestic court to adopt a more 
theorised approach to human rights. As McCrudden recognised, ‘[e]ven where 
the result of the foreign judicial approach has not been adopted, it has often 
been influential in sharpening the understanding of the court’s view of domestic 
law’.929 ‘Foreign law may perform a cognitive function … the confrontation of 
both legal systems may force some consideration and better understanding of 
the nature of domestic law’.930  
 
However, heuristic uses of foreign jurisprudence are also likely to be the more 
obscure in the judgment. Where foreign jurisprudence is used as part of an 
information gathering exercise, as an analytical lens, yardstick or benchmark 
against which to measure thinking, it is easy to understand the lack of explicit 
citations. This finding also goes some way towards explaining the anomalies in 
the data set discussed above,931 where it was explained that the data collected 
on explicit citation did not show some Supreme Court Justices—known for their 
enthusiasm for comparative law—as heavy users of foreign jurisprudence. This 
finding also addresses one of the main criticisms about the use of foreign 
jurisprudence: that these sources perform mainly a legitimation function. If the 
Justices are not always citing the foreign jurisprudence used, it is difficult to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
929 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of Comparative Law’ in Esin Örücü 
(ed), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National Committee of 
Comparative Law2003) 17; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: 
Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20(4) OJLS 499, 512. 
930 Eg Luc Heuschling, ‘Comparative Law in French Human Rights Cases’ in Esin Örücü (ed), 
Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, above n 638, 44; Rabinder Singh, ‘Interpreting 
Bills of Rights’ [2008] Statute Law Review 82. 
931 Above, text from n 909. 
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conclude that these sources are simply used opportunistically, in order to 
bolster predetermined conclusions. If that were always the case, all references 
to foreign jurisprudence would be explicit and detectable on the face of the 
judgments. 
 
9.2.2 Foreign jurisprudence used for consistency  
The heuristic uses described above are distinct from the ‘gap-filling’ thesis 
offered by much of the literature. That is, that foreign jurisprudence may offer a 
useful perspective where the indigenous jurisprudence is lacking or unsettled. 
While it is fairly clear that counsel tend to approach foreign jurisprudence in this 
way, it was not possible to find clear evidence that the Justices do so. The only 
evidence might be the tendency to review foreign jurisprudence in human rights 
cases where the Strasbourg jurisprudence was unhelpful or non-existent. 
However, even in those instances, other explanations were more realistic. Thus 
the use of American and Canadian jurisprudence in Ambrose v Harris was more 
likely used to bolster the majority’s reluctance to decide the case in a way that 
was perceived to be advancing on the Strasbourg jurisprudence.932 Indeed, it is 
a common feature of judicial reasoning under the HRA that the ECHR must be 
understood and applied uniformly amongst all contracting states. In human 
rights cases engaging Convention issues, considerations of this kind have 
therefore led the court to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence. Since 
the court also relies on the Strasbourg jurisprudence to set out the position of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
932  Ambrose v Harris (Procurator Fiscal, Oban) [2011] UKSC 53; Lord Kerr, ‘The modest 
underworker of Strasbourg?’, Clifford Chance Lecture (London 25 January 2012) 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_120125.pdf> accessed 13 October 2013, 17. 
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the various contracting states, it is not surprising that foreign jurisprudence is 
used less often in cases of this kind. Even where it would be of interest to the 
Supreme Court to review the position of the other states signatory to the 
Convention, it is clear that the Court prefers to accept the results of the 
Strasbourg Court’s research on the point.  
 
The approach is surprising, given the well-recognised problems with the quality 
and consistency of the Strasbourg Court’s decisions. As Amos has written, the 
Strasbourg case law ‘can be unclear, confusing, and admitting of many possible 
interpretations’.933 If consistency and uniformity are the aim, the Court may find 
it necessary to draw assistance from the jurisprudence of foreign domestic 
states as a means to establishing the common position where the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is lacking or unclear. There is some evidence that the Supreme 
Court has approached foreign jurisprudence in this way—the Cadder case 
discussed in chapter seven provides a good example.934 The example indicates 
that although the scope for using foreign jurisprudence is likely to be more 
limited in Convention cases where the case law of the supranational court is 
prioritised, the Supreme Court is willing to make use of those sources where 
they can provide assistance in confirming the conclusions of the Strasbourg 
Court and confirming the consensus on a position. The feeling lingers, however, 
that the very existence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence prevents research into 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
933 Merris Amos ‘The Principle of Comity’ [2009] Yearbook of European Law 503, 525; See also 
Lord Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 MLR 159, 162-164, 
expressing ‘doubts … about the suitability, at least for this country, of having questions of human 
rights determined by an international tribunal made up of judges from many countries’. 
934 Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scotland) [2010] UKSC 43. 
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foreign jurisprudence in the terms that the Court might otherwise have sought to 
undertake. 
 
The influence of the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence is evident when one 
contrasts the approach in those cases with the approach where there is no 
supranational court jurisprudence to refer to. In these cases, foreign 
jurisprudence is important precisely because there is no supranational court to 
provide authoritative guidance on the interpretation of the relevant instrument. It 
is therefore up to the contracting states to work in harmony, balancing the 
interpretation of the instrument according to common developments with a 
measure of self-regulation, so that the courts do not attach a meaning to the 
instrument that was not envisaged by all contracting parties. Far from resorting 
to foreign jurisprudence where there is a dearth of domestic jurisprudence, in 
these cases foreign jurisprudence may appropriately be of equal or greater 
importance than the domestic case-law, irrespective of the nature or absence of 
domestic jurisprudence. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’) provides a useful example.935 As there is no 
supranational body acting as the final arbiter on the interpretation of the 
Refugee Convention, it is not surprising to see citations to foreign cases in 
these judgments. Various examples of this approach were readily discoverable 
in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court as well as the earlier case law from 
the House of Lords. The quantitative analyses of the Supreme Court judgments 
further support the claim. Of the 246 judgments handed down by the Supreme !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
935  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
(entered into force 4 October 1967) 
 321 
Court between the start of its work in October 2009 and the end of the judicial 
year in July 2013, the Refugee Convention was cited in 13 (5% of all the 
Supreme Court’s judgments). Of the 13 cases in which the words ‘Refugee 
Convention’ are found, five concern the interpretation of the Convention’s 
provisions.936 Foreign jurisprudence is cited in each of these five cases. Many of 
the Supreme Court Justices interviewed spoke on the subject in these terms, 
highlighting the importance of consensus in such cases. At times, it was 
suggested that the ‘imperative’ extends so far that judges will be prepared to 
suppress certain hesitations in order to achieve uniformity.  
 
However, it is clear that further complications may arise where there are many 
signatories to a Convention—since it is likely to be more difficult to establish an 
interpretation based on state practice in those circumstances. This is in addition 
to the fact that, despite a shared agreement or a common membership of a 
legal system, a legal order does not necessarily require homogeneity. Moreover 
it is important to distinguish between what countries are doing under the 
Convention and what they are doing as a matter of discretion over and above 
Convention obligations, in order to avoid the well-articulated risks of re-writing 
the instrument.937 As Lord Brown put it in a Refugee Convention case before the 
House of Lords:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
936 R (JS (Sri Lanka)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 15; HJ (Iran) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31; R (ST (Eritrea)) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 12; RT (Zimbabwe) and others v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38; Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2012] UKSC 54. 
937 R (Hoxha) v Special Adjudicator [2005] 1 WLR 1063.  
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It is one thing to invite this House to construe the Convention as a 
living instrument generously and in the light of its underlying 
humanitarian purposes; quite another to urge your Lordships 
effectively to rewrite it.938 
Given the Court’s ability to maintain this awareness and balance in these cases, 
it is not obvious (other than for purely practical reasons) why there is such 
reluctance to engage in research of this kind into the jurisprudence of the 
European member states. Moreover, taking a more proactive approach to the 
ECHR could provide the Court with an opportunity to conduct its own review, 
providing the findings as support for its reasoning where required. After all, the 
use of foreign jurisprudence as reasons for a decision was among the clearest 
explanations given by the Justices interviewed.  
 
9.2.3 Instrumental uses, standing up to Strasbourg 
In keeping with the finding that foreign jurisprudence is most significantly used 
to support reasons for a decision, there is evidence that some Justices of the 
Supreme Court are inclined to use foreign jurisprudence to support conclusions 
that are at odds with the relevant jurisprudence. In other words, the Justices use 
foreign jurisprudence instrumentally, as a tool to legitimate a particular result. It 
is these types of uses that have attracted the most criticism.939 For example, it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
938 Ibid 1088. 
939 Eg Ian Cram, 'Resort to foreign constitutional norms…’ , above n 904, 139-141; Elizabeth 
Wicks, ‘Taking Account of Strasbourg? The British Judiciary’s Approach to Interpreting 
Convention Rights’ [2005] EPL 405, 410. See also Justice Antonin Scalia, ‘The Bill of Rights: 
Confirmation of Extent Freedoms or Invitation to Judicial Creation?’ in Grant Huscroft and Paul 
Rishworth (eds) Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart 
Publishing 2002); James Allan, ‘A Defence of the Status Quo’ in Tom Campbell et al (eds), 
Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and Institutions (Oxford University Press 2003). Cf. 
Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’, above n 929, 527. 
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is often suggested that judges use that jurisprudence which is likely to support 
their own predetermined conclusions or, worst, as a means of ‘fig-leafing’, 
designed to obscure the reality of judicial choice.940  
 
The claims in this thesis are not as expansive. While it is argued that the UK 
Supreme Court does use foreign jurisprudence instrumentally, it is not 
suggested that this instrumentalism is driven by political concerns. Rather, the 
Supreme Court’s instrumentalism is driven by a general desire to give reasons 
for conclusions, especially those that may be unpopular or controversial. This is 
especially important in human rights cases where, for example, the Supreme 
Court has reached a conclusion at odds with the relevant jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court. In this way, foreign jurisprudence may provide a useful tool in 
increasing the confidence of the Supreme Court and encourage it to develop the 
domestic law of human rights, which meets the distinctive needs of the United 
Kingdom.  
 
There is evidence that the Supreme Court is showing greater willingness to 
reject the Strasbourg jurisprudence where it is unhelpful or at odds with the 
constitutional arrangements in the United Kingdom. This is most obvious in 
cases where the Strasbourg jurisprudence has been thought to be out-dated; 
implicit in the construction of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’, 941  is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
940 Richard Posner, 'No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws' Legal Affairs July/Aug 2004 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp accessed 01 
February 2011; Sujit Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University 
Press 2006), 7. 
941 Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 1 [31]. 
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presumption that domestic courts may properly conclude that Convention 
jurisprudence has lost its relevance with age. The decision in Re P is a good 
example of the willingness to construct conclusions on the basis of the way the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence was thought to be developing.942  
 
Another obvious excuse for divergence (also relevant in Re P) is created by the 
operation of the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine, which signifies that there are 
issues on which there is no relevant Strasbourg authority at all.943 It is relatively 
clear that judges are willing to view the matter in this way. A connected 
possibility is related to the nature of the Strasbourg authority itself. Although 
some commentators have argued that Strasbourg’s decisions are so important 
as to be considered as authority even in instances in which they did not ‘argue 
the point through in a coherent and thorough manner’,944 the prevailing attitude 
among the judiciary has been that there is ‘room for dialogue’ where an English 
court ‘considers that the Strasbourg Court has misunderstood or been 
misinformed about some aspect of English law’ and ‘it may wish to give a 
judgment which invites the [Court] to reconsider the question’.945  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
942 In Re P (A Child) (Adoption: Unmarried Couples) [2008] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 173 
943 E.g. Francesca Klug ‘A Bill of Rights: Do we need one or do we already have one?’ [2007] PL 
701, 708. 
944 Ian Loveland ‘Making it up as they go along? The Court of Appeal on same sex spouses and 
succession rights to tenancies’. [2003] PL 222, 233. 
945 R v Lyons (No  3) [2003] 1 AC 976 [46]. A number of judges have recently given lectures that 
have been critical of the Strasbourg Court and its approach to its jurisprudence: Lord Sumption, 
‘The Limits of Law’, 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture (Kuala Lumpur, 20 November 2013); Lord 
Judge, ‘Constitutional Change: Unfinished Business’ (University College London, 4 December 
2013); Lord Justice Laws, ‘The Common Law Constitution’ Hamlyn Lectures 2013, (Lecture 3: 
‘The Common Law and Europe’ (London, 27 November 2013); Jack Straw, ‘Aspects of Law 
Reform: an Insider’s Perspective’, Hamlyn Lectures 2012 (Lecture 2: The Human Rights Act and 
Europe); Baroness Hale ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is the Supreme Court Supreme?’ Nottingham 
Human Rights Lecture 2011 (Nottingham, 1 December 2011); Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British 
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It was argued in chapter eight that this evaluative approach to Strasbourg 
jurisprudence has developed a step further. The Supreme Court has shown 
willingness to reject Strasbourg jurisprudence as determinative of a particular 
issue even in cases where that jurisprudence is clear and constant. This 
represents a departure from the deferential start to the relationship with the 
Strasbourg Court, and the sense that the UK Courts appeared to be acting as 
‘merely agents or delegates of the ECHR and Council of Europe’ of 
Strasbourg.946 Horncastle is the best example of this approach.947 The case is 
illustrative of both the strength attached to the (clear and constant) Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, and of the willingness to depart from it. There is nothing in the 
judgment given by Lord Phillips (giving the judgment of the Court) to suggest 
that the Supreme Court felt that the Strasbourg jurisprudence was not ‘clear and 
constant’. Instead, Lord Phillips acknowledged the argument that the Supreme 
Court ‘should treat the judgment of the Chamber in Al-Khawaja as determinative 
of the success of these appeals’ and responded by providing reasons for 
declining to do so. 948 The Supreme Court would ‘decline to follow’ the relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on the basis that the Strasbourg court had not 
‘sufficiently appreciate[d] or accommodate[d] particular aspects of our domestic 
process’. 949  The reasons for that conclusion relied heavily on foreign 
jurisprudence from the established common law courts. HM Treasury v Ahmed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Interpretation of Convention Rights’, Lecture at University College of London’s Judicial Institute 
(London, 14 December 2011). 
946 Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’, ibid. 
947 R v Horncastle and another [2009] UKSC 14. 
948 Ibid [10]. 
949 Ibid [11]. 
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provided another alternative example, from the perspective of dissenting 
judgments.950  
 
It is important that the Supreme Court is able to determine cases according to 
their assessment of the legal settlement in the UK. As Feldman has put it: 
‘comparative study should not lead to attempted mimicry of others, but should 
inform the journey towards a national system which meets our distinctive 
needs’.951 This reflects the optimism shared by many, that the HRA 1998 would 
foster a domestic law of human rights, rather than copy the corpus of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence into domestic law. Indeed Lord Irvine has recently 
confirmed this to have been the intention at the time of the HRA’s passage 
through Parliament. Lord Irvine made it clear that the Supreme Court ‘should 
not abstain from deciding the case for themselves simply because it may cause 
difficulties for the UK on the international law plane’. 952 In fact, Lord Irvine 
suggested in that speech that it was the Supreme Court’s ‘constitutional duty’ of 
judges to reject Strasbourg decisions that are flawed.953 Lord Kerr lent support 
to this sentiment in a 2011 lecture: 
… if we have been the modest underworker [of Strasbourg], we 
should stop it at once. We should kick the habit. We should stiffen 
our sinews and stride forward confidently. … [E]ven if a case can be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
950 HM Treasury v Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (No.2) (FC) [2010] UKSC 2. 
951 David Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and constitutional principles’ [1999] 19(2) LS 
165, 205. 
952 Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’ (Lecture at University 
College of London’s Judicial Institute, 14 December 2011). 
953 Ibid. 
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made that in the past we were excessively deferential to Strasbourg, 
there are recently clear and vigorous signals that we are no longer.954  
 
 
9.3 Providing a given audience with reasons 
The underlying theme running through the different approaches to foreign 
jurisprudence is that the Justices are, in part, using those sources to 
communicate with an audience. For the most part, this manifests itself as the 
giving of reasons. For example, Justices that appear to cite foreign 
jurisprudence out of courtesy to counsel are also extending reasons for their 
conclusions; if heavy reliance has been place on foreign jurisprudence by 
counsel, it is natural that a Justice might address it when explaining their own 
conclusions in judgment. An extension of that possibility is that Justices are 
simply addressing the cited material as part of their explanation to the parties in 
the decided case.  
 
Similar theories can be applied to the use of foreign jurisprudence in Convention 
cases, where the audience is the Strasbourg Court. This is especially clear 
where the Supreme Court had reached a conclusion at odds with the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. In such cases there is a greater impulse towards the 
giving of reasons in anticipation of such a time as when the case may come 
before the Strasbourg Court for review. In other words, the Court is using 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
954 Lord Kerr, ‘The modest underworker of Strasbourg?’, Clifford Chance Lecture (25 January 
2012) <http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_120125.pdf> accessed 13 October 2013, 
1. 
 328 
foreign jurisprudence in part to defend its conclusions to Strasbourg. This 
communication forms part of what is commonly considered to be a growing 
‘dialogue’ with the Strasbourg Court:955 the jurisprudence of foreign domestic 
courts may provide a useful perspective to the Strasbourg Court in its own 
review. Cases like Horncastle demonstrate that the adoption of a conclusion at 
odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence can be supported in this way, 956 
providing a layer of reasoning to the Court’s judgment, which may assist the 
Strasbourg court in its own review. The then President of the Strasbourg Court 
recognised the value of such dialogue, considering that it could ‘only serve to 
cement a relationship between the two courts’.957  Viewed in this way, the 
jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts is more valuable than has so far been 
considered. By taking those sources into account, the Justices may begin to 
take a more theorised approach to human rights cases, working with the 
Strasbourg Court in human rights cases, rather than under it.  
 
However, this communication is strictly between the Supreme Court and 
supranational courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights. The 
Justices were dismissive in interview about the idea that they would be affected 
in the way they write judgments by the thought of an international audience. 
When citing foreign jurisprudence, the Justices of the Supreme Court do not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
955  E.g. Nicolas Bratza, ‘The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg’ [2011] 
European Human Rights Law Review 505; Merris Amos, ‘The dialogue between United Kingdom 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights’ [2012] 61(3) ICLQ 557; John Spencer, 
'Squarring up to Strasbourg- Horncastle in the Supreme Court' [2010] Archbold Review 6; Lady 
Justice Arden, ‘Peaceful or Problematic? The relationship between national Supreme Courts and 
Supranational courts in Europe’ (2010) 29 (1) Yearbook of European Law 3; Alan Paterson, Final 
Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing 2013),, 222-233. 
956 R v Horncastle, above n 947. 
957 Nicolas Bratza, ‘The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg’, ibid 512. 
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consider themselves to be in conversation with the Justices of other domestic 
courts. Foreign jurisprudence is cited only when helpful for the purposes of the 
instant case. The only obvious exception is where the Court is tasked with the 
interpretation of an international convention or instrument, for which there is no 
supervisory court. In those circumstances the Supreme Court is likely to review 
the foreign jurisprudence not only to learn of any common consensus as to the 
interpretation of the instrument, but also to ensure that it does not leap ahead of 
any international consensus. In doing so, it necessarily contributes to the body 
of jurisprudence that the courts of another contracting state will review in a 
similar case from that jurisdiction. 
 
The popular theories of transjudicial dialogue (a growing tradition of 
international conferences and symposiums, which facilitate a direct exchange of 
ideas between judges and practitioners from all over the world) are not 
supported by this thesis. Any jurisprudence prompted by international meetings 
or conferences is likely to be drawn from a small family of courts, since the 
Justices tend to engage with a small number of jurisdictions, usually in the 
common law tradition. Moreover the significance of these events is limited. It is 
only in very rare cases that such dialogue substantially affects judicial 
reasoning. When it does, it is probably better explained as part of a prior 
willingness to draw from foreign jurisprudence than as a product of judicial 
exchanges per se. Indeed, during the interviews with the Justices of the 
Supreme Court, only two of the Justices attributed any real weight to these 
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meetings. Rarely was an example given where they could recall an instance of 
discussion with other judges having a significant effect on judgments.958  
 
9.4 The effect of changing working methods 
Finally, the research findings have also made obvious certain developments in 
the working methods of the UK’s top court. Most obviously, the decline in the 
use of foreign jurisprudence between 2011 and 2013, mentioned above,959 
could be explained as a product of the change in judgment styles at the 
Supreme Court. One of the most interesting research findings was that the 
Supreme Court is increasingly handing down single or plurality style judgments, 
which in turn appear to yield significantly fewer citations to foreign 
jurisprudence. Of the total 246 cases handed down by the Supreme Court 
between 2009 and 2013, there were 130 with plurality or effectively plurality 
judgments. Interestingly, only 33 of the remainder actually comprised of a full 
set of separate judgments; although the other 83 could not be classified as 
being a plurality or effectively plurality judgment, in each case at least one 
member of the court chose to associate himself (by the expression of 
agreement) with the judgment of another. 
 
This is not altogether surprising, given the greater sense of collegiality at the 
new Supreme Court. For example, Paterson has described the establishment of 
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958 Cf. Penny Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of the Judges (Hart Publishing 
2013), 400: ‘There is a far more intense international interchange of senior judges, in ideas, 
visits, exchanges, conferences and publications than outsiders appreciate’. 
959 Above, text around n 921. 
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‘team-working’ practices under Lord Phillips and Lord Neuberger, as far greater 
than there had been at the House of Lords.960 This sense of collaborative work 
has most obviously manifested itself through changes to the Supreme Court’s 
working methods. As Mak has explained:  
Since October 2009, the judges have been experimenting with a 
system in which one judge writes the lead opinion and the other 
judges on the panel may choose to concur with this judge, to write a 
separate opinion, or to write a dissenting opinion.961   
By changing its working methods in this way, ‘the Court aims to create more 
transparency’.962  The reasoning is that ‘working with majority opinions leads to 
more consistency and gives clearer guidance to the lower courts on how to 
operate in the future’.963  
 
Mak’s own interview evidence ‘indicated that the use of foreign legal materials 
need not be hampered by the increased use of majority opinions’ because ‘an 
individual judge might still choose to write a separate opinion about foreign law 
if this judge is not satisfied with the majority opinion’.964 However, the analysis 
of the data for this research indicates otherwise: the effect of plurality style 
judgments on the use of foreign jurisprudence appears to be fairly significant. 
The proportion of citations to foreign jurisprudence is smallest in plurality type 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
960 Alan Paterson: Final Judgment, above n 955, 141. 
961 Elaine Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law?’ [2011] CLJ 420, 430; Repeated 
in Mak’s most recent publication, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts (Hart Publishing 2013), 130. 
962 Ibid. 
963 Ibid. 
964 Ibid. 
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judgments; greater in cases with more than one written judgment; and greatest 
in cases where a full set of separate judgments were given. 
 
However, despite the general trend towards collective judgments and (it might 
be thought) more collective approaches to judgment writing, the different 
Justices continue to take individualised approaches to judicial reasoning. This is 
because, as Paterson points out, the Supreme Court ‘team’ is a rather unusual 
one.965 Lord Reed explained:   
It is a curious team because the value of the team depends on 
everybody using their own individual intelligence and their own 
experience and so forth and bringing all that to the party…966 
 
 
9.5 Reflections on Judicial Reasoning at the Supreme Court  
When writing in memory of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Mance opened his 
chapter titled ‘foreign laws and foreign languages’ with the following caption 
from Thomas Mann, Josef und seine Brüder:  
Denn nur durch Vergleichung unterscheidet man sich und erfährt, 
was man ist, un ganz zu weden, der man sein soll (‘For only by 
comparing yourself with others do you learn what you are, in order to 
realise your full potential’).967 
The quote captures some of the most important research findings presented in 
this thesis. The first of these is the most obvious: since there are no rules !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
965 Alan Paterson: Final Judgment, above n 955, 141. 
966 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, conducted by Alan Paterson, Ibid. 
967 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’, above n 911, 85. 
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governing the use of foreign jurisprudence in the UK, the Supreme Court has 
been willing to use comparative sources where it is thought to shed light on an 
issue or provide a useful benchmark (or ‘yardstick’) against which to measure 
domestic law. The discretionary nature of these sources means that individual 
judicial attitudes and approaches play a large part in their use.  
 
These findings also shed light on judicial reasoning in human rights cases more 
broadly and judicial reasoning at the UK Supreme Court more generally. The 
willingness to use foreign jurisprudence heuristically, as an analytical lens or 
yardstick against which to measure a judge’s own reasoning, hints at the 
attempt to ensure that the Court is not looking at matters in ‘too parochial a 
way’.968 In this regard, the Supreme Court is not very different from other top 
courts around the world, increasingly ready to accept the protection of human 
rights and the balance of constitutional powers as part of their role. Similar 
themes of cooperation with other top courts permeate the explanations about 
using foreign jurisprudence to identify and maintain consistency with the 
evolving international consensus. Finally, the support to be derived from foreign 
jurisprudence where the Supreme Court is seeking to adopt a conclusion at 
odds with the otherwise relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence demonstrates a 
greater confidence on the part of the UK’s top court than was previously evident 
at the House of Lords.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
968 Interview with The Rt. Hon. Lord Reed, above n 920. This approach to foreign jurisprudence 
is likely to reflect the Court’s use of other persuasive sources more generally, although a fuller 
study would be required for confirmation.  
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This is not a claim that the Supreme Court is evolving into a quasi-constitutional 
court; the Court continues to lack any power to find statutes incompatible with 
the constitution.969 Early in the life of the Supreme Court, Malleson accepted 
that it may never be a full constitutional court but argued that the Supreme 
Court did nevertheless have an ‘expanding role’ which was ‘rooted in continuity 
rather than radical change’. 970  Moreover it was the continuity that would 
‘facilitate rather than inhibit its development into a more powerful judicial 
body’.971 The research findings set out in this thesis support that conclusion.   
 
The use of foreign jurisprudence is not a new phenomenon. When referring to 
these non-binding sources, the Justices of the UK Supreme Court are simply 
continuing a long established tradition from the development of the common 
law. For example, it is not difficult to understand the tendency to make reference 
to foreign jurisprudence for the purpose of identifying international consensus 
as being closely connected to the impulse to compare with past precedents, 
rationalised on a ‘like for like’ type of reasoning. Neither did the Human Rights 
Act effect any change to the legitimacy of references to foreign jurisprudence. 
The initial tendency to defer to the Strasbourg jurisprudence was in part derived 
from the duty in section 2 of the Act, to ‘take into account’ those decisions, but 
the use of foreign jurisprudence is nowhere prohibited.972  Indeed, it is the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
969  Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland (eds), Constitutional Courts: A Comparative 
Study (Simmonds and Hill 2009) 3; Kate Malleson, ‘The Evolving Role of the Supreme Court’ 
[2011] Public Law 754, 757. 
970 Kate Malleson, ‘The Evolving Role of the Supreme Court’, ibid 764. 
971 Ibid.  
972 Jane Wright, ‘Interpreting Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998: towards an indigenous 
jurisprudence of human rights’ [2009] PL 595, 614-615. 
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continued use of foreign jurisprudence that has provided the opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to reconsider the scope of the section 2 duty. It is not 
insignificant that the willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to depart from 
the clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence as in Horncastle was heavily 
supported by references to relevant foreign jurisprudence.973  
 
These findings also speak to the characteristics of the new Supreme Court. 
While the Court might be described as more collegiate than the House of Lords, 
and plurality style judgments are common, it does not follow that the Justices 
are becoming homogenous. One of the clearest conclusions to be drawn from 
the varied explanations about the value of foreign jurisprudence and the 
methods through which they are used, is that the Justices continue to take 
individualised approaches to judicial reasoning.974 The result is that the value to 
be drawn from foreign jurisprudence is heavily reliant on the individual skills and 
interests of the Justices. This much is clear from the practical barriers to these 
sources, leading the Court to rely on the introduction of foreign jurisprudence by 
counsel or academic texts.975 As Bobek explains: 
On the whole … the judicial as well as extra-judicial pronouncements 
of the senior English judiciary on the use and the utility of 
comparative law for the decision-making of an English judge are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
973 Horncastle, above n 947. 
974 See also Elaine Mak, ‘Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the 
Netherlands: Explaining the Development of Judicial Practices’ (2012) 8(2) Utrecht Law Review 
20, 30. 
975 Similarly, Bobek has recently concluded that the limits on (persuasive) authority and citation 
in English courts are of ‘functional, not political origin’. ‘An open system, such as the English one, 
might gradually become overburdened … with the amount of available materials, internal as well 
as external. Anything might be cited—too much becomes cited, if the technology permits. 
Michael Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University Press 
2013), 79.  
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rather positive. The occasional moderate sceptical voices are 
concerned with ‘how can we do it’ in terms of (linguistic) competence, 
time, costs, and resources, pointing out the difficulty an English judge 
faces when trying to understand the particularities of a foreign 
system of law. There are, however, no rejections, certainly not 
outright, of comparative inspiration qua persuasive authority in 
courts.976 
 
If, as has been argued here, foreign jurisprudence can provide useful and 
significant contributions to judicial reasoning at the UKSC, it will be important 
that consideration is given to improving access to these sources. Recognising 
the value that Lord Rodger had added in this respect, Lord Mance recently 
wrote: 
Too often in the highest court, issues arise which one feels must 
have been considered in other major legal systems. Too often, 
difficulties of obtaining appropriate information or an appropriate 
interlocutor to explore or explain a foreign system stand in the way of 
cross-fertilization of this sort. Lord Rodger’s knowledge and 
experience straddled different legal systems and was, in that respect, 
unique. His departure invites the thought that the Supreme Court 
should itself aim to acquire a comparative legal and linguistic 
expertise …977 
 
Foreign jurisprudence remains a persuasive rather than binding source, but the 
opportunity to be persuaded is a valuable one. Unlike the US Supreme Court, 
where the debates about the legitimacy of citations to foreign jurisprudence are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
976 Michael Bobek, ibid 83. 
977 Lord Mance, ‘Foreign Laws and Languages’, above n 911, 96-97. 
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most polarised, the UK court is not a constitutional court. Rather than searching 
for compatibility with a domestic constitutional text, the UKSC’s primary task in 
human rights cases is to ensure compatibility with international instruments—
the ECHR in particular. It is this novel task that led UK courts to adopt a 
deferential stance towards the Strasbourg jurisprudence in the early years of the 
HRA. It is also for this reason that the jurisprudence of other foreign domestic 
courts remains important. It is worth remembering that the prevailing fear about 
judicial comparitivism in other jurisdictions has been that it provides an 
opportunity for judges to obscure the reality of judicial choice. The chief risk is 
that comparitivism might import foreign standards that were not intended or 
anticipated by the domestic legislature. In the UK the situation is reversed. The 
prevailing fear is that the provisions of a domestic statute—the HRA—are 
responsible for an overly deferential attitude to the European standards. The 
Supreme Court thus has the peculiar task of achieving compatibility with an 
international instrument, without compromising the United Kingdom’s 
sovereignty. In this context, the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts 
provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to measure the Strasbourg 
case law and support departures from it where necessary. Paradoxically, it is 
the jurisprudence of foreign domestic courts that may enable the Supreme 
Court to realise its full potential: to develop the domestic law of human rights 
that many hoped the Human Rights Act would foster.  
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Annexe 1: Interview communication and design 
Interview requests 
Dear [judge title and name]  
 
I am a PhD candidate at Queen Mary, University of London, working under the 
supervision of Professor Kate Malleson. My research focuses on the use of 
foreign jurisprudence in UK human rights cases.  
 
I am writing to request a short interview with you to ask your views about the 
use of foreign jurisprudence in the Supreme Court, the status of such 
jurisprudence and the factors and/or methods involved in its use. A central aim 
of my research is to understand how members of the appellate courts approach 
the use of foreign jurisprudence and it would therefore be invaluable to my work 
to hear your perspective on this topic. The interview would last a maximum of 
30 minutes.  
 
If you could spare any time between [interview period], I would be extremely 
grateful. I append a list of my profile and research abstract so that you may 
have a better idea about my personal credentials and research area.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Hélène Tyrrell 
 
 
Requests for permission to use quoted material 
Dear [judge title and name]  
 
I am writing to follow up on an interview that you kindly allowed me to conduct 
with you on [date of interview]. You may remember me: I am a PhD candidate at 
Queen Mary, University of London, working under the supervision of Professor 
Kate Malleson. My research is on the use of foreign jurisprudence in UK human 
rights cases.  
 
At the time of the interview it was agreed that I would write to confirm approval 
for any quotes that I wished to use in my thesis. I re-confirmed this in my thank 
you letter, after the interview. I am now writing to make good on this promise 
and to ask for your permission to use the attached quotes in my PhD thesis and 
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future work. I have numbered the quotes and highlighted the words attributed to 
you (transcribed from my recording of the interview) for ease of reference. I 
have also included the paragraphs around the quotes where necessary to give 
an idea of the context in which they are used or the point that I have used them 
to illustrate. Any interview evidence from other judges present in these sections 
has been anonymised, pending permission of those quoted.  
 
Your contributions are an invaluable addition to my thesis but it is not my aim to 
misrepresent or misinterpret any of the interview evidence. Therefore, if there 
are retractions or corrections to be made, please do not hesitate to let me know. 
I also append my (revised) research abstract, to provide context. It has recently 
been confirmed that the examiners for this thesis will be Professor Alan 
Paterson and Professor Ian Cram. I have not included the full draft of the thesis 
but I would be happy to send it (or this document) electronically if it would be 
helpful.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Hélène Tyrrell !!!
Interview questions 
The interviews followed a ‘semi-standardised’ or ‘guided-semistructured’ 
method. What follows is an outline of interview questions commonly put to the 
interviewees but does not account for deviation or elaboration. 
 
Attitude to the use of foreign jurisprudence  
 
1. How relevant do you think that foreign domestic case law is to your work 
as a judge in the Supreme Court and do you perceive that these have 
been of growing relevance? 
 
2. What, for you, is useful about comparative material? 
 
3. How has the Human Rights Act altered the relevancy or use of foreign 
jurisprudence?  
 
4. From your impression, would you say that foreign jurisprudence is more 
or less useful in human rights cases?  
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5. Could you approximate a proportion of cases in which foreign 
jurisprudence is used (cited vs not cited)?    
 
 
Purpose of foreign jurisprudence 
 
6. Why is foreign jurisprudence used?  
 
7. The literature discusses the possibility that judges use comparative 
material to fill ‘gaps’ in the domestic law. Would you agree?  
 
8. There has also been an suggestion that a pedagogical factor is at play. Is 
it ever in your mind that other (foreign) courts will be using your 
judgments and does that alter your judgment at all? 
 
9. Other suggestions might include using foreign jurisprudence as part of a 
legitimation exercise; to bolster a conclusion that the court seeks to 
reach; to reassure the judge; to engage in a ‘transjudicial dialogue’ per 
se. How do these explanations relate to your experience? 
 
10. Is there a preference for citations from some jurisdictions above others?  
 
11. What is the influence of the Judicial Community (regular meetings with 
judges from foreign courts, exchanges)? There has been much 
discussion about a ‘transnational dialogue’ evolving between judges from 
various jurisdictions. Do you feel that this is an accurate analysis? 
 
12. What are the content and consequences of this dialogue, if it exists? 
Does it furnish judges with knowledge that they would otherwise not 
have?  
 
13. Whatever its content, does direct interaction between judges pique 
curiosity about foreign jurisprudence, or encourage greater use of foreign 
jurisprudence, as some scholars have suggested? Or to put it another 
way, if unable to meet, would citation of foreign jurisprudence diminish?  
 
14. If this dialogue does increase citation of foreign jurisprudence – what is 
the importance of it relative to institutional variables, such as judge’s own 
legal training and backgrounds or the support personnel (JAs) who have 
interest / experience of foreign jurisprudence?  
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15. Is it appropriate to consider decisions of other European (domestic) 
courts in human rights cases?  
 
16. How much of a problem is the linguistic barrier? Is this a significant 
hurdle to comparison with countries that do not operate or publish their 
judgments in English? If this did occur with greater frequency, would you 
be tempted to draw from foreign jurisprudence more often?  
 
17. Is greater weight attached to comparative material where the court is 
considering a question that does not fall within the jurisdiction of a 
supranational court? For example, in human rights cases some direction 
is inevitably given from the Strasbourg Court, whereas the Refugee 
Convention (now widely regarded as a human rights instrument although 
it wasn’t necessarily designed as such) has no supranational body. 
Similar instruments would be the Hague Convention, the Warsaw 
Convention an so on.  
 
18. In some cases, comparative material is distinguished even though it is 
not binding. Why do you suppose that it?  
 
 
Working Methods 
 
19. How does comparative law come to your attention? Is it always the case 
that counsel will raise it, or do you actively seek it out? 
 
20. Do you expect Counsel to consider relevant comparative material? 
 
21. How much of your own research do you conduct beyond the material 
given to you by Counsel? What sources would you use to do that? 
 
22. A related question is about the judicial assistants. Do you ask for 
assistance with research for cases? If so, would your judicial assistants 
bring comparative law to your attention, or would you ask them to do a 
search for any relevant foreign jurisprudence? 
 
23. How often would you say that foreign jurisprudence is considered without 
explicit citation in the judgment? Or, to put it another way, do the law 
reports accurately reflect the extent to which foreign jurisprudence is 
used?  
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Annexe 2: Sample data, supporting figures 6-8 
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